Archive for the ‘Sociology’ Category

The I. Q. Controversy The Media and Public Policy Stanley Rothman 323p_0887381510


I read this becus i want to do a follow-up study like this. Both analyzing media output and doing another expert survey.



I had been thinking about using PCA on political questions to see any obvious underlying structure. Basically, I want to do OKC questions style. Gather lots of questions, have lots of ppl answer them. Do PCA, see what results are.

Political perspective was assessed in two ways. First, respondents stated their agreement or disagreement with a series of six political statements. The statements dealing with U.S. economic exploitation, the fairness of the private enterprise system, affirmative action, the desirability of socialism, alienation caused by the structure of society, and the propriety of extramarital sexual relations. Responses to these statements were discovered, in a previous investigation incorporating many more such statements, to load highly on a factor representing overall political perspective.6o Agreement was assessed on a 4- point scale, where I was “Strongly agree” and 4 was “Strongly disagree.” For four of the six statements, the mean response is approximately at indifference. Respondents are somewhat more likely to disagree that “The United States would be better off if it moved toward socialism” and that “The structure of our society causes most people to feel alienated.” The second measure of political perspective asked experts to indicate their global political perspective on a 7-point scale, where I was “Very liberal” and 7 was “Very conservative.” Mean self-assessment on this scale is 3.19 (s.d.: 1.28, r.r.:95.6%), putting this expert population slightly to the left of center.

Factor analysis of responses to the six statements and the global rating reveal that all questions, with the exception of the statement about extramarital affairs, load highly on a single factor (i.e., are highly correlated). The five statements and the global rating were therefore normalized and combined to form a political perspective supervariable. It is this variable that is used as a measure of overall political perspective. Note that the liberal position on the five included statements (e.9., belief in socialism, affirmative action, economic exploitation) can all be characterized as placing a higher value on equality of outcome than on economic efficiency.

This tactic has been used before, even if only on a limited set of political opinions.


While few would argue that intelligence and aptitude test scores do nor affect self-esteem and motivation, the magnitude of this influence is difficult to measure. There have been many reports of significant positive correlations between test scores and self-concept, motivation, or expectancy, but causality remains rhe evidence seems to indicate, however, that the influence of test scores on these affective variables is probably not large. (Causation in the opposite direction may not be very significant either, as the correlation may reflect the influence of a third variable, students’actual level ofability and success in school.) Brim and his associates found that high school students tended to greatly overestimate their own intelligence, as measured by test scores. This was particularly true of students with low scores. Fifty percent of students thought their scores were too low relative to their actual level of ability, while 45 percent thought their scores were accurate. only 7 percent ofthe students reported lowering their self-estimates of intelligence as a result of their test scores, while 24 percent raised their estimates.16

Dunning Kruger, but much earlier.

Reference 16 is: Orville G. Brim, Jr., ‘American Attitudes Towards Intelligence Tests,” American Psychologrsl 20 (1965):125-130; Brim et al. 17. Goslin, p. 133

This book is a quick read and covers the area decently well. The major drawback is that it doesnt discuss deliberative democracy or liquid democracy. IMO this book is not as good as Caplans recent book on the same topic which i also read. Maybe cuz i read his first.


many people conflate political ignorance with sheer “ stupidity.” 2

But often, ignorance is actually smart. Even highly intelligent voters

can rationally choose to devote little or no effort to acquiring political

knowledge. Indeed, political knowledge levels have stagnated over the

past several decades, despite the fact that IQ scores have risen enormously

during the same period.3


This error with the FLR effect is one that Somin continously makes thruout the book, so I will just address it once here.


The FLR effect is not g-loaded. It is like training effects. Training increases the IQ, but not g. Training does not make u smarter. It is a form of error introduced to the measurement.






However, it turns out that the decision to vote is rational so long as the

voter perceives a significant difference between candidates and cares even

slightly about the welfare of fellow citizens, as well as his or her own.15

A simple calculation suggests why this is true.16

Assume that Uv equals the expected utility of voting, Cv equals

the cost of voting, and D equals the expected difference in welfare per

person if the voter’s preferred candidate defeats her opponent. Let us

further assume that this is a presidential election in a nation with three

hundred million people, that the voter’s ballot has only a one in one

hundred million chance of being decisive, and that the voter values the

welfare of his fellow citizens an average of a thousand times less than

his ow n.17

The figure of one in one hundred million is used for ease of exposition.

Adopting the slightly more accurate figure of one in sixty million— the

average odds of decisiveness in the 2008 presidential election— would

not significantly alter the result.18

Thus, we get the following equation:


The Utility o f Voting

D*(300 million/1000) / (100 million) – Cv = Uv


Ive seen this argument before. It is surely wrong. The difference between the various political options is very small. Especially in the US. A decisive vote will change very, very little in these countries. Might change nothing.


This is one of those, works in theory under perfect conditions but not in real politics-arguments.




M ore realistically, the average citizen probably lacks the time and

expertise to study either the Gelman model or the alternatives. Unless

he or she finds the reading interesting or has an extensive background in

statistics, the costs o f doing the reading and analyzing the models would

be far greater than the expected benefits.2 Thus the rational citizen could

reasonably base his or her decisions on voting and acquiring political

information on a rough intuitive sense that the chance of decisiveness is

extremely low, but still higher than zero. And that is exactly what most

people actually seem to do.


No. If one actually asks a lot of people why they vote, and i did this, they dont give answers like that. Their answers come in two categories basically:


1) The Kantian Voting argument

2) The lost right to complain arguments


The first one goes simply: if everybody thought like that (about not voting), something very bad wud happen (i.e. democracy wud crash, or somesuch).


A moment’s reflection will show that this is not good reasoning. Just swap ”voting” with ”become a firefighter”. In reality this is a matter of game theory. To the rational person, the fewer other ppl who vote, the more reason to vote, cuz his power is higher then. Ofc, if everybody was perfectly rational, they wud never admit to not voting if they wanted to vote. Why? The more people ppl believe that u vote, the less their own vote is worth, and hence it will make them less likely to vote, which increases the worth of ur vote. And so on.


2) I will let Carlin handle this one:


Also, ppl sometimes claim that one has a duty to vote. I think duty ethics is garbage, but some countries do have compulsory laws:




Belief in many other political conspiracy theories is common as well,

including claims that the government is hiding evidence of visitation by

alien civilizations, claims that the AID S virus was deliberately manu­

factured to target African Americans, and assertions that government

agencies planned the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and

other prominent political leaders.84


This reminds me of Gordon’s very interesting paper: Gordon, Robert A. “Everyday life as an intelligence test: Effects of intelligence and intelligence context.” Intelligence 24.1 (1997): 203-320.



He shows clearly that belief in conspirary theories correlates perfectly with group mean IQ.




Rational irrationality also deserves some of the blame. It is prob­

ably no accident that Republicans are disproportionately susceptible to

birtherism, while Democrats are far more likely to endorse 9 /11 conspir­

acy theories. It is no secret that partisan Republicans tend to be hostile

to Obama, while most partisan Democrats felt similarly about Bush.

These predispositions make partisans more willing to believe any claim

that reflects poorly on their political enemies— often without carefully

considering whether the claim is true or even plausible.


Such bias seems irrational if the partisans’ only goal is to get at the

truth, to determine whether the allegations against Bush or Obama are

accurate. But it is perfectly rational if their objective is at least partly to

enjoy the emotional satisfaction of being confirmed in their preexisting

views. After all, the partisan voter who mistakenly embraces birtherism

or 9 /11 conspiracy theories suffers no personal harm as a result, while

deriving at least some psychological benefit.


