Klart Sprog, Klart Sind

… i hvert fald via krak. Vi ledte efter åndssvage bynavne og vi fandt en god del. Mange flere end forventet. Her ses nogle af de gode:

Terminologi

Level

Med levels mener jeg hvad der normalt går under betegnelsen level i forskellige spil. Dette er et slags mål for flere ting: 1) Hvor stærk karakteren er, 2) Hvor meget erfaring karakteren har. Jeg kunne godt bruge et dansk ord som niveau, men jeg holder mig til det engelske term.

RPG

Med RPG mener jeg alle de spil hvor der er en forholdsvis stor fokus på karakterens level. Dette implicerer at man styrer en eller flere karakterer. Eksempel på flere karakterer: Dungeon Siege singleplayer. Eksempler på en karakter: Dungeon Siege multiplayer, WOW, Guild Wars, Diablo 1-2. Samtidig er der i RPGs også en stor fokus på bestemte karakterer. Dette er i kontrast til spil hvor der ikke er stor fokus på enkelte karakterer. Eksempel: Command and Conquer serien.

Levels, verdenen

Det jeg vil diskutere er: Bør levelsne på HNPCs (creeps, Hostile Non-Playable Characters) følge med den spillede karakter eller ej? Bør’et i dette spørgsmål skal forstås i forhold til hvis man vil lave et godt spil.

Ingen sammenhæng mellem den spillede karakters level og HNPCs

Hvis levelsne på HNPCs ikke følger med den spillede karakters, så sker det at de HNPCs hvis level ikke er maks. levelet eller deromkring, vil blive for lette at dræbe når karakteren er blevet maks. level. Dette implicerer at spillet vil blive væsentligt mindre udfordrende i de områder der er bosat med sådanne HNPCs. Dette implicerer videre, at hvis den spillede karakter tog til et sådant område, så ville det blive kedeligt at spille. Dette er en uønsket situation.

Hvis en stor del af verdenen er bosat med ikke-omkring maks. level HNPCs, så er en stor del af verdenen kedelig for spillere hvis karakter er maks. level. Dette er meget uønsket.

Løsning et

En løsning er at sørge for at kun en lille del af verdenen er bosat med ikke-omkring maks. level HNPCs. Dette ses fx i Guild Wars: Factions og Guild Wars: Nightfall. Det modsatte ses i Guild Wars: Prophecies.

Løsning to

En anden løsning er at indbygge en funktion der kan aktiveres af en spiller og som gør at HNPCs i et område stiger i level således, at de igen giver modstand til en karakter i maks. level. Dette kom i Guild Wars i en opdatering efter Nightfall. Denne løsning kræver en slags instancing, hvor en kopi af verdenen er lavet om og en anden ikke er. Ellers ville det ikke være muligt for en lav level karakter at spille området samtidig. Dette ville både forhindre begyndere i at komme forbi et område samt at forhindre spillere i at spille en ny karakter op og komme forbi det område.

Her er der antaget en slags lineær bevægelse igennem verdenen. Hvis der var flere mulige områder per level interval og disse skiftede til at være lavet om til maks. level, så ville det være muligt at spille en karakter op. Dette kunne fx indstilles efter tid.

Et problem er at det kræver en markant større verden hvis der skal være mindst to områder til hvert level interval indtil maks. level. Samtidig kræver det en løsning til hvad der sker hvis man befinder sig i et område som er ved at blive lavet om og det ikke er instanseret. Hvis det blot blev lavet om med det samme, så ville en lav level karakter dø med det samme når de HNPCs han/hun kæmper imod bliver omkring maks. level.

Sammenhæng mellem den spillede karakters level og HNPCs

Hvis levelsne af HNPCs følger med den spillede karakters, så undgår man at spilleren ikke får modstand i områder hvor HNPCs er ikke-omkring maks. level og den spillede karakter er.

