New paper out: The personal Jensen coefficient does not predict grades beyond its association with g

Found null results for a proposed metric (actually two). In the spirit of publishing failed ideas, I wrote this up.

Abstract

General intelligence (g) is known to predict grades at all educational levels. A Jensen coefficient is the correlation of subtests’ g-loadings with a vector of interest. I hypothesized that the personal Jensen coefficient from the subjects’ subtest scores might predict grade point average beyond g. I used an open dataset to test this. The results showed that it does not seem to have predictive power beyond g (partial correlation = -.02). I found the same result when using a similar metric suggested by Davide Piffer.

openpsych.net/ODP/2014/10/the-personal-jensen-coefficient-does-not-predict-grades-beyond-its-association-with-g/

Meisenberg’s new book chapter on intelligence, economics and other stuff

G.M. IQ & Economic growth

I noted down some comments while reading it.

In Table 1, Dominican birth cohort is reversed.

 

“0.70 and 0.80 in world-wide country samples. Figure 1 gives an impression of

this relationship.”

 

Figure 1 shows regional IQs, not GDP relationships.

“We still depend on these descriptive methods of quantitative genetics because

only a small proportion of individual variation in general intelligence and

school achievement can be explained by known genetic polymorphisms (e.g.,

Piffer, 2013a,b; Rietveld et al, 2013).”

 

We don’t. Modern BG studies can confirm A^2 estimates directly from the genes.

E.g.:

Davies, G., Tenesa, A., Payton, A., Yang, J., Harris, S. E., Liewald, D., … & Deary, I. J. (2011). Genome-wide association studies establish that human intelligence is highly heritable and polygenic. Molecular psychiatry, 16(10), 996-1005.

Marioni, R. E., Davies, G., Hayward, C., Liewald, D., Kerr, S. M., Campbell, A., … & Deary, I. J. (2014). Molecular genetic contributions to socioeconomic status and intelligence. Intelligence, 44, 26-32.

Results are fairly low tho, in the 20’s, presumably due to non-additive heritability and rarer genes.

 

“Even in modern societies, the heritability of

intelligence tends to be higher for children from higher socioeconomic status

(SES) families (Turkheimer et al, 2003; cf. Nagoshi and Johnson, 2005; van

der Sluis et al, 2008). Where this is observed, most likely environmental

conditions are of similar high quality for most high-SES children but are more

variable for low-SES children. “

 

Or maybe not. There are also big studies that don’t find this interaction effect. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heritability_of_IQ#Heritability_and_socioeconomic_status

 

“Schooling has

only a marginal effect on growth when intelligence is included, consistent with

earlier results by Weede & Kämpf (2002) and Ram (2007).”

In the regression model of all countries, schooling has a larger beta than IQ does (.158 and .125). But these appear to be unstandardized values, so they are not readily comparable.

“Also, earlier studies that took account of

earnings and cognitive test scores of migrants in the host country or IQs in

wealthy oil countries have concluded that there is a substantial causal effect of

IQ on earnings and productivity (Christainsen, 2013; Jones & Schneider,

2010)”

 

National IQs were also found to predict migrant income, as well as most other socioeconomic traits, in Denmark and Norway (and Finland and the Netherland).

Kirkegaard, E. O. W. (2014). Crime, income, educational attainment and employment among immigrant groups in Norway and Finland. Open Differential Psychology.

Kirkegaard, E. O. W., & Fuerst, J. (2014). Educational attainment, income, use of social benefits, crime rate and the general socioeconomic factor among 71 immigrant groups in Denmark. Open Differential Psychology.

 

 

Figures 3 A-C are of too low quality.

 

 

“Allocation of capital resources has been an

element of classical growth theory (Solow, 1956). Human capital theory

emphasizes that individuals with higher intelligence tend to have lower

impulsivity and lower time preference (Shamosh & Gray, 2008). This is

predicted to lead to higher savings rates and greater resource allocation to

investment relative to consumption in countries with higher average

intelligence.”

 

Time preference data for 45 countries are given by:

Wang, M., Rieger, M. O., & Hens, T. (2011). How time preferences differ: evidence from 45 countries.

They are in the megadataset from version 1.7f

Correlations among some variables of interest:

r
             SlowTimePref Income.in.DK Income.in.NO   IQ lgGDP
SlowTimePref         1.00         0.45         0.48 0.57  0.64
Income.in.DK         0.45         1.00         0.89 0.55  0.59
Income.in.NO         0.48         0.89         1.00 0.65  0.66
IQ                   0.57         0.55         0.65 1.00  0.72
lgGDP                0.64         0.59         0.66 0.72  1.00

n
             SlowTimePref Income.in.DK Income.in.NO  IQ lgGDP
SlowTimePref          273           32           12  45    40
Income.in.DK           32          273           20  68    58
Income.in.NO           12           20          273  23    20
IQ                     45           68           23 273   169
lgGDP                  40           58           20 169   273

So time prefs predict income in DK and NO only slightly worse than national IQs or lgGDP.