This kind of rational irrationality does not work. It implies the false thesis of voluntarism, namely that one can choose to believe things without evidence. This is not how beliefs work. One cannot just will oneself into believing something absurd. Rational irrationalism can work in that one can rationally decide that analyzing certain things properly and thoroly is not worth the time and hence relying on shortcuts instead, which are more error prone.






The ability of voters to punish large and obvious policy failures by

incumbents is one of the major advantages of democracy over dictator­

ship. It probably helps explain the remarkable fact that no mass famine

has ever occurred in a modern democracy, no matter how poor.72 By

contrast, famines deliberately engineered by the government have often

occurred in dictatorships.73

Even generally ignorant and irrational voters can recognize a mass

famine when they see one, and are likely to hold political incumbents

responsible for it. Similar factors may explain the fact that democratic

governments rarely if ever engage in mass murder against their own

citizens, while many authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships do so



Somin has made these claims before. As for the famine one, it checks out. See Wiki:


The sources for 73-74 are:


73. Joseph S talin ’s com m unist governm ent deliberately engineered a fam ine th at

killed millions in the early 1930s U.S.S.R. See R ob ert Conquest, The H a rvest o f S o rro w

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). An even larger governm ent-created fam ine

occurred in M aoist China, tak in g an estim ated th irty m illion lives. See Jasper Becker,

H u n g ry G hosts: M a o ’s Secret F am ine (New York: H o lt, 1996).


74. Rudolph Rum m el, P o w er K ills : D em o cra cy as a M eth o d o f N o n v io le n ce (New

Brunswick: Transaction, 1997); Rudolph Rummel, Death by Governm ent(New Brunswick:

T ran sactio n, 1994)-




If the connection between two or more matters of public policy is

not obvious or is ignored by politicians and the media for their own rea­

sons, voters may fail to pick it up. Social Security reform, for instance,

is almost never defined as a racial issue, yet the lower life expectancy

of blacks combined with the fact that they pay Social Security payroll

taxes at the same rate as whites turned Social Security into a major hid­

den redistribution from black workers to white retirees.89 The subtlety

of the connection leads the relevant black issue public to ignore it. Such

problems might often prevent an issue public from ever forming to begin

with. Thanks in part to political ignorance, some potential issue publics

are likely to be numbered among Mancur Olson’s “ forgotten groups who

suffer in silence.” 90


This wud be true if africans and europeans contributed equally. They dont. Europeans earn much more money and thus pay much higher taxes.




In addition to alleviating knowledge problems by transferring decision­

making power to foot voters, reductions in the size and complexity of

government might also reduce information problems with respect to

issues that still remain subject to the ballot box. The debate over voter

ignorance has focused on how much voters know but rarely on the ques­

tion of how much government there is for them to know about. Yet it is

clear that the greater the size and scope of government, the more voters

have to know to control its policies through the ballot. As James Madison

put in Federalist62, “ [i]t w ill be of little avail to the people that the laws

are made by men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that

they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood.” 94


Indeed. Also great quote.




Unfortunately, the lack of systematic survey evidence of political

knowledge in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries makes it very

difficult to directly compare knowledge levels then to those that prevail

today. Yet we can get some idea through analysis of the sophistication of

political rhetoric directed at voters by politicians. Candidates and politi­

cal office-holders have strong incentives to accurately gauge the level of

sophistication of their audience so as to make more effective campaign



Linguistic researchers at the website used the

Flesch-Kincaid scale to gauge the grade level of the language and phras­

ing used in every presidential inaugural address from 1789 to 20 0 1.11

They found that every inaugural address prior to 1900 reached what

would today be considered a izth-grade level, except for one that scored

at 1 1 .5 .103 By contrast, inaugural addresses over the past fifty years have

been around a 7th- to 9th-grade level.104


Political scientist Elvin Lim documents a similar pattern in the evo­

lution of presidential speeches over the past sixty years, concluding that

they have become increasingly simplistic.10′’ The same pattern emerges

from linguist Paul J J Payack’s content analysis of political debates. In

the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, D ouglas’s speeches rated an 1 1 .9

grade level, and Lincoln’s an 1 1 . z.106 Recent presidential debates tended

to fall somewhere between the 6th- and 9th grade-levels.107 The differ­

ence is all the more striking in light of the much higher education levels

of modern voters compared to those of the nineteenth century.


Obviously, linguistic sophistication is not the same thing as substan­

tive sophistication. It is theoretically possible that modern politicians are

simply making complex arguments using simple words. Nonetheless, lin­

guistic complexity and substantive complexity do tend to be correlated.

To the extent that is true, it would seem that politicians are directing

much less sophisticated arguments at voters than did their predecessors

o f a century ago.


Very interesting!


The source is this one:


The obvious hypothesis seems to be true: mass media made presidents lower the level, so as to target more ppl. Starting with radio and become worse with TV. At least, it cant get worse now, but we are also at rock bottom.




Empirical studies almost uniformly show that education and political

knowledge are highly correlated, even when controlling for other variables.7

Not surprisingly, those people with the highest education levels also tend

to have greater political knowledge. Unfortunately, however, there is a

major fly in the education-increases-knowledge ointment: massive rises in

education over the past fifty years have not led to significant increases in

political knowledge.8 From 1972 to 1994, average educational attainment

for Americans over the age of thirty grew from eleven years of schooling to

thirteen, while measured political knowledge remained roughly constant.9

On an education-adjusted basis, political knowledge may actually have

declined, with 1990s college graduates having knowledge levels comparable

to those of high school graduates in the 1940s.10 It is also noteworthy that

rising education levels have failed to increase political knowledge despite

the fact that measured intelligence has been rising, with IQ scores increas­

ing substantially over the past century.11


The stagnation of political knowledge levels in the face of greatly

augmented educational attainment suggests that further raising of edu­

cation levels cannot be counted on to increase political knowledge in the



The decline is surely due to opening up of education. High school in 1940 was more g selective than college is today in the US.


HS or more was about 24% in 1940, and college is about 32% now. Add to that all the lower g immigrants, it means that the college level is quite low now compared to HS in 1940.

Back then ”high school” actually meant just that.




An alternative but not mutually exclusive explanation is that edu­

cation correlates with political knowledge in large part because it is a

proxy for intelligence. When IQ is controlled for, the correlation between

education and economic knowledge is sharply reduced, and intelligence

turns out to have the greater effect of the tw o .11 Political knowledge may

function similarly. Yet rising IQ scores over the last several decades have

also seemingly failed to increase political knowledge.


I was going to cite this study, but he did it himself. :)

its this one, by Caplan, his libertarian brother in arms.


Caplan, Bryan, and Stephen C. Miller. “Intelligence makes people think like economists: Evidence from the General Social Survey.” Intelligence 38.6 (2010): 636-647.




Nonetheless, future technological breakthroughs might still signifi­

cantly increase political learning through the media. This is particularly

likely if future technologies make it possible for people to assimilate

new information with less time and effort than is possible at present.

Rationally ignorant voters may continue to limit the resources they are

willing to devote to learning about politics. But more advanced informa­

tion technology might make it possible for them to learn more without

devoting any more effort to the task than at present.74


Genetic engineering, gogogo! :)



Interesting small book that casts light on the use of sterilizations in nordic countries. It shows quite clearly that eugenics has it origin in collectivist and socialist thinking and was supported by most parties in the 20-40s. Clearly not just something the nazis did (and did wrong).