Det giver et andet problem, dog, og det er at spilleren mister følelsen af, at hans/hendes karakter bliver stærkere. Dette ville man typisk vurdere ud fra ens evner overfor en konstant som fx et vis type HNPCs. Eksempel på spil hvor HNPCs følger med spilleren: Fallout 3.

Løsning et

En måde at forsøge at give denne fornemmelse alligevel er at tydeligt vise at ens karakter bliver stærkere. Fx tal når man gør skade. Dog skal man således være opmærksom på ikke at øge armor-effekten for meget, da tallene således ikke ville stige i takt med at spillerens karakter stiger i level.

Løsning to

Alternativt kan man også blot lade være med at give spilleren fornemmelsen af, at hans/hendes karakter bliver stærkere. Dette fjerner dog en del af det typiske formål med at spille et RPG spil: Karakterudvikling. Dette kan kompenseres for ved at lægge mere fokus på karakterens udrustning. Spil der har valgt at ignorere denne karakterudviklingsdel: Guild Wars Serien.

Illustration

Her ses en illustration der viser det ovenstående. Jeg er ikke ophavsmanden til dette billede.

Læs Løkke vil hjælpe de dygtigste frem.

Det ser jeg frem til.

Bemærk også denne perle:

»Det er et fremragende forslag, som vi har efterspurgt længe. Vi mener, at hvis man skal behandle mennesker ens, så skal man behandle dem forskelligt«, siger politisk ordfører Henriette Kjær.

Med den generelle form: Hvis man gerne vil opnå x, så skal man gøre en handling der hvis den lykkedes vil opnå ikke-x. Omvendt psykologi? Næppe. Dum udtalelse? Jep!

Og siden, at det er demokratisk politik, så slipper vi ikke for lidt uærlig argumentation:

»Vi har allerede mulighed for differentieret undervisning, så hvis dette i virkeligheden er udtryk for, at statsministeren ønsker mere ulighed, så synes jeg, at han skal sige det direkte. De borgerlige har en gammel drøm om at skille de dårlige børn fra meget tidligt i folkeskolen, hvilket betyder, at mange bliver chanceløse«, siger politisk ordfører Henrik Sass Larsen.

Selv hvis hun havde ret i, at det generelt sker, at når “de borgerlige” (skældsord?) har magten, så falder de dårlige elever fra i skolen, så følger det ikke, at dette var deres hensigt (“drøm”). Dette er uden tvivl sagt for at få dem til at fremstå dårlige/onde/med en ond vilje.

Det har næppe været nogen borgerligs hensigt at opnå dette. Det er hvad man kan kalde for en bikonsekvens af deres handlinger. (Givet, at det sker.)

En ide er at skabe flere valgsfagslignende kurser i uddannelserne. Hvem kunne fx ikke tænke sig at lære Networking i skolen af en kompetent lærer?ⁱ Dette behøver ikke tage et helt år. Hvis det kun er meget dygtige elever der har valgt kurset, så kan farten sættes betydeligt op.

iMan kan jo altid blive nødt til at læse bøger for at lære det. En rigtig god en af slagsen er: ‘Netværk på godt og ondt’ af Klaus Kjøller

Efter at folkene bag PB fik en temmelig hård straf, så er folk så småt begyndt at udtale sig. Politiken har en overskrift med titlen: “Musikere: Piratdommen er rimelig“, og man kikker naturligvis straks for at finde ud af hvilke musikere der er tale om. Men der er slet ikke tale om nogen musikere, blot en jurist fra en musikerforbund. Ingen overraskelse.

Contraries

If one looks in a general dictionary one will not a find a definition of contrary that is philosophically useful.ⁱ

I looked the word up in a philosophical dictionary but that was not satisfied with the provided definition:

A pair of categorical propositions which (provided that we assume existential import) cannot both be true, but can both be false. In the traditional square of opposition, an A proposition and its corresponding E are contraries. Thus, for example:

All cars are green and No cars are green are contraries.ⁱⁱ

The reason why I am not satisfied with the above is that it is too narrow, i.e. that some contraries are not captured by the definition. I’m looking for a more rigorous definition. It seems that I have to create my own.