 

 

“Another possible mediator of intelligence effects that is difficult to

measure at the country level is the willingness and ability to cooperate. A

review by Jones (2008) shows that cooperativeness, measured in the Prisoner‟s

dilemma game, is positively related to intelligence. This correlate of

intelligence may explain some of the relationship of intelligence with

governance. Other likely mediators of the intelligence effect include less red

tape and restrictions on economic activities (“economic freedom”), higher

savings and/or investment, and technology adoption in developing countries.”

 

There are data for IQ and trust too. Presumably trust is closely related to willingness to cooperate.

Carl, N. (2014). Does intelligence explain the association between generalized trust and economic development? Intelligence, 47, 83–92. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2014.08.008

 

 

“There is no psychometric evidence for rising intelligence before that time

because IQ tests were introduced only during the first decade of the 20th

century, but literacy rates were rising steadily after the end of the Middle Age

in all European countries for which we have evidence (Mitch, 1992; Stone,

1969), and the number of books printed per capita kept rising (Baten & van

Zanden, 2008).”

 

There’s also age heaping scores which are a crude measure of numeracy. AH scores for 1800 to 1970 are in the megadataset. They have been going up for centuries too just like literacy scores. See:

A’Hearn, B., Baten, J., & Crayen, D. (2009). Quantifying quantitative literacy: Age heaping and the history of human capital. The Journal of Economic History, 69(03), 783–808.

 

 

“Why did this spiral of economic and cognitive growth take off in Europe

rather than somewhere else, and why did it not happen earlier, for example in

classical Athens or the Roman Empire? One part of the answer is that this

process can start only when technologies are already in place to translate rising

economic output into rising intelligence. The minimal requirements are a

writing system that is simple enough to be learned by everyone without undue

effort, and a means to produce and disseminate written materials: paper, and

the printing press. The first requirement had been present in Europe and the

Middle East (but not China) since antiquity, and the second was in place in

Europe from the 15thcentury. The Arabs had learned both paper-making and

printing from the Chinese in the 13thcentury (Carter, 1955), but showed little

interest in books. Their civilization was entering into terminal decline at about

that time (Huff, 1993). “

 

Are there no FLynn effects in China? They still have a difficult writing system.

 

“Most important is that Flynn effect gains have been decelerating in recent

years. Recent losses (anti-Flynn effects) were noted in Britain, Denmark,

Norway and Finland. Results for the Scandinavian countries are based on

comprehensive IQ testing of military conscripts aged 18-19. Evidence for

losses among British teenagers is derived from the Raven test (Flynn, 2009)

and Piagetian tests (Shayer & Ginsburg, 2009). These observations suggest

that for cohorts born after about 1980, the Flynn effect is ending or has ended

in many and perhaps most of the economically most advanced countries.

Messages from the United States are mixed, with some studies reporting

continuing gains (Flynn, 2012) and others no change (Beaujean & Osterlind,

2008).”

 

These are confounded with immigration of low-g migrants however. Maybe the FLynn effect is still there, just being masked by dysgenics + low-g immigration.

 

 

“The unsustainability of this situation is obvious. Estimating that one third

of the present IQ differences between countries can be attributed to genetics,

and adding this to the consequences of dysgenic fertility within countries,

leaves us with a genetic decline of between 1 and 2 IQ points per generation

for the entire world population. This decline is still more than offset by Flynn

effects in less developed countries, and the average IQ of the world‟s

population is still rising. This phase of history will end when today‟s

developing countries reach the end of the Flynn effect. “Peak IQ” can

reasonably be expected in cohorts born around the mid-21stcentury. The

assumptions of the peak IQ prediction are that (1) Flynn effects are limited by

genetic endowments, (2) some countries are approaching their genetic limits

already, and others will fiollow, and (3) today‟s patterns of differential fertility

favoring the less intelligent will persist into the foreseeable future. “

 

It is possible that embryo selection for higher g will kick in and change this.