In Sweden, however, th e au th o rities advocated p ersu asio n , n o t force. The

Swedish sterilization p rogram contained several procedures by which involun­

tary sterilization was carried out. The legally incompetent, to begin with, could

be subjected to sterilization without their consent according to the 1934 and

1941 laws. How was this category defined? According to instructions circulated

by the Board of Health in 1947, a person should be able to understand “the

meaning and the consequences” of the operation to be declared legally compe­

tent. But: “Such an understanding is n o t at hand only because he knows that he

cannot have a child after a sterilization; it must furtherm ore be required that

he to some extent comprehends the importance o f sterilization for himself and

for society.” As to the mentally retarded, legal incompetence was said to prevail

if he or she could be com pared intellectually with a person twelve years old or



Mental age of 12 seems to accord nicely with modern deviation based definitions. 12/16=.75 or 12/18=.67. Normalt siger man at <70 IQ er retarderet. Det samme gælder i Danmark, jf.




Mjoen condemned this lenient attitude toward alcohol as an irresponsible

handling o f scientific results by a “spectacle-wise” academic. M ohr was guilty

o f neglecting the risk involved by the uncertainty o f the results, argued Mjoen.

He admitted that no effects on the hereditary material had been proven. But

the lack o f scientific p ro o f in no way justified the lack o f action. “We have every

reason to believe that alcohol is a much more serious enemy for the family, the

people and the race than one has so far considered it to be!”42


The arg u m en t o f u nacceptable risk was often used by M joen to justify

eugenic measures. The risk incurred by not acting was so serious that it was

morally irresponsible n o t to take immediate action even on the basis o f quite

u n certain knowledge. He also justified steps against race crossing w ith the

same kind o f argument. He admitted uncertainty about the detrimental effects

and agreed that more knowledge must be sought, but in such a situation it was

safest to say, “ Until we have acquired sufficient knowledge be careful/”43


apparently another example of the irrational precautionary principle:



This is a GREAT book, which goes down to the basics about heritability and the various claims people have made against it. Highly recommended. Best book of the 29 i have read this year.


The denial of genetically based psychological differences is the kind of sophisti-

cated error normally accessible only to persons having Ph.D. degrees.

David Lykken


Quote checks out.




I was introduced to the nature–nurture debate by reading Ned Block

and Gerald Dworkin’s well-known and widely cited anthology about

the IQ controversy (Block & Dworkin 1976a). This collection of arti-

cles has long been the main source of information about the heredity–

environment problem for a great number of scientists, philosophers, and

other academics. It is not an exaggeration to say that the book has been

the major influence on thinking about this question for many years. Like

most readers, I also left the book with a feeling that hereditarianism (the

view that IQ differences among individuals or groups are in substantial

part due to genetic differences) is facing insuperable objections that strike

at its very core.


There was something very satisfying, especially to philosophers, about

the way hereditarianism was criticized there. A strong emphasis was on

conceptual and methodological difficulties, and the central arguments

against hereditarianism appeared to have full destructive force indepen-

dently of empirical data, which are, as we know, both difficult to evaluate

and inherently unpredictable.


So this looked like a philosopher’s dream come true: a scientific issue

with potentially dangerous political implications was defused not through

an arduous exploration of themessy empiricalmaterial but by using a dis-

tinctly philosophical method of conceptual analysis and methodological

criticism. It was especially gratifying that the undermined position was

often associated with politically unacceptable views like racism, toler-

ation of social injustice, etc. Besides, the defeat of that doctrine had a

certain air of finality. It seemed to be the result of very general, a priori

considerations, which, if correct, could not be reversed by “unpleasant”

discoveries in the future.


But very soon I started having second thoughts about Block and

Dworkin’s collection. The reasons are worth explaining in some detail

I think, because the book is still having a considerable impact, especially

on discussions in philosophy of science.


First, some of the arguments against hereditarianism presented there

were just too successful. The refutations looked so utterly simple, elegant,

and conclusive that it made me wonder whether competent scientists

could have really defended a position that was somanifestly indefensible.

Something was very odd about the whole situation.



There is indeed something about this. This book is a premier case of what Weinberg called mentioned with his comment “…a knowledge of philosophy does not seem to be of use to physicists – always with the exception that the work of some philosophers helps us to avoid the errors of other philosophers.”






Of course,Bouchardwould be justified in notworrying toomuch about

these global methodological criticisms if the only people who made a

fuss over them were philosophers of science. Even with this unfriendly

stance becoming a consensus in philosophy of science, scientists might

still remain unimpressed because many of them would probably be sym-

pathetic to JamesWatson’s claim: “I do not like to suffer at all from what

I call the German disease, an interest in philosophy” (Watson 1986: 19).


Source is: Watson, J. D. 1986, “Biology: A Necessarily Limitless Vista,” in S. Rose and L.

Appignanesi (eds.), Science and Beyond, Oxford, Blackwell.




At this point I am afraid I may lose some of my scientific readers.

Remembering Steven Weinberg’s statement that the insights of philoso-

phers have occasionally benefited scientists, “but generally in a negative

fashion – by protecting them from the preconceptions of other philoso-

phers” (Weinberg 1993: 107), they might conclude that it is best just to

avoid reading any philosophy (including this book), and that in this way

they will neither contract preconceptions nor need protection fromthem.

But the problemis that the preconceptions discussed here do not originate

from a philosophical armchair. Scientists should be aware that to a great

extent these preconceptions come from some of their own. Philosophers

of science uncritically accepted these seductive but ultimately fallacious

arguments from scientists, repackaged them a little, and then fed them

back to the scientific community, which often took them very seriously.

Bad science was mistaken for good philosophy.


Sesardic clearly saw the same connection to Weinberg’s comments as i did. :)




It may seem surprising that Jones dismissed the views of the founder

of his own laboratory (Galton Laboratory, University College London)

in such amanner. But then again this should perhaps not be so surprising.

One can hardly be expected to study seriously the work of a man whom

one happens to call publicly “Victorian racist swine” – the way Jones

referred to Galton in an interview (Grove 1991). Also, in Jones’s book

Genetics for Beginners (Jones & Van Loon 1993: 169), Galton is pictured

in a Nazi uniform, with a swastika on his sleeve.


The virulent antinazism among these lefties is extraordinary. It targets everybody having the least to do with ideas the nazis also liked. It is a wonder no one attacks vegetarians or people who campaign against smoking for being nazis…




Arthur Jensen once said that “a heritability study may be regarded

as a Geiger counter with which one scans the territory in order to find

the spot one can most profitably begin to dig for ore” (Jensen 1972b:

243). That Jensen’s advice as to how to look upon heritability is merely

an application of a standard general procedure in causal reasoning is

confirmed by the following observation from an introduction to causal

analysis: “the decomposition of statistical associations represents a first

step. The results indicate which effects are important and which may be

safely ignored, that is, where we ought to start digging in order to uncover

the nature of the causal mechanisms producing association between our

variables” (Hellevik 1984: 149). High heritability of a trait (in a given

population) often signals that it may be worthwhile to dig further, in the

sense that an important geneticmechanismcontrolling differences in this

trait may thus be uncovered.8


Another great Jensen insight.


Citation is to: 1972b, “Discussion,” in L. Ehrman, G. S. Omenn, E. Caspari (eds.), Genetics,

Environment and Behavior, New York, Academic Press.




Second, even if a trait is shared by all organisms in a given population

it can still be heritable – if we take a broader perspective, and compare

that populationwith other populations. The critics of heritability are often

confused, and switch from one perspective to another without noticing it.