The problem with the above is that it only works for categorical propositions but contraries are not restricted to categorical propositions. For instance, two scientific theories may be contraries but they are not categorical propositions, or can be composed as a set of categorical propositions.

A more rigorous definition is this:

Two propositions, p and q, are contraries iff they belong to a set of propositions in which at most one proposition is true.

Note that it may be that no propositions in the set is true.

More formally we may define contraries as this:

For all x and for all y and for all z, iff x belongs to z and y belongs to z and at most one proposition in z is true, then x is a contrary of y and y is a contrary of x.

Contradictories

If one looks at the definition of contradictory the situation is better, though I still want to clarify the definition.ⁱⁱⁱ

A contradictory may be defined as this:

Two propositions p and q are contradictory iff p and q belong to a set of propositions where exactly one of the propositions is true.

Note that this is assuming the law of the excluded middle.^iv

More formally we may define contradictories thus:

For all x and for all y and for all z, iff x belongs to z and y belongs to z and exactly one proposition is true in z, then x is a contradiction of y and y is a contradiction of x.

Note also that all contradictories given my two definitions are contraries and that some contraries are contradictories.

idictionary.reference.com/search?q=contrary

iiwww.philosophypages.com/dy/c7.htm#cntrr

iiidictionary.reference.com/search?q=contradictory

iven.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle

politiken.dk/indland/article690595.ece

Og så er det vist også på tide at vi fjerner den lov. Hvis folk har lyst til at bolle deres familie, så lad dem.

Copyright © Norman Swartz 1994
URL www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/blood_sport.htm
This revision: April 9, 1994
Department of Philosophy
Simon Fraser University

These notes may be freely reproduced, in whole or in part, provided the copyright notice and URL (above) are preserved on the copy. Any other reproduction is illegal.

Philosophy as a Blood Sport

Preface

This essay was written for a Festschrift for David Zimmerman, on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday.

Festschriften are, by custom, celebratory in nature. And so I must ask indulgence in my offering this somber, downbeat, essay. I am sure that David will not take it amiss. It is certainly not my desire to rain on David’s parade. Indeed, knowing of his intense sense of fairness, I suspect that he might even agree with some of what I have written. In any event, I have been talking about these matters with several colleagues in the Department over a period of many months, and it is time I put some of this in writing. This Festschrift provides only the occasion. I assure everyone that I had no particular philosophers, save the one faulted in the first paragraph, in mind when I wrote it.

It was back in the spring of 1965. I was a graduate student at Indiana University and the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was holding its annual convention in Chicago. I and a few of my classmates drove from the campus at Bloomington to Chicago for the weekend meetings. At those meetings I witnessed the rudest, the most ill-mannered, performance I have ever seen by a philosopher. Robert Imlay read a paper, “Do I Really Ever Raise My Arm?” G*** B*** was in the audience. Immediately when Imlay had finished speaking, B*** was on his feet, usurping the meeting’s Chair of his scheduled role. B*** fumed: “You have got it all wrong. I am going to tell you what you should have said. Then, when I have said that, I will leave this room because I do not care how you will reply.” Whereupon B*** did just as he announced. He gave an impromptu talk of a few minutes, standing at his place in the audience, and then he turned and strode out of the room. Grover Maxwell, who was chairing the meeting, recovered admirably, and – pretending that none of this had happened at all – said, eloquently, “And now let us begin.”1

To this young graduate student, terribly naive about professional courtesies and mores, the incident was, although incredible, not particularly disturbing. It was titillating; it had a taste of scandale.

But with the perspective acquired over more than twenty-five ensuing years, having been involved both as spectator of, and participant in, numerous further public exchanges between philosophers, I now see that spontaneous piece of theater not as an isolated aberration but, sorrowfully, as only my first exposure to a number of such incidents.