Shulman, C., & Bostrom, N. (2014). Embryo Selection for Cognitive Enhancement: Curiosity or Game-changer? Global Policy, 5(1), 85–92. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12123

 

 

“Fertility differentials between countries lead to replacement migration: the

movement of people from high-fertility countries to low-fertility countries,

with gradual replacement of the native populations in the low-fertility

countries (Coleman, 2002). The economic consequences depend on the

quality of the migrants and their descendants. Educational, cognitive and

economic outcomes of migrants are influenced heavily by prevailing

educational, cognitive and economic levels in the country of origin (Carabaña,

2011; Kirkegaard, 2013; Levels & Dronkers, 2008), and by the selectivity of

migration. Brain drain from poor to prosperous countries is extensive already,

for example among scientists (Franzoni, Scellato & Stephan, 2012; Hunter,

Oswald & Charlton, 2009). “

 

There are quite a few more papers on the spatial transferability hypothesis. I have 5 papers on this alone in ODP: openpsych.net/ODP/tag/country-of-origin/

But there’s also yet unpublished data for crime in Netherlands and more crime data for Norway. Papers based off these data are on their way.

 

Does conscientiousness predict PISA scores at the national level? A cautious meta-analysis

Just a quick write-up before I write up a paper with this for ODP.

Introduction

Altho general cognitive ability (g) has received the most attention by differential psychologists, personality receives a fair share now a days. And just as g has been shown to have great predictive power in large meta-analyses in a variety of contexts (e.g. Gottfredson 1997 is still the best summary IMO), so has the personality trait of conscientiousness (C) (e.g. The Validity of Conscientiousness for Predicting Job Performance A meta-analytic test of two hypotheses A Meta-Analytic Investigation of Conscientiousness in the Prediction of Job Performance Examining the Intercorrelations and the Incremental Validity of Narrow Traits..asp(1) The Case for Conscientiousness Evidence and Implications for a Personality Trait Marker of Health and Longevity).

The ‘new’ thing in differential psych is to study national g estimates and how they correlate. This is the field ive been working mostly in with the spatial transferability hypothesis. The question then is, does C have predictive ability at the national level too? Well, maybe. There are some national estimates of the big five/OCEAN traits in Schmitt et al 2007. I added them to the Megdataset.

 

Partial correlations

The PISA x measured IQ (not the ones where scholastic ability have been factored in!) correlations were also of interest since no one apparently had calculated the mean PISA x measured IQ correlation. Well, it is .92. So, does C explain some of the remaining variance? One idea is to calculate the partial correlations of C and PISA with mIQ partialed out. However, this method seems to be wrong since some of the correlations are above 1! Ive never seen partial correlations above 1 before.

ConscientiousnessMeanSchmittEtAl2007
Math00Mean 1.4828725419
Read00Mean 1.1065080555
Sci00Mean 1.0012991174
Math03Mean 1.0742429148
Read03Mean 1.1147063889
Sci03Mean 1.2609157051
Sci06Mean 0.9137135525
Read06Mean 0.6593605051
Math06Mean 0.3923821506
Read09Mean 0.8607255528
Math09Mean 0.6409903363
Sci09Mean 0.843892485
Finance12Mean 0.3834897092
Math12Mean 0.3682415819
Read12Mean 0.5272534233
Sci12Mean 0.5563931581
CPS12Mean 0.1497008328

 

Multiple regression

So maybe another method is called for. I used multiple regression on all 17 PISA variables. One may be tempted to simply average them, but as Joost de Winter pointed out to me in an email, the PISA for the same year are not independent. So one cannot just count them as independent. One can get around this problem by doing the meta-analysis within test type, i.e. reading, math and science. Results:

Reading:
> IQ.betas.weighted.mean
[1] 0.9631086
> C.betas.weighted.mean
[1] 0.1673834
> sum(samples.sizes)
[1] 166Math:
> IQ.betas.weighted.mean
[1] 0.9621924
> C.betas.weighted.mean
[1] 0.02653771
> sum(samples.sizes)
[1] 167Science:
> IQ.betas.weighted.mean
[1] 0.9826468
> C.betas.weighted.mean
[1] 0.1080092
> sum(samples.sizes)
[1] 167

The results from reading have p=.03, so maybe. In 1-2 years, we will have more data from PISA15 to test with. There are plenty of reasons to be cautious: 1) The measured IQs are not perfectly reliably measured. This means that the true correlation between g and PISA scores is higher, leaving less variance to be explained by non-g factors. Maybe nothing? 2) The quality of the personality data is quite poor. Altho one may counter-argue that this is a reason to be more optimistic since the results (well, reading results) are still plausible.

The R sourcecode for the paper is here. The dataset is here.

What about measured IQ and PISA scores?