Consider the following “problem” for heritability:


the heritability of “walking on two legs” is zero.And yetwalking on two legs

is clearly a fundamental property of being human, and is one of the more

obvious biological differences between humans and other great apes such

as chimpanzees or gorillas. It obviously depends heavily on genes, despite

having a heritability of zero. (Bateson 2001b: 565; cf. Bateson 2001a: 150–

151; 2002: 2212)


When Bateson speaks about the differences between humans and other

great apes, the heritability of walking on two legs in that population

(consisting of humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas) is certainly not zero.

On the other hand, within the human species itself the heritability may

well be zero. So, if it is just made entirely clear which population is

being discussed, no puzzling element remains. In the narrower popula-

tion (humans), the question “Do genetic differences explain why some

people walk on two legs and some don’t?” has a negative answer because

there are no such genetic differences. In the broader population (humans,

chimpanzees, and gorillas) the question “Do genetic differences explain

why some organisms walk on two legs and some don’t?” has an affirma-

tive answer. All this neatly accords with the logic of heritability, and cre-

ates no problem whatsoever. The critics of hereditarianism like to repeat

that heritability is a population-relative statistic, but when they raise this

kind of objection it seems that they themselves forget this important



Things like the number of finger is also heritable within populations. There are rare genetic mutations that cause supernumerary body parts:


However, these are very rare, so to spot them, one needs a huge sample size. Surely the heritability of having 6 fingers is high, while the heritability of having 4 fingers is low, but not zero. Of the people who have 4 fingers, most of the casesare probably caused by unique environment (i.e. accidents), but some are caused by genetics.




(4) It is often said that in individual cases it is meaningless to compare

the importance of interacting causes: “If an event is the result of the joint

operation of a number of causative chains and if these causes ‘interact’

in any generally accepted meaning of the word, it becomes conceptually

impossible to assign quantitative values to the causes of that individual

event” (Lewontin 1976a: 181).But this is in fact not true.Take, for example,

the rectangle with width 2 and length 1 (from Figure 2.3). Its area is 2,

which is considerably below the average area for all rectangles (around

100). Why is that particular rectangle smaller than most others? Is its

width or its length more responsible for that? Actually, this question is

not absurd at all. It has a straightforward and perfectlymeaningful answer.

The rectangleswith thatwidth (2) have on average the area that is identical

to the mean area for all rectangles (100.66), so the explanation why the

area of that particular rectangle deviates so much from the mean value

cannot be in its width. It is its below-average length that is responsible.


Even the usually cautious David Lykken slips here by condemning

the measurement of causal influences in the individual case as inherently

absurd: “It is meaningless to ask whether Isaac Newton’s genius was due

more to his genes or his environment, as meaningless as asking whether

the area of a rectangle is due more to its length or its width” (Lykken

1998a: 24). Contrary to what he says, however, it makes perfect sense to

inquire whether Newton’s extraordinary contributions were more due to

his above-average inherited intellectual ability or to his being exposed

to an above-average stimulating intellectual environment (or to some

particular combination of the two). The Nuffield Council on Bioethics

makes a similar mistake in its report on genetics and human behavior:

“It is vital to understand that neither concept of heritability [broad or

narrow] allows us to conclude anything about the role of heredity in the

development of a characteristic in an individual” (Nuffield 2002: 40). On

the contrary, if the broad heritability of a trait is high, this does tell us

that any individual’s phenotypic divergence from the mean is probably

more caused by a non-standard genetic influence than by a non-typical

environment. For a characteristically clear explanation of why gauging

the contributions of heredity and environment is not meaningless even in

an individual case, see Sober 1994: 190–192.


This is a good point. The reason not to talk about the causes of a particular level of g in some person is not that it is a meaningless question, it is that it is difficult to know the answer. But in some cases, it is clearly possible, cf. my number of fingers scenario above.




Nesardic mentions two studies that fysical attractiveness is not correlated with intelligence. That goes against what i believe(d?). He cites:


Feingold, A. 1992, “Good-looking People Are NotWhatWe Think,” Psycholog-

ical Bulletin 111: 304–341.


Langlois, J. H., Kalakanis, L., Rubenstein, A. J., Larson, A., Hallam, M., and

Smoot, M. 2000, “Maxims or Myths of Beauty? A Meta-Analytic and Theo-

retical Review,” Psychological Bulletin 126: 390–423.


But i apparently dont have access to the first one. But the second one i do have. In it one can read:


According to this maxim, there is no necessary correspondence

between external appearance and the behavior or personality of an

individual (Ammer, 1992). Two meta-analyses have examined the

relation between attractiveness and some behaviors and traits

(Feingold, 1992b2; L. A. Jackson, Hunter, & Hodge, 1995). Fein-

gold (1992b) reported significant relations between attractiveness

and measures of mental health, social anxiety, popularity, and

sexual activity but nonsignificant relations between attractiveness

and sociability, internal locus of control, freedom from self-

absorption and manipulativeness, and sexual permissiveness in

adults. Feingold also found a nonsignificant relation between at-

tractiveness and intelligence (r = .04) for adults, whereas L. A.

Jackson et al. found a significant relation for both adults (d = .24

overall, d = .02 once selected studies were removed) and for

children (d = .41).


These meta-analyses suggest that there may be a relation be-

twe^n behavior and attractiveness, but the inconsistencies in re-

sults call for additional attention. Moreover, the vast majority of

dependent variables analyzed by Feingold (1992b) and L. A.

Jackson et al. (1995) assessed traits as defined by psychometric

tests (e.g., IQ) rather than behavior as defined by observations of

behaviors in actual interactions. Thus, to fully understand the

relations among appearance, behaviors, and traits, it is important to

broaden the conception of behavior beyond that used by Feingold

and L. A. Jackson et al. If beauty is only skin-deep, then a

comprehensive meta-analysis of the literature should find no sig-

nificant differences between attractive and unattractive people in

their behaviors, traits, or self-views.


So, maybe. It seems difficult that g and pa (phy. attract.) is NOT associated purely by effect of mating choices, since females prefer males with high SES and males prefer females with have pa. Then comes the mutational load hypothesis, and the fact that smarter people presumably are better at taking care of their bodies, which increases pa. I find it very difficult indeed to believe that they arent correlated.




In my opinion, this kind of deliberate misrepresentation in attacks on

hereditarianism is less frequent than sheer ignorance. But why is it that a

number of peoplewho publicly attack “Jensenism” are so poorly informed

about Jensen’s real views? Given the magnitude of their distortions and

the ease with which these misinterpretations spread, one is alerted to

the possibility that at least some of these anti-hereditarians did not get

their information about hereditarianismfirst hand, fromprimary sources,

but only indirectly, from the texts of unsympathetic and sometimes quite

biased critics.8In this connection, it is interesting to note that several

authors who strongly disagree with Jensen (Longino 1990; Bowler 1989;

Allen 1990; Billings et al. 1992; McInerney 1996; Beckwith 1993; Kassim

2002) refer to his classic paper from 1969 by citing the volume of the

Harvard Educational Review incorrectly as “33” (instead of “39”). What

makes this mis-citation noteworthy is that the very same mistake is to

be found in Gould’s Mismeasure of Man (in both editions). Now the

fact that Gould’s idiosyncratic lapsus calami gets repeated in the later

sources is either an extremely unlikely coincidence or else it reveals that

these authors’ references to Jensen’s paper actually originate from their

contact with Gould’s text, not Jensen’s.


Gotcha. A nice illustrating case of the thing map makers used to use to prove plagiarism.