Philosophers, of course, are supposed to be critical. We have trained, and daily refine our skills, at exposing the errors in others’ work. But while the exposing of error is an essential part of the doing of philosophy, it is not all there is to doing philosophy. Far too much of the practice of philosophy, both written and dialogical, has become one-sided: finding what is wrong in someone else’s work and failing to find what is right, useful, and meritorious in that work.

It is revelatory to attend the colloquia of academics and researchers outside of philosophy. The ambience is often, indeed almost invariably, radically different from meetings of philosophers. Philosophers have much to learn from those examples.

I remember when as an undergraduate, a year before I was to switch my career to philosophy, I took a summer job at the General Electric Research Laboratory, a scientific mecca which, at that time at least, was the largest privately funded research lab in the world. Every Friday afternoon there was a visiting researcher scheduled to deliver a talk in the auditorium explaining his latest research.2 These sessions were well-attended and keenly anticipated. The discussions following the talks were animated and exciting. And they were totally unlike much of what I have experienced in philosophy. To the best of my recollection, there was not a single instance at GE of anyone’s ever challenging the speaker on anything said. Instead these sessions were made up entirely of replies of this nature: “I’m working on such-and-such. Do you think I could adopt your techniques for what I am doing?”; or, “I think I can help you with so-and-so aspect of your problem. Let’s get together on this.”; or, “Have you heard of x’s results (/techniques)? I think his results (/techniques) could be useful to you.”; etc.

In other words, the discussions were invariably, and wholly, given over to trying to enhance, and make use of, one another’s work, to a cooperativeness, and selflessness that was natural, easy, and uninhibited. No one tried to ‘score any points’ off anybody else; no one tried to attack any other person’s work.

Since then I have witnessed the same friendly collegiality numerous times among other academics, and by ‘other’ I mean ‘non-philosophers’. Granted there have been occasions when I have seen philosophers behave in a similarly admirable manner. But I have also seen too many occasions when philosophers have ‘gone for the jugular’.

Is the blood lust I am speaking-of the cause of the underrepresentation of women in our profession? Does our very manner – collectively speaking of course, there are many individual exceptions – of doing philosophy repel the gentler, kinder, souls among our students? Have we adopted a collective personality which perpetuates itself by driving away those students who do not share our aggressiveness? These questions are, of course, sociological ones, ones whose answers call upon empirical research, and – as philosophers – we do not much ourselves conduct empirical research. But we must not fall back upon a priori answers.

As a father of a daughter who is pursuing a Ph.D. degree in philosophy, I have been afforded a rare opportunity to see academic philosophers from the outside, through someone else’s eyes. But it is not just, or even especially, Diane’s views which have troubled me. It is, rather, that she has been the catalyst for my seeking to learn from my own students how they view philosophers and, along with that, the contemporary practice of philosophy. Many of my women students, having finally been invited to offer their opinions and to relate their experiences, have been forthcoming. And what stories I have heard.

What so many persons currently practicing philosophy, currently serving as role models and mentors to students, find exhilarating – the cut and thrust of verbal battle – antagonizes, indeed offends, many students. Colloquia are viewed by these students – especially women – as the academic counterparts of courtroom battles. (Is there something of F. Lee Bailey, Louis Nizer, and Melvin Belli in many of us?) My students tell me that there is a palpable feeling of combat in philosophy paper readings and colloquia. And with their having alerted me to it, I, too, have come to sense it. Moreover, certain anecdotal evidence suggests that aggressive challenging of guest speakers’ theses has chilling effects on many of our students. For example, my best student of a year or two ago, a student with a real flair for philosophy, told me that she wanted no part of the hostility she felt at colloquia, and, despite my trying to convince her otherwise, was determined to leave philosophy. So far as I know, she has.3

It is not only in meetings. I find something of the same ruthlessness in many journal articles, and to an even greater extent in the reports that journal referees write about others’ work. I have, in various capacities, had opportunity to read a fair number of referees’ reports. Many of them leave me incredulous. What is there about writing an anonymous report on another’s work that empties the spleen of so many philosophers? Time and again, I have had to edit referees’ reports so as to make them, simply, civil. (Steven Davis, who sees far more referees’ reports than I do, has told me that he, too, finds many of them outrageously hostile.)