#the mean PISA x IQ correlation
DF.C.PISA.IQ.rcorr = rcorr(as.matrix(DF.C.PISA.IQ))
IQ.PISA.cors = DF.C.PISA.IQ.rcorr$r[19,] #get IQ row
IQ.PISA.cors = IQ.PISA.cors[2:18] #remove C and IQ-IQ
mean(IQ.PISA.cors) #the mean measured IQ x PISA correlation
round(IQ.PISA.cors,2)
#weighted mean
IQ.PISA.cors.n = DF.C.PISA.IQ.rcorr$n[19,] #get IQ row
IQ.PISA.cors.n = IQ.PISA.cors.n[2:18] #remove C and IQ-IQ
IQ.PISA.cors.weighted = IQ.PISA.cors*IQ.PISA.cors.n
IQ.PISA.cors.weighted.mean = sum(IQ.PISA.cors.weighted)/sum(IQ.PISA.cors.n)

The unweighted mean is 0.919, the weighted is 0.924.

 

Refs

Schmitt, D. P., Allik, J., McCrae, R. R., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2007). The Geographic Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits: Patterns and Profiles of Human Self-Description Across 56 Nations. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 38(2), 173–212. doi:10.1177/0022022106297299

Appendix – full output from MR

PISA test IQ.betas C.betas samples.sizes
Math00Mean 0.9895461 0.096764646 22
Read00Mean 0.977835 0.297191736 22
Sci00Mean 0.9759363 0.099720868 22
Math03Mean 0.9812832 0.016108517 27
Read03Mean 1.0141552 0.27851122 27
Sci03Mean 1.008251 0.104575077 27
Sci06Mean 0.9796918 0.125369373 38
Read06Mean 0.9346129 0.118300942 37
Math06Mean 0.9455623 0.010964361 38
Read09Mean 0.9596431 0.140295939 39
Math09Mean 0.9628133 0.035653129 39
Sci09Mean 0.977768 0.102601624 39
Finance12Mean 0.5286025 -0.144810379 14
Math12Mean 0.9497653 0.001486034 41
Read12Mean 0.9506026 0.094608558 41
Sci12Mean 0.9767656 0.103772057 41
CPS12Mean 0.8830054 -0.025983714 29

International general factor of personality? yes, but…

I merged the dataset from Schmitt et al (2007)’s paper about OCEAN traits in 56 countries with the rest of the megadataset. Then i extracted the first factor of the OCEAN means and SDs. These two are nearly uncorrelated (.07). As for factor strength, they are not too bad:

> DF.OCEAN.mean.omega
Omega 
Call: omega(m = DF.OCEAN.mean)
Alpha:                 0.73 
G.6:                   0.74 
Omega Hierarchical:    0.54 
Omega H asymptotic:    0.64 
Omega Total            0.84 

Schmid Leiman Factor loadings greater than  0.2 
                                        g   F1*   F2*   F3*   h2   u2   p2
ExtraversionMeanSchmittEtAl2007      0.44        0.66       0.64 0.36 0.30
AgreeablenessMeanSchmittEtAl2007     0.58  0.56             0.66 0.34 0.51
ConscientiousnessMeanSchmittEtAl2007 0.62  0.52             0.66 0.34 0.58
NeuroticismMeanSchmittEtAl2007      -0.66  0.28  0.36 -0.36 0.76 0.24 0.56
OpennessMeanSchmittEtAl2007          0.23        0.21  0.51 0.38 0.62 0.14

With eigenvalues of:
   g  F1*  F2*  F3* 
1.40 0.69 0.62 0.40 

general/max  2.04   max/min =   1.7
mean percent general =  0.42    with sd =  0.19 and cv of  0.46 
Explained Common Variance of the general factor =  0.45

 

and

> DF.OCEAN.SD.omega
Omega 
Call: omega(m = DF.OCEAN.SD)
Alpha:                 0.79 
G.6:                   0.78 
Omega Hierarchical:    0.72 
Omega H asymptotic:    0.86 
Omega Total            0.84 

Schmid Leiman Factor loadings greater than  0.2 
                                      g   F1*   F2*   F3*   h2   u2   p2
ExtraversionSDSchmittEtAl2007      0.80                   0.64 0.36 0.99
AgreeablenessSDSchmittEtAl2007     0.57        0.47       0.55 0.45 0.59
ConscientiousnessSDSchmittEtAl2007 0.57  0.35             0.48 0.52 0.68
NeuroticismSDSchmittEtAl2007       0.78  0.52             0.87 0.13 0.69
OpennessSDSchmittEtAl2007          0.43        0.24       0.25 0.75 0.74

With eigenvalues of:
   g  F1*  F2*  F3* 
2.08 0.41 0.31 0.00 

general/max  5.09   max/min =   136.11
mean percent general =  0.74    with sd =  0.15 and cv of  0.2 
Explained Common Variance of the general factor =  0.74

 

Compare with values in Table 5 in my just published paper. GFP-mean is clearly weaker than g factor at individual level, GFP-SD is about the same.