Incidentally, in this case it ended up having another use! :)




Nesardic quotes:


In December 1986 our newly-born daughter was diagnosed to be suffering

from a genetically caused disease called Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa

(EB). This is a disease in which the skin of the sufferer is lacking in certain

essential fibers. As a result, any contact with her skin caused large blisters

to form, which subsequently burst leaving raw open skin that healed only

slowly and left terrible scarring. As EB is a genetically caused disease it

is incurable and the form that our daughter suffered from usually causes

death within the first sixmonths of life . . .Our daughter died after a painful

and short life at the age of only 12 weeks. (quoted in Glover 2001: 431 –

italics added)


from: Glover, J. 2001, “Future People, Disability, and Screening,” in J. Harris (ed.),

Bioethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press.


Nasty disease indeed. Only eugenics can avoid such atrocities.




On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that for many important

psychological traits (particularly IQ), the environmental influences that

account for phenotypic variation among adults largely belong to the non-

shared variety. In particular, adoption studies of genetically unrelated

children raised in the same family show that for many traits the adult

phenotypic correlation among these children is very close to zero (Plomin

et al. 2001: 299–300). This very surprising but consistent result points

to the conclusion that we may have greatly overestimated the impact

of variation in shared environmental influences.6The fact that variation

within a normal range does not have much effect was dramatized in the

following way by neuroscientist Steve Petersen:


At a minimum, development really wants to happen. It takes very impov-

erished environments to interfere with development because the biological

system has evolved so that the environment alone stimulates development.

What does this mean? Don’t raise your children in a closet, starve them, or

hit them in the head with a frying pan. (Quoted in Bruer 1999: 188)


But if social reforms are mainly directed at eliminating precisely these

between-family inequalities (economic, social, and educational), and if

these differences are not so consequential as we thought, then egalitar-

ianism will find a point of resistance not just in genes but also in the

non-heritable domain, i.e., in those uncontrollable and chaotically emerg-

ing environmental differences that by their very nature cannot be an easy

object for social manipulation.


All this shows that it is irresponsible to disregard constraints on mal-

leability and fan false hopes about what social or educational reforms can

do. As David Rowe said:


As social scientists, we should be wary of promisingmore than we are likely

to deliver. Physicists do not greet every new perpetual motion machine,

created by a basement inventor, with shouts of joy and claims of an endless

source of electrical or mechanical power; no, they know the laws of physics

would prevent it. (Rowe 1997: 154)


I will end this chapter with another qualification.Although heritability

puts constraints on malleability it is, strictly speaking, incorrect to say

that the heritable part of phenotypic variance cannot be decreased by

environmentalmanipulation. It is true that if heritability is, say, 80 percent

then at most 20 percent of the variation can be eliminated by equalizing

environments. But if we consider redistributing environments, without

necessarily equalizing them, a larger portion of variance than 20 percent

can be removed.


Table 5.5 gives an illustration how this might work.

In this examplewith just two genotypes and two environments (equally

distributed in the population), themain effect of the genotype on the vari-

ation in the trait (say, IQ) is obviously stronger than the environmental

effect. Going from G2 to G1 increases IQ 20 points, while going from the

less favorable environment (E2) to the more favorable one (E1) leads

to an increase of only 10 points. Heritability is 80 percent, the genetic

variance being 100 and the environmental variance being 25. Now if we

expose everyone to the more favorable environment (E1) we will com-

pletely remove the environmental variance (25), and the variance in the

new population will be 100. The genetic variance survives environmental

manipulation unscathed.




But there is a way to make an incursion into the “genetic territory.”

Suppose we expose all those endowed with G1 to the less favorable

environment (E2) and those with G2 to the more favorable environment

(E1). In this way we would get rid of the highest and lowest score, and

we would be left only with scores of 95 and 105. In terms of variance, we

would have succeeded in eliminating 80 percent of variance by manipu-

lating environment, despite heritability being 80 percent.


How is this possible? The answer is in the formula for calculating vari-

ance in chapter 1 (see p. 21). One component of variance is genotype–

environment correlation, which can have a negative numerical value.

This is what has happened in our example. The phenotype-increasing

genotype was paired with the phenotype-decreasing environment, and

the phenotype-decreasing genotype was paired with the phenotype-

increasing environment. This move introduced the negative G–E corre-

lation and neutralized the main effects, bringing about a drastic drop in



The strategy calls to mind the famous Kurt Vonnegut story “Harrison

Bergeron,” where the society intervenes very early and suppresses the

mere expression of superior innate abilities by imposing artificial obsta-

cles on gifted individuals. Here is just one short passage from Vonnegut:


And George, while his intelligence was way above normal, had a little

mental-handicap radio in his ear – he was required by law to wear it at all

times. It was tuned to a government transmitter and, every twenty seconds

or so, the transmitter would send out some sharp noise to keep people like

George from taking unfair advantage of their brains. (Vonnegut 1970: 7)


We all get a chill from the nightmare world of “Harrison Bergeron.” But

in its milder forms the idea that if the less talented cannot be brought

up to the level of those better endowed, the latter should then be held

back in their development for the sake of equality, is not entirely with-

out adherents. In one of the most carefully argued sociological studies

on inequality there is an interesting proposal in that direction, about

how to reduce differences in cognitive abilities that are caused by genetic



Asociety committed to achieving full cognitive equality would, for example,

probably have to exclude genetically advantaged children from school. It

might also have to impose other handicaps on them, like denying them

access to books and television. Virtually no one thinks cognitive equality

worth such a price.Certainlywe do not.But if our goalwere simply to reduce

cognitive inequality to, say, half its present level, instead of eliminating it

entirely, the pricemight bemuch lower. (Jencks et al. 1972: 75–76 – emphasis



So although Jencks and his associates concede that excluding geneti-

cally advantaged children from school and denying them access to books

may be too drastic, they appear to think that the price of equality could

become acceptable if the goalwas lowered andmeasuresmademoremod-

erate. Are they suggesting that George keeps the little mental-handicap

radio in his ear but that the noise volume should be set only at half



I wonder if someone cud make a good video based on this… Oh that’s right…




David Lykken had a good comment on this tendency of some

Darwinians (he had John Tooby and Leda Cosmides in mind) to pub-

licly dissociate themselves from behavior genetics, in the hope that this

move would make their own research less vulnerable to political criti-

cisms: “Are these folks just being politic, just claiming only the minimum

they need to pursue their own agenda while leaving the behavior geneti-

cists to contend with the main armies of political correctness?” (Lykken



There are some obvious, and other less obvious, consequences of polit-

ically inspired, vituperative attacks on a given hypothesisH.On the obvi-

ous side, many scientists who believe that H is true will be reluctant to

say so, many will publicly condemn it in order to eliminate suspicion that

they might support it, anonymous polls of scientists’ opinions will give

a different picture from the most vocal and most frequent public pro-

nouncements (Snyderman & Rothman 1988), it will be difficult to get

funding for research on “sensitive” topics,19the whole research area will

be avoided by many because one could not be sure to end up with the

“right” conclusion,20texts insufficiently critical of “condemned” views

will not be accepted for publication,21etc.