I am not remotely suggesting that we not attend to, still less desist from, the uncovering of error in philosophical work. But there are ways of doing this that are humane and honorable, and other ways that are insulting and unseemly. A person’s stature as a philosopher is not diminished by generosity and sensitivity. One thinks, for example, of Carl Hempel. Those who have known him personally (I have not) invariably speak of his kindness, and that humanity reflects in his writings: we look in vain there for a ‘put down’ of other philosophers. In Hempel’s work we see how it is possible to do philosophy extremely well without savagery. (Happily many other names come to mind as well.) But, by and large, or at any rate, to a greater extent than is warranted, philosophy has a vicious streak. If we really care about our profession, we need to reverse its destructive tendencies.

To be sure, what I have expressed here are opinions. You well may disagree with me. But if you are inclined to dismiss what I have written, do try to elicit views from students, not just those who have cast their lot with us, viz. the senior undergraduates and graduates, but from beginning students, most of whom abandon philosophy courses after initial exposure. It is easy to explain the attrition as being due to students’ inability to meet the high standards of the profession. But ought we to be sure that that is the principal reason? Might there be something else which disaffects students? Something not about philosophy itself, so much as about philosophers themselves?

Selected readers’ comments.

Notes

1. Robert Imlay recalls the incident exactly as I do and has provided me with some additional information. It turns out that the meeting was the first time Imlay had ever read a paper in public. To this day, he regards B***’s onslaught as the most traumatic episode of his professional career.
2. This was the early 1960s. I do not recall even one woman as guest speaker that entire summer.
3. There is as well a significant further category of loss. Susan Wendell speaks of this in a note (25/07/92) she wrote me on reading a draft of this paper: “In addition to the consequences you point out, I think that the performance-under-fire aspect of presenting and hearing papers gives our students a false picture of philosophy. After all, a philosophic position is not proven false just because Jane Q. Philosopher can not instantly think of a good rebuttal to a criticism from the audience, nor is Jane thus proven to be a bad philosopher. Unfortunately, uncharitable opinions of precisely these sorts often are fostered in such circumstances. Even what looks to be a devastating criticism is sometimes seen to be smoke-and-mirrors after a few hours of hard thought. Many students, however, come to value the quick and clever point too highly. I have seen too many smart alecks, who have no significant ability to listen, produced by a philosophical education.”

Jeg har længe gået og været utilfreds med undervisningsmaterialet i Danmark. (Med det mener jeg: Hvad der bliver undervist i.) Min utilfredshed kommer fra den store fokus på skønlitteratur og -analyse. Hvad mener dem bestemmer dette helt præcist, at folk lærer ved at foretage en analyse af skønlitteratur? Grundskolens (0-10. kl.) rolle er at formidle de informationer som en enhver dansker bør have, hvilket er præcis derfor, at undervisning på dette niveau er obligatorisk. Hvad er det at de mener, at man får ud af at foretage skønlitteraturanalyser af romaner, noveller og digte?

Etik/moral-svaret

Det bedste svar jeg har kunnet finde indtil videre er dette: Etik. Noget og endda meget fiktion foregår i et miljø der er meget analogt til vores eget. Når man læser en novelle eller roman, så får man således fortalt en historie der kunne være sand. Hvis vi strækker den lidt, så kan det i mindre grad betragtes som en oplevelse; en erfaring. Ud fra denne kan man gennem analyse nå frem til etiske eller moralske pointer, som pga. de fiktive verdeners lighed med den rigtige verden, også gælder i den rigtige verden.