Dataset
Var% MR
Var% MR SL Omega h. Omega h. a. ECV R2
NO Complete cases 0.68 0.65 0.87 0.91 0.78 0.98
NO Impute 1 0.66 0.62 0.86 0.9 0.74 0.96
NO Impute 2 0.64 0.6 0.85 0.89 0.75 0.95
NO Impute 3 0.63 0.59 0.82 0.87 0.73 0.99
DK complete cases 0.57 0.51 0.83 0.85 0.68 0.99
DK impute 4 0.55 0.51 0.86 0.88 0.73 0.99
Int. S. Factor 0.43 0.35 0.76 0.77 0.51 0.81
Cognitive data 0.33 0.74 0.79 0.57 0.78
Personality data 0.16 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.41

Then i correlated these with national IQ, S factor and local S factors in Norway and Denmark.

> round(cor(DF.OCEAN.general.scores,use="pairwise.complete.obs"),2)
             GFP.mean GFP.SD S.in.Norway S.in.Denmark Islam S.Int    IQ
GFP.mean         1.00   0.07        0.09        -0.25  0.17 -0.21 -0.58
GFP.SD           0.07   1.00        0.39         0.26 -0.14  0.36  0.24
S.in.Norway      0.09   0.39        1.00         0.78 -0.72  0.73  0.60
S.in.Denmark    -0.25   0.26        0.78         1.00 -0.71  0.54  0.54
Islam            0.17  -0.14       -0.72        -0.71  1.00 -0.33 -0.27
S.Int           -0.21   0.36        0.73         0.54 -0.33  1.00  0.86
IQ              -0.58   0.24        0.60         0.54 -0.27  0.86  1.00

So strangely, the correlation of GFP-mean x national IQ is very negative. It correlates weakly with S factors. Let’s try partialing out national IQ:

> DF.OCEAN.general.scores.no.IQ = partial.r(DF.OCEAN.general.scores,c(1:6),7)
> DF.OCEAN.general.scores.no.IQ
partial correlations 
             GFP.mean GFP.SD S.in.Norway S.in.Denmark Islam S.Int
GFP.mean         1.00   0.26        0.68         0.09  0.02  0.72
GFP.SD           0.26   1.00        0.31         0.16 -0.08  0.32
S.in.Norway      0.68   0.31        1.00         0.67 -0.73  0.53
S.in.Denmark     0.09   0.16        0.67         1.00 -0.70  0.19
Islam            0.02  -0.08       -0.73        -0.70  1.00 -0.21
S.Int            0.72   0.32        0.53         0.19 -0.21  1.00

Even more strange. GFP-mean strongly correlates with 2 S factors, but not the one in Denmark. The Danish data are very good (25 variables) and so are the international data (42-54 variables). And all the S factors correlate strongly before partialing (.78, .73, .54) but mixed after removing IQ (.67, .53, .19). Again Denmark is odd. For GFP-SD, it is similar, but weaker (before: .39, .26, .36; after: .31, .16, .32).

What to make of this? So i emailed some colleagues:

Dear [NAMES]

Do you know if someone have looked at an international general factor of personality? Because I did it just now using a dataset of OCEAN trait scores (big five) from Schmitt et al 2007. There is indeed an international GFP in the data. It correlates negatively with national IQs (-.58). Strangely, partialing out national IQs, it correlates highly with general socioeconomic factors in Norway (.68) and internationally (.72), but not in Denmark (.09). Strange? Thoughts? I can send you the data+code if you like.

Regards,
Emil

One of them had insider info:

Emil,

There is a paper about to appear in Intelligence in which an international GFP has been computed and analyzed.

Best,

[NAME].
So i publish this here quickly so i establish priority and independence.

What about OCEAN traits themselves?