On the less obvious side, a nasty campaign against H could have the

unintended effect of strengthening H epistemically, and making the criti-

cism of H look less convincing. Simply, if you happen to believe that H is

true and if you also know that opponents of H will be strongly tempted

to “play dirty,” that they will be eager to seize upon your smallest mis-

take, blow it out of all proportion, and label you with Dennett’s “good

epithets,” with a number of personal attacks thrown in for good measure,

then if you still want to advocate H, you will surely take extreme care to

present your argument in the strongest possible form. In the inhospitable

environment for your views, you will be aware that any major error is a

liability that you can hardly afford, because it willmore likely be regarded

as a reflection of your sinister political intentions than as a sign of your

fallibility. The last thing onewants in this situation is the disastrous combi-

nation of being politically denounced (say, as a “racist”) and being proved

to be seriously wrong about science. Therefore, in the attempt to make

themselves as little vulnerable as possible to attacks they can expect from

their uncharitable and strident critics, those who defendHwill tread very

cautiously and try to build a very solid case before committing themselves

publicly. As a result, the quality of their argument will tend to rise, if the

subject matter allows it.22


Interesting effects of the unpopularity of the views.




First of all, the issue about heritability is obviously a purely empirical

and factual one. So there is a strong case for denying that it can affect

our normative beliefs. But it is worth noting that the idea that a certain

heritability value could have political implications was not only criticized

for violatingHume’s law, but also for being politically dangerous. Bluntly,

if the high heritability of IQ differences between races really has racist

implications then it would seem that, after all, science could actually dis-

cover that racism is true.


The dangerwas clearly recognized byDavidHorowitz in his comments

on a statement on race that the Genetics Society of America (GSA)

wanted to issue in 1975. A committee preparing the statement took the

line that racism is best fought by demonstrating that racists’ belief in the

heritability of the black–white difference in IQ is disproved by science.

Horowitz objected:


The proposed statement is weak morally, for the following reason: Racists

assert that blacks are genetically inferior in I.Q. and therefore need not

be treated as equals. The proposed statement disputes the premise of the

assertion, but not the logic of the conclusion. It does not perceive that the

premise, while it may be mistaken, is not by itself racist: it is the conclusion

drawn (wrongly) from it that is racist. Even if the premise were correct, the

conclusion would not be justified …Yetthe proposed statement directs its

main fire at the premise, and by so doing seems to accept the racist logic.

It places itself in a morally vulnerable position, for if, at some future time,

that the premise is correct, then the whole GSA case collapses, together

with its case for equal opportunity. (Quoted in Provine 1986: 880)


The same argument was made by others:


To rest the case for equal treatment of national or racial minorities on

the assertion that they do not differ from other men is implicitly to admit

that factual inequality would justify unequal treatment. (Hayek 1960:


But to fear research on genetic racial differences, or the possible existence

of a biological basis for differences in abilities, is, in a sense, to grant the

racist’s assumption: that if it should be established beyond reasonable doubt

that there are biological or genetically conditioned differences in mental

abilities among individuals or groups, then we are justified in oppressing

or exploiting those who are most limited in genetic endowment. This is, of

course, a complete non sequitur. (Jensen 1972a: 329)

If someone defends racial discrimination on the grounds of genetic differ-

ences between races, it is more prudent to attack the logic of his argument

than to accept the argument and deny any differences. The latter stance can

leave one in an extremely awkward position if such a difference is subse-

quently shown to exist. (Loehlin et al. 1975: 240)

But it is a dangerousmistake to premise themoral equality of human beings

on biological similarity because dissimilarity, once revealed, then becomes

an argument for moral inequality. (Edwards 2003: 801)


Good point indeed.

This shortish book contains a wealth of information and 100s of citations. Unfortunately, the author has not kept a high standard of citing things, nor does he make it clear when he cites something less reliable. This makes it the case that one cannot just take the points for granted and have to check every interesting but potentially dubious claim.

I thought chapters 1-3 were the most interesting, as it was about the science of sex differences. The least interesting part was the one about fatherless families. Pretty much all he cites is a lot of correlational studies, and does not discuss the methodology either.

Its worth a read if one is interested in a huge collection of sex differences, but its not a good introduction to the science of that area. For that, try David Buss’s introduction to evolutionary psychology instead.


In 1966, a botched circumcision left one of two male identical

twins without a penis. A leading sex psychologist, Dr. John

Money of Johns Hopkins University, persuaded the parents to

raise the toddler as a female. When the child was twenty-two months

old, surgeons castrated him and constructed what appeared from

the outside to be female genitalia. Called Brenda and treated like a

girl, the child was later prescribed female steroids to “facilitate and

mimic female pubertal growth and feminization.”1

When Brenda was twelve, Dr. Money reported that she and

her parents had adjusted well.2 The media loved the story of the

“opposite-sex identical twins.” In a long report, Time magazine

called the case “strong support” for the view that “conventional

patterns of masculine and feminine behavior can be altered.” The

1979 Textbook of Sexual Medicine noted the girl’s “remarkably

feminine” development, which was taken as demonstrating the

flexibility and “plasticity of human gender identity and the rela-

tive importance of social learning and conditioning in this


In academia, numerous introductory psychology and sociol-

ogy texts used the case to argue that sex roles are basically learned.4

Theorists who believed that gender roles are socially constructed

were ecstatic. In 1994, Judith Lorber described how the girl’s par-

ents “bent over backwards to feminize the girl and succeeded. Frilly

dresses, hair ribbons, and jewelry created a pride in looks, neatness

and ‘daintiness.’” The social construction of gender, she concluded,

“overrode any possibly inborn traits.”5

In retrospect, one wonders whether it is fair to say that what

happened to Brenda was simply “social construction.” With the injec-

tion of female hormones and without the male hormones coming

from testicles, Brenda was getting a bit more encouragement toward

femininity than families and society usually administer. Nonethe-

less, when the facts became more accurately known, it was clear

that neither the chemicals nor the socialization efforts had succeeded

in making Brenda a girl. Some hardworking researchers and jour-

nalists were able to show that Dr. Money had completely misrepre-

sented the results of his experiment. In the early 1990s, they located

the grown-up Brenda and found that she was now named David,

working in a slaughterhouse, married to a woman, and the adop-

tive father of three children.6 At age fourteen, Brenda had decided

to start living as a male, and at fifteen, she had been told the truth

about her biological past. She then announced that she had always

felt like a male and wanted to become one again. She was given a

mastectomy, male hormones and a constructed penis.

The story that emerged revealed that David had always acted

like a male even when everyone in his world had told him he was a

female and should behave like one. The first time “Brenda” was put

in a dress, she pulled it off. When given a jump rope, she tied people

up or whipped them with it. At nine, she bought a toy machine gun

when she was supposed to buy an umbrella. The toy sewing machine

went untouched; she preferred to build forts and play with dump trucks.

She rejected cosmetics and imitated her dad shaving. On a trip to New

York, she found the Rockettes to be sexy. She wanted to urinate stand-

ing up. On the playground, her kindergarten and elementary school

teachers were struck by her “pressing, aggressive need to dominate.”7

As the real story of the reconstruction of David was made pub-

lic, responsible researchers on the Johns Hopkins medical staff

decided they should find out what had become of the many boys

born without penises, most of whom had been castrated and sub-

sequently raised as girls. Of twenty-five located (ranging in age from

five to sixteen), every single one exhibited the rough-and-tumble

play more characteristic of boys than girls. Fourteen had declared

themselves to be boys, in one case as early as age five. Two children

were found who were born without a penis but had not been cas-

trated or sexually reassigned. Both these children, raised as boys, fit

in well with their male peers and “were better adjusted psycholog-

ically than the reassigned children.”8

On hearing this Johns Hopkins paper, Dr. Margaret Legato, a

Columbia University professor of medicine and an expert on sex-

ual differentiation, asserted: “When the brain has been masculin-

ized by exposure to testosterone [in the womb], it is kind of useless

to say to this individual, ‘you’re a girl.’ It is this impact of testos-

terone that gives males the feelings that they are men.”9

Im surprised it didnt work better than it did. This is a huge change in environment and hormonal levels, even castration. Nature is stubborn, very stubborn.