Men hvis det er etik/moral man gerne vil undersøge i, hvorfor “går man så over åen efter vand”? Hvorfor denne omvej når man blot kan undervise direkte i etik? Her kan det indvendes, at den etik der bliver undervist i filosofi er alt for teoretisk; for upraktisk og derfor ikke anvendelig for den almindelige borger, eller er uforståelig for den gennemsnitlige person. Men jeg skrev ikke noget om, at der skulle være tale om teoretisk etik, såsom metaetik. Jeg kan sagtens finde en masse praktisk etik¹ som man kan undervise almindelige mennesker i, og som de kan forstå.

Lære at læse/skrive-svaret

Et andet svar (som kunne være godt i grundskolen) er at folk skal læse et eller andet, når de skal lære at læse og skrive (per imitation). Siden at 1) skønlitteratur er mindre kedeligt for de fleste at læse, så vil flere læse lektier hvis lektien består af skønlitteratur, hvilket er godt, 2) skønlitteratur er lettere at læse end faglitteratur. Men dette svar har også store problemer. Det kan godt ske, at skønlitteratur er en god måde at lære folk at læse på i grundskolen, men hvorfor er der så stadig en enorm fokus på litteraturanalyse på gymnasiet? (Diskuteres i næste afsnit) Desuden er det jo kun i folkeskolens lavere klasser 0-7., at undervisningen fokuserer på, at folk skal lære at læse. Derefter har de lært at læse og så bliver læsnings-svaret meget ringe.

Det kan også spekuleres, at det netop er pga. den store fokus på skønlitteratur i undervisningssystemet, at folk synes det er mindre kedeligt. Hvis folk blev tvunget til at læse faglitteratur, så ville folk måske udvikle en mere nysgerrig holdning overfor viden. Dette ville være meget positivt for landet.

Værre går det når man forsøger at bruge lære at læse/skrive-svaret til at forsvaret undervisning i digte og deslige. Jeg håber sandelig ikke, at de ønsker at nogen seriøst vil begynde at udtrykke sig så kryptisk (og ineffektivt) på en arbejdsplads. Hvis du spurgte din arbejdsgiver, hvad du skal gøre ved et eller andet problem, ville du så foretrække, at han svarede “Tom, tom, tom – saligt tom

er verden for andet end ting”?² Eksemplet overdrevet, men pointen er blot, at klarhed er det man skal bruge i et sådant svar. Der er ikke tid til at sætte sig ned og forsøge at gætte på hvad der blev ment med det. Sproget er funktionelt i praksis og dets opgave er at overføre information mellem personer.

Gymnasiet

På gymnasiet er situationen anderledes. Gymnasiet er ment som et “springbræt” til de reelle uddannelser; gymnasiet er blot en pre-uddannelse der i sig selv er ubrugelig, men som er brugbar for de reelle uddannelser. Siden at de reelle uddannelser er meget forskellige, så har vi også forskellige gymnasier til at være “springbræt” til disse. Eksempelvis bliver flertallet, gætter jeg umiddelbart på, af HTX-elever uddannet inden for noget teknisk efter gymnasiet: Ingeniører, computer-relaterede ting, videnskabsfolk etc. Jeg spørger så hvad disse mennesker skal med skønlitteraturanalyse (og skønlitteratur generelt) til deres fremtidige uddannelser? Intet. Det er ikke relevant for fx en softwareingeniør at læse Herman Bang’s Tine fra slutningen af 1800-tallet³, eller sidde og bruge sin tid på at tolke på grænsen til de uforståelige digte fra modernismen: “Det. Det var det. Så er det begyndt. Det er. Det bliver ved. Bevæger sig. Videre. Bliver til. Bliver til det og det og det. Går videre end det. Bliver andet og mere. Bliver nyt. Noget nyt. Noget stadig mere nyt. Bliver i næste nu så nyt som det nu kan blive. Fører sig frem. Flanerer. Berører, berøres. Indfanger løst materiale. Vokser sig større og større.”⁴

Kulturdannethed-svaret

Dette sidste svar er nok det som mange politikere har i sinde når de udformer deres kulturkanoner og laver danskhedsprøver til indvandre som indeholder en masse spørgsmål om dansk kultur. Det essentielle er, at de ønsker at alle danskere bør kende til en eller anden samling af skønlitteratur. Men hvilken mulig begrundelse kunne de dog have for en sådan holdning? Det kan ikke blot være, at de godt kan lide den omtalte litteratur selv. Hvis det var deres begrundelse, så ville de træffe valget om hvad for noget kultur der er vigtigt for folk. Dette har de ingen rettighed til.