(sorry, tables apparently not easy to make smaller)
All correlations:
E mean E SD A mean A SD C mean C SD N mean N SD O mean O SD Mean SD S.NO S.DK Islam Int.S IQ
E mean 1 0.14 0.2 0.22 0.25 0.23 -0.49 0.17 0.27 0.09 0.23 0.06 -0.19 -0.02 0.09 -0.02
E sd 0.14 1 -0.08 0.47 -0.07 0.48 0.13 0.66 0.3 0.34 0.81 0.45 0.35 -0.35 0.53 0.39
A mean 0.2 -0.08 1 0.15 0.65 0.21 -0.48 0.21 0.26 -0.13 0.11 0.08 -0.26 0.26 -0.25 -0.53
A SD 0.22 0.47 0.15 1 0.23 0.43 0 0.45 0.22 0.35 0.71 0.18 0.23 -0.18 0.12 -0.04
C mean 0.25 -0.07 0.65 0.23 1 0.1 -0.57 0.07 0.2 -0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.19 0.14 -0.19 -0.6
C SD 0.23 0.48 0.21 0.43 0.1 1 0.11 0.62 0.41 0.25 0.78 0.34 -0.03 0.04 0.19 0.04
N mean -0.49 0.13 -0.48 0 -0.57 0.11 1 0.22 -0.09 0.25 0.19 -0.1 0.13 -0.06 0.12 0.38
N SD 0.17 0.66 0.21 0.45 0.07 0.62 0.22 1 0.41 0.28 0.83 0.23 0.19 0 0.24 0.18
O mean 0.27 0.3 0.26 0.22 0.2 0.41 -0.09 0.41 1 0.07 0.4 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.06
O sd 0.09 0.34 -0.13 0.35 -0.03 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.07 1 0.56 0.22 0.14 -0.07 0.25 0.37
Mean SD 0.23 0.81 0.11 0.71 0.07 0.78 0.19 0.83 0.4 0.56 1 0.41 0.25 -0.15 0.36 0.25
S.factor.in.Norway 0.06 0.45 0.08 0.18 0.04 0.34 -0.1 0.23 -0.01 0.22 0.41 1 0.78 -0.72 0.73 0.6
S.factor.in.Denmark -0.19 0.35 -0.26 0.23 -0.19 -0.03 0.13 0.19 -0.07 0.14 0.25 0.78 1 -0.71 0.54 0.54
IslamPewResearch2010 -0.02 -0.35 0.26 -0.18 0.14 0.04 -0.06 0 0.04 -0.07 -0.15 -0.72 -0.71 1 -0.33 -0.27
International.S.Factor 0.09 0.53 -0.25 0.12 -0.19 0.19 0.12 0.24 -0.02 0.25 0.36 0.73 0.54 -0.33 1 0.86
LV2012estimatedIQ -0.02 0.39 -0.53 -0.04 -0.6 0.04 0.38 0.18 -0.06 0.37 0.25 0.6 0.54 -0.27 0.86 1
With IQ partialed out:
E mean E sd A mean A SD C mean C SD N mean N SD O mean O SD Mean SD S.NO S.DK Islam Int.S
E mean 1 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.3 0.23 -0.52 0.18 0.27 0.1 0.24 0.09 -0.21 -0.02 0.21
E sd 0.17 1 0.16 0.53 0.22 0.51 -0.02 0.65 0.35 0.23 0.8 0.29 0.18 -0.28 0.42
A mean 0.22 0.16 1 0.15 0.49 0.28 -0.36 0.36 0.27 0.07 0.29 0.58 0.03 0.15 0.48
A SD 0.22 0.53 0.15 1 0.25 0.43 0.02 0.47 0.21 0.4 0.74 0.26 0.3 -0.2 0.3
C mean 0.3 0.22 0.49 0.25 1 0.15 -0.46 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.63 0.2 -0.02 0.82
C SD 0.23 0.51 0.28 0.43 0.15 1 0.1 0.62 0.41 0.26 0.79 0.39 -0.05 0.06 0.31
N mean -0.52 -0.02 -0.36 0.02 -0.46 0.1 1 0.17 -0.07 0.13 0.11 -0.45 -0.1 0.05 -0.44
N SD 0.18 0.65 0.36 0.47 0.23 0.62 0.17 1 0.43 0.23 0.83 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.18
O mean 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.41 -0.07 0.43 1 0.1 0.42 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.06
O sd 0.1 0.23 0.07 0.4 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.23 0.1 1 0.52 0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.14
Mean SD 0.24 0.8 0.29 0.74 0.29 0.79 0.11 0.83 0.42 0.52 1 0.33 0.15 -0.09 0.3
S.factor.in.Norway 0.09 0.29 0.58 0.26 0.63 0.39 -0.45 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.33 1 0.67 -0.73 0.53
S.factor.in.Denmark -0.21 0.18 0.03 0.3 0.2 -0.05 -0.1 0.11 -0.04 -0.07 0.15 0.67 1 -0.7 0.19
IslamPewResearch2010 -0.02 -0.28 0.15 -0.2 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.73 -0.7 1 -0.21
International.S.Factor 0.21 0.42 0.48 0.3 0.82 0.31 -0.44 0.18 0.06 -0.14 0.3 0.53 0.19 -0.21 1
R code (load in the megadataset as DF.mega3 first):
DF.interest = cbind(DF.mega3[2:12],
                    DF.mega3[14],
                    DF.mega3[40],
                    DF.mega3[42],
                    DF.mega3[64],
                    DF.mega3[76])
DF.interest.cor = rcorr(as.matrix(DF.interest))
round(DF.interest.cor$r,2)
write.csv(round(DF.interest.cor$r,2),file="OCEANCors.csv")