Other writers whose approach to gender has been influenced

by biology have more directly blamed feminists for ignoring or belit-

tling good science on sex differences.22 But the other side replies that

some of the sociobiological literature is filled with “sexism,” “biased

selection of examples” and “a social construction of gender that is

relatively independent of the facts.”23 Mainstream feminists regu-

larly charge that a hidden or not so hidden agenda meant to pre-

serve male status lies behind the sex difference research.24

Feminists who make charges of this kind are often remarkably

candid in declaring that their politics influence their scientific judg-

ments. Thus Anne Fausto-Sterling admits to demanding “the high-

est standards of proof . . . on claims about biological inequality.”25

Sheila Tobias, author of Overcoming Math Anxiety, says she does

research on girls and math to get the truth, but also to get the coun-

try to believe that girls have the potential to perform equally with


Ah, the difference of standards of evidence.

Note that this is not grounded in any claims about it being extraordinarily claims, and thus having a low prior and thus needing stronger evidence to get P>0.5.


Today, however, the majority of the sex difference researchers

who focus on biology are women. In preparing his book on sex dif-

ferences, Robert Pool read widely and spoke to many researchers

in the field, and was struck by the fact that this research fraternity

was “really a sorority. Most of the scientists doing the provocative,

ground-breaking research into human sex preferences are women.”

This seems to be for two reasons: First, men are wary about pub-

lishing any findings that might bring charges of sexism. Second,

some female researchers seem to have been suspicious about what

their male colleagues were up to; these women say they got involved

because they believed that male researchers were neglecting the seri-

ous study of women. Others did so because they were intrigued and

troubled by some differences favoring men and they wanted to find

out what could explain these results.37 Pool finds that almost all of

these female researchers “identify themselves as feminists or at least

sympathize with feminist goals. . . . They are not fools or tools of

male-dominated society, nor do they have any hidden agendas, and

they uniformly resent such implications.”38

Many of these female researchers also began their studies con-

vinced that sex differences were minimal and that societal forces

caused those that existed. John Williams and Deborah Best, for exam-

ple, began their international comparison of stereotypes believing

there was no basis for them, but concluded that they had “a substan-

tial degree of behavioral validity” and were explained in part by biol-

ogy.39 Similarly, Diane Halpern intended to demonstrate that any

gender differences in cognition were the result of “socialization prac-

tices, artifacts and mistakes in the research, and bias and prejudice.”

After reviewing a pile of journal articles that stood several feet high

and numerous books and book chapters that dwarfed the stack of

journal articles, I changed my mind. . . . [T]here are real, and in some

cases sizable, sex differences with respect to some cognitive abilities.

Socialization practices are undoubtedly important, [sic] there is also

good evidence that biological sex differences play a role.40

It is not usually pleasant to change one’s mind about core convic-

tions, but these researchers say the data has forced them to do so.41

Eleanor Maccoby’s research has led her to give more emphasis to

biology in her study of children. In a recent lecture, after noting the

stereotypical pattern of young boys’ and girls’ fantasy stories (Bat-

man and the like for boys, brides and ballet for girls), Maccoby told

her audience of fellow academics, “I too want to say, ‘ugh.’”42 But

the truth was the truth.

Nature really is stubborn.


Many other male hobbyists, like the Battlebot community of

technonerds, have interests that focus on machines or war. There

are the car enthusiasts, the model train lovers, the war board-game

connoisseurs, the Civil War buffs. These hobbyists are single-minded

about what they love; and studies have found single-mindedness

and a highly focused brain to be more characteristic of men than


This seems like an interesting claim, it is especially related to geniuses, of which there is an extreme sex ratio. Note 107 leads to: Moir, 1999, pp. 253–55; Lubinski et al., 1993, p. 702.

which leads to

Moir, Anne, and Bill Moir. 1999. Why Men Don’t Iron. New York:

Citadel Press.

Lubinski, David, C. P. Benbow and C. E. Sanders. 1993. Reconceptu-

alizing Gender Differences in Achievement among the Gifted. In

International Handbook of Research and Development of Gifted-

ness and Talent, ed. K. A. Heller, F. J. Monks and A. H. Passow.

London: Pergamon Press.

unfortunately, these are both books so i cant look them up easily.


In 1975, the California Department of Education went so far

as to reject reading texts with any portrayal of women in a house-

hold role. The publisher Open Court appealed the rejection of its

reading texts, which had already been revised to meet standards of

gender equality. (The publisher noted that California bureaucrats

had even complained about a brief reference to Mother Hubbard.)145

Open Court made little headway. In later editions of the text, for

example, The Little Engine That Could became female.

It may be time to start questioning the assumption that soci-

ety pressures young women to be homemakers. My observations of

bright University of Virginia students suggest that they feel pres-

sured in other directions entirely. I remember one young woman

with a 3.8 grade point average in economics who told me how furi-

ous she was at her economics professors. When she told them she

loved children and wanted to be an elementary school teacher, they

let her know they were disappointed—she could do so much more.

I encounter feminist students who seem to have absorbed all

of their teachers’ opinions but whose hearts appear to be at war

with their opinions. In class they are sure that women would be

physicists and engineers—or, at the very least, have demanding

careers of some kind—if it were not for discriminatory socializa-

tion. I remember one of my students who openly declared that she

was looking for a husband who would be the “wife” so she could

quickly advance in her career. But when our discussion meandered

into the popularity of romance novels, she said she read them all

the time. When I expressed surprise and asked why she would pur-

chase so many books filled with powerful and worldly heroes and

spirited but traditional heroines, she said, “Lots of things I do have

nothing to do with what I spout around campus all day.”

Indeed, the effect of the environment is proved to be of smaller importance, since women are routinely exposed to these anti-traditional stories, and yet they still prefer natural gender roles. Nature triumphs over environment here.


It is not surprising, though, that women everywhere seem to

care very much about how they look. In Syrian universities, women

attending classes with men spend as much time dressing for classes

as American women spend dressing for a dinner party. On the streets,

demure Muslim girls in head scarves practice a “below the knees

exhibitionism” with sheer stockings and sling-back heels beneath

their skirts.90 A student who spent a summer in a small Jordanian

city confirms that when Islamic women are not allowed to show

hair or ears and when they wear their skirts to their ankles, they use

more makeup than Western women do and spend more time on

pedicures. A recent study examining the self-images of Iranian-born

women living in Los Angeles and Tehran found that the latter group,

largely unexposed to Western media and required to wear body-

encasing clothes, were nonetheless more concerned about their weight

and more dissatisfied with their bodies, on average, than were the

women living in Los Angeles.91

We will see in the next section that men also have to compete,

in those areas that women care about. Still, it seems unfair, in some

cosmic sense, that men can attract women in different ways—through

success in politics, business, sports or music, for instance—whereas

for women so much depends on how they look. As a thoughtful author

of a book on beauty puts it, “Every woman finds herself, without her

consent, entered into a beauty contest with every other woman.”92

As long as men love female beauty, women will care about

their appearance. And the “male gaze” so often attacked bySex 61

mainstream feminists will continue to please as well as annoy. As a

younger woman, writer Anne Roche Muggeridge hated the street

taunts and the “horrid, cold-faced girl-watching in school corridors

and pubs.” But, like most women, she enjoyed being “approvingly

noticed.” She even liked—“very much” liked—the clearest sign of

such notice, the wolf-whistle:

Girls don’t know whether they are pretty or not. They stand in despair

in front of their mirrors and wail to their mothers: I look so ugly!