Det kan heller ikke være, at det er det kultur der var været stort i Danmarks historie, for det ville være at sige, at hvis noget har været populært, så bør det blive ved med at være populært. En sådan holdning er meget farlig, da nogle ting måske ikke burde have været populære til at starte med. Dette er i øvrigt analogt til hvordan traditioner virker: Man gør noget, fordi at man har gjort det før.

Hvad med, at lade folk selv bestemme hvad for noget skønlitteratur de bedst kan lide? Folk er forskellige, og jeg har i hvert fald næsten aldrig kunne lide det skønlitteratur “jeg har læst” i skolesystemet; som jeg er blevet påduttet at læse.

Hvad skal vi så med tiden?

Lad os antage, at kritikken ovenfor holder, og at vi derfor skal finde noget nyt at smide ind i skemaerne. Der er også den mulighed, at vi blot kan lade være med at have den undervisning der plejer at være i skønlitteratur relaterede ting. På den måde får folk mere fritid og man kunne tilmed skære lidt ned på SU’en pga. et reduceret timeantal.

Alternativt kunne man undervise i noget andet som folk har brug for i stor stil og som ikke godt kan læres i grundskolen eller som er relevant for de mest sandsynlige fremtidige rigtige uddannelser for det gymnasium. (Disse kan findes ud fra statistikker.)

En god kandidat til noget avanceret (kan ikke læres godt i grundskolen pga. for lav alder) er logik og ræsonnering. Hos befolkningen eksisterer der den meget farlige holdning, at at tænke korrekt er noget man kan fra naturens side og man som sådan ikke har brug for at lære. Dette er fuldstændig forkert og netop pga. dette, så er verden fyldt med fejlslutninger.⁵

1Peter Singer’s bog Practical Ethics er en ide. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_ethics, se også en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Applied_ethics anvendt etik som det ca. kan oversættes til.

2www.da-net.dk/60erneNoter.htm

3www.e-poke.dk/bang_tine.asp – 1889

4www.litteratursiden.dk/temaer/inger-christensens-60er-digt-det

5Se dette glimrende citat af Jon Espersen som er på omslaget til hans lærebog i logik Logi og Argumenter: deleet.dk/2008/03/14/citat-fra-logik-og-argumenter/ Bogen kan hentes her: deleet.dk/2008/09/03/logik-og-argumenter-torrent/

I’ve heard that claim, but do you think it is true? I don’t.
All LPoEs (Logical Problem of Evil’s) can be seen as an inconsistent set of propositions. Here’s a really simple version:

Simple LPoE:
1. God is all-good.
2. God is all-powerful.
3. God is all-knowledgeable.
4. If god is all-good, all-powerful and all-knowledgeable, then there is no evil.
5. There is evil.

The above set of propositions is inconsistent, i.e. they cannot all be true; it is impossible that they are all true. But from the fact that a set of propositions cannot be true, it does not follow that any one of them are impossible.

It does not follow either, that if all but one of them are true, then the last is necessarily false; impossibly true. That would be to commit a modal scope fallacy. What does follow from all but one of them being true is that the last one is false. So, there is a confusion between:

1. If all but one of the propositions in an inconsistent set are true, then the last proposition is necessarily false.

2. Necessarily, if all but one of the propositions in an inconsistent set are true, then the last proposition is false.

So, given the above I don’t know why someone thinks that a sound LPoE establishes that god is impossible. For that to work, one would need to establish that evil is necessarily and I don’t think that is feasible. After all, if evil is necessarily, it is not god’s fault that there is evil, is it?