#remove IQ
DF.interest.cor.without.IQ = partial.r(DF.interest, c(1:15),16)
write.csv(round(DF.interest.cor.without.IQ,2), file="OCEANCors_no_g.csv")

DF.OCEAN.full = cbind(DF.mega3[2:12])
DF.OCEAN.full.omega = omega(DF.OCEAN.full)
DF.OCEAN.full.mr = fa(DF.OCEAN.full)

DF.OCEAN.mean = cbind(DF.mega3[c(2,4,6,8,10)])
DF.OCEAN.mean.omega = omega(DF.OCEAN.mean)
DF.OCEAN.mean.mr = fa(DF.OCEAN.mean)

DF.OCEAN.SD = cbind(DF.mega3[c(3,5,7,9,11)])
DF.OCEAN.SD.omega = omega(DF.OCEAN.SD)
DF.OCEAN.SD.mr = fa(DF.OCEAN.SD)

DF.OCEAN.general.scores = cbind(DF.OCEAN.mean.mr$scores,DF.OCEAN.SD.mr$scores,
                                DF.mega3[14],DF.mega3[40],DF.mega3[42],DF.mega3[64],DF.mega3[76])
colnames(DF.OCEAN.general.scores) = c("GFP.mean","GFP.SD","S.in.Norway","S.in.Denmark","Islam","S.Int","IQ")
round(cor(DF.OCEAN.general.scores,use="pairwise.complete.obs"),2)
DF.OCEAN.general.scores.no.IQ = partial.r(DF.OCEAN.general.scores,c(1:6),7)

Megadataset is in the OSF repository, version 1.6b.

New paper out: Crime, income, educational attainment and employment among immigrant groups in Norway and Finland

openpsych.net/ODP/2014/10/crime-income-educational-attainment-and-employment-among-immigrant-groups-in-norway-and-finland/

Abstract

I present new predictive analyses for crime, income, educational attainment and employment among immigrant groups in Norway and crime in Finland. Furthermore I show that the Norwegian data contains a strong general socioeconomic factor (S) which is highly predictable from country-level variables (National IQ .59, Islam prevalence -.71, international general socioeconomic factor .72, GDP .55), and correlates highly (.78) with the analogous factor among immigrant groups in Denmark. Analyses of the prediction vectors show very high correlations (generally ±.9) between predictors which means that the same variables are relatively well or weakly predicted no matter which predictor is used. Using the method of correlated vectors shows that it is the underlying S factor that drives the associations between predictors and socioeconomic traits, not the remaining variance (all correlations near unity).

All data and source files are at the OSF repository: osf.io/emfag/

Causal effect of education on IQ scores using the discordant twin design?

Recently, the twin-control design has been used to test causal models (e.g. exercise→happiness, exercise→¬depression/anxiety symptoms, casual sex→depression/suicidal thoughts). The theory is simple. Suppose we do a standard cross-sectional design study and find that X and Y are correlated. Suppose we suspect that X causes Y. Then, if X causes Y, then one would expect to see a relationship within identical twin pairs for X and Y. If the correlation between X and Y is due to shared genetics, then it will not be correlated within identical twin pairs (baring any de novo mutation being responsible for it). If it is found to be correlated within identical twins, then the education model may be true but also some developmental models relying on non-education environmentally caused differences as well as de novo mutation genetic models.

Did anyone do a study like this? I haven’t seen it, but it is quite simple to do. The only thing needed is a dataset with identical twins, educational attainment/years in school and some g proxy. Maybe NLSY? If you know of a dataset, contact me and we will try.

Review: Dataclysm: Who We Are (When We Think No One’s Looking) (Christian Rudder)

www.goodreads.com/book/show/21480734-dataclysm

gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=9d2c0744b6bcce6ec9e67625125244a8

This good is based on the popular but discontinued OKTrends blog, but now apparently active again becus of the book release. There is some more info in the book than can be found on the blog, but overall there is much more on the blog. The book is short (300 pp) and written in non-academic style with no statistical jargon. Read it if u think big data about humans is interesting. The author is generally negative about it, so if u are skeptical about it, u may like this book.

Review: G Is for Genes: The Impact of Genetics on Education and Achievement (Kathryn Asbury, Robert Plomin)

www.goodreads.com/book/show/17015094-g-is-for-genes

gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=97ac0ec914522d3c888679e9c02291c6

So i kept finding references to this book in papers, so i decided to read it. It is a quick read introducing behavior genetics and the results from it to lay readers and perhaps policy makers. The book is overly long (200) for its content, it cud easily have been cut 30 pages. The book itself contains not much new to people familiar with the field (i.e. me), however there are some references that were interesting and unknown to me. It may pay for the expert to simply skim the reference lists for each chapter and read those papers instead.

The main thrust of the book is what policies we shud implement becus of our ‘new’ behavioral genetic knowledge. Basically the authors think that we need to add more choice to schools becus everybody is different and we want to use the gene-environment correlations to improve results. It is hard to disagree with this. They go on about how labeling is bad, but obviously labeling is useful for talking about things.

If one is interested in school policy then reading this book may be worth it, especially if one is a layman. If one is interested in learning behavior genetics, read something else (e.g. Plomin’s 2012 textbook)

Review: Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them (Joshua D. Greene)

www.goodreads.com/book/show/17707599-moral-tribes

gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=08a6526a7a706c4ae5f5aa7543ffc702

Years ago when i used to study filosofy, i came across Joshua’s website. On the site i found his phd thesis which i read. It is probably the best meta-ethics writing ive come across. He seems to have removed it from the site “available by request”, however i still have it: Greene, J. D. (2002). The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality and What To Do About It. Anyway, this thesis is what apparently turned into the book. The book is clearly written for a mass market, so it has only a few notes and is very light on statistics. I think it is basically sound. The later chapters were somewhat annoying to read due to excessive repetition and unclear language. I suppose he added to appeal more to laymen and confused people.

In he introduction, he is so nice as to lay out the book:

In part 1 (“Moral Problems”), we’ll distinguish between the two major kinds of moral problems. The first kind is more basic. It’s the problem of Me versus Us: selfishness versus concern for others. This is the problem that our moral brains were designed to solve. The second kind of moral problem is distinctively modern. It’s Us versus Them: our interests and values versus theirs. This is the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality, illus­trated by this book ‘s first organizing metaphor, the Parable of the New Pastures. (Of course, Us versus Them is a very old problem. But histori­cally it’s been a tactical problem rather than a moral one.) This is the larger problem behind the moral controversies that divide us. In part 1, we’ll see how the moral machinery in our brains solves the first problem (chapter 2) and creates the second problem (chapter 3).

In part 2 (” Morality Fast and Slow”), we’ll dig deeper into the moral brain and introduce this book’s second organizing metaphor: The moral brain is like a dual-mode camera with both automatic settings (such as “portrait” or “landscape”) and a manual mode. Automatic settings are efficient but inflexible. Manual mode is flexible but inefficient. The moral brain’s automatic settings are the moral emotions we’ll meet in part 1, the gut-level instincts that enable cooperation within personal relationships and small groups. Manual mode, in contrast, is a general capacity for practical reasoning that can be used to solve moral problems, as well as other practical problems. In part 2, we’ll see how moral thinking is shaped by both emotion and reason (chapter 4) and how this “dual-process” morality reflects the general structure of the human mind (chapter 5).

In part 3, we’ll introduce our third and final organizing metaphor: Common Currency. Here we’ ll begin our search for a met amorality, a global moral philosophy that can adjudicate among competing tribal moralities, just as a tribe’ s morality adjudicates among the competing inter­ests of its members. A metamorality’s job is to make trad e-offs among competing tribal values, and making trade-off s requires a common cur­rency, a unified system for weighing values. In chapter 6, we’ll introduce a candidate metamorality, a solution to the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality . In chapter 7, we’ll consider other ways of establishing a common currency, and find them lacking. In chapter 8, we’ll take a closer look at the metamorality introduced in chapter 6, a philosophy known (rather unfortunately) as utilitarianism. We’ll see how utilitarianism is built out of values and reasoning processes that are universally accessible and, thus, how it gives us the common currency that we need.*

Over the years, philosophers have made some intuitively compelling arguments against utilitarianism. In part 4 (” Moral Convictions”), we’ll reconsider these arguments in light of our new understanding of moral cognition. We’ll see how utilitarianism becomes more attractive the better we understand our dual-process moral brains (chapters 9 and 10).

Finally, in part 5 (” Moral Solutions”), we return to the new pastures and the real-world moral problems that motivate this book. Having de­fended utilitarianism against its critics, it’s time to apply it-and to give it a better name. A more apt name for utilitarianism is deep pragmatism (chapter 11 ). Utilitarianism is pragmatic in the go o d and familiar sense: flexible, realistic, and open to compromise. But it’s also a deep philosophy , not just about expediency. Deep pragmatism is about making principled compromises. It’s about resolving our differences by appeal to shared values-common currency.

So, TL;DR, morality is an evolved mechanism to facilitate cooperation. It does this well, but not always. Typical moral disagreements are confused due to relying on rights-talk. Rights-talk is fundamentally useless even counter-productive to resolving conflicts. Utilitarianism (aka cost-benefit analysis in moral language) is the only game in town, so even if it is not technically true, it is still the most useful approach to moralizing.