[Mothers reassure,] and the daughters don’t believe it. But when a

group of young, handsome male strangers spontaneously burst into

a chorus of admiring notes, a girl must, even in her confusion and

diffidence, experience a glow of pleasure and a dawning self-


Muggeridge wishes she were still in “the being-whistled-at age

bracket.”93 Other women approaching their fifties also feel a loss

because men no longer gaze at them in “that safe but sexual kind

of way.”94 Indeed, feminists such as Germaine Greer are among those

who have complained about becoming invisible to men as they grow


It is impossible to please these women. Damned if u whistle, damned if u dont…

It also reminds me of a similarly natural but irrational man thing: trying to impress prostitutes.


A few years ago, a student brought me a romance novel, Laura

Taylor’s Anticipation, that was used in her course on women’s lit-

erature. She said the climactic scene appeared to her to be a rape.

In it Spence declares that Viva and he will marry, and Viva asserts

they will not. Her blue eyes flash as she walks out of the room toward

her bedroom. He follows, relieves her of her wine glass, and smiles

at the outraged expression on her face. He scoops her up and deposits

her on the bed while shedding his clothes in record time. She glares

at him and says, “Are you deaf?” He gently topples her on her back.

Leaning over her, he efficiently jerked the front of her caftan apart,

sending dozens of buttons flying every which way, then stripped it

off her body.

What do you think you are doing?” she demanded as she glared

at him.

He watched her nipples tighten into mauve nuggets that invited his

mouth. “Easing your tension,” he announced in a matter of fact tone,

despite the heat flooding his loins and engorging his sex. He came

down over her, his hips lodging between her thighs, his upper body

weight braced by his arms. “As sexist as that probably sounds.”

She squirmed, trying to free herself, and a sound of fury burst out

of her when she failed to budge him.

Spence abruptly says their children should have names. She asks

what children; they are not getting married. He declares his love.

She asks if he is sure. He’s “‘never been more sure of anything in

my life.’” He asks if she will make babies and grow old with him.

“‘Yes, Yes, Yes!’” Then they make love “as their bodies, hearts and

souls mated forever.”141

This is very rough sex, in which consent comes only after the

man has forcefully and matter-of-factly stripped off the woman’s

clothes and placed his nude and aroused body between her legs. It

comes as the high point in a fantasy aimed at women.

There have been many academic studies of sexual fantasies.

One of the most interesting has found that pornographic films can

be classified by theme. Of the nine themes reported by psychologist

Roy Baumeister, the one that was by far the most sexually arousing

for women

involved a woman who was initially reluctant to have sex but changed

her mind during the scene and became an active willing participant

in sexual activity.142 [This study and another] suggest that the woman’s

transition from no to yes, as an idea, increases sexual excitement.

A review of the literature on sexual fantasies found that fantasies

of being overpowered and forced to have sex were far more common

among women than men. In some studies, over half the female sam-

ple reported fantasies of being overpowered, and other research found

a third of women endorsing such specific fantasies as being a slave

who must obey a man’s every wish. When women are given lists of

sexual fantasies to choose among, that of being forced sexually is

sometimes the first or second most frequently chosen one.

And the ubiquitous rape fantasies:


To proliferate their genes, our male ancestors either mated with

many women or promoted their offspring’s survival by supporting

and defending the mother and children. In a subculture where it is

possible to take either the quantity or the quality approach to sir-

ing the next generation, McSeed, with less of what social scientists

call “embodied capital” than more mainstream males, is better able

to succeed with the quantity approach.60 A white version of McSeed

was more recently in the news when the Wisconsin Supreme Court

affirmed a judgment forbidding a man named David Oakley from

having any more children until he supported those he already had.

Oakley, an unemployed factory worker, had nine children by four

different women.

that doesnt sound legal… where is the eugenics police?

besides, quality vs. quantity, see:

besides, the roles that fathers can provide: resources and protection, we now have the state to be and the police. to be sure, fathers are still those paying for the state and hence the police, but they arent the immediate helper, making them seem less important.


In addition, one letter writer had a question about how to greet

a guy she had hooked up with who never called again, and another

asked whether the guy she slept with on the first date will think she

is a total slut. The “advice guy” responded that it depends on the

guy. A poll in another issue, however, found that 76 percent of male

respondents said they would not date again any girl they slept with

on the first date.

No source given. Really? why does it matter?


Men want more space than women do. In the workplace, men

have a much stronger desire than women for jobs with no close

supervision. Studies show that women like to be alone within the

confines of a bedroom or an office, whereas men are more likely to

need real isolation—a long drive or a trip to the mountains. Think

also of those frequently solitary and overwhelmingly male pastimes,

hunting and fishing. No matter how good their relationships, men

are far more likely than women to report that they need free time

to relax and pursue hobbies away from their mates.119

Boys do travel in large groups, bonded by a mutual interest in

the same activities; but they are relatively more attached to things,

less to people. From childhood, girls but not boys focus on close

relationships and, especially, a best friend.120 When female college

students tell stories about themselves, they speak of friends and com-

munity; they are often giving or receiving advice, and if they act

alone, something bad happens. Men’s stories are very frequently

about acting alone in contests, and they have happy outcomes.121

There is an okcupid question on this one can data mine:

How important is it to you to have your own unique “thing” (like a weekly Girls’ Night Out or Guys’ Movie Night) that you don’t share with your partner(s)?

Very – I need some ME time to be happy

Sort of – I need friends outside of my partner

Not much – I like sharing stuff with my partner

I’d prefer not to have exclusive things


Moreover, it is a massive risk to rely on modern medicine to

help reset the biological clock and make late childbirth safer. Recent

studies have revealed increased rates of major birth defects in infants

born through intracytoplasmic sperm injection and in vitro fertil-

ization over those conceived naturally. Even after controlling for the

age of the mother and other factors, a child conceived by either IVF

or ICSI is still more than twice as likely to be diagnosed with a major

birth defect than is a naturally conceived child.135

probably due to insufficient embryo selection:


Women in their late twenties are, with reason, much more pes-

simistic today about ever marrying.139 Studies show that “the older

she gets, the harder it is for a college-educated woman to find a hus-

band.” College-educated women “tend to seek husbands who are

slightly older and have even higher levels of education and achieve-

ment than they do,”140 but the number of men in this already lim-

ited pool declines as women age. So it is not surprising that 63 percent

of women hope to meet their future husband in college. They will

never again be surrounded by so many eligible men who share their

interests and aspirations.

One wonders about the effects of the fact that there are now about 2 women per 1 man with a university degree. If womens hypergamy leads them to select blindly for degrees, there will be a lack of such men. Uh oh!


What does one say to a boy who continually badgers a girl for

oral sex? Or who sticks his crotch in the girl’s face? The answer is

that we can’t say much if we assume that there are no differences

between males and females. We often can get young people to be

more considerate by saying, “How would you feel if someone did

that to you?” That might work if a boy took a girl’s book bag. If

we say, “How would you feel if she did that to you” about the crotch-

in-the-face stunt, the boy is likely to say, “That would be great.”

Most boys don’t find this sort of behavior degrading or obnox-

ious. Why should they believe that girls do? If sex is recreational,

why is it degrading?

Another failing of the golden rule.

the generalized failure condition for that is when people do not share interests or desires. if one tries to fix it one gets: act so that ur actions is what the other desires… which is just preference utilitarianism on a local level. ;)


Starting education early might be expected to improve the

school performance of inner-city children; and this does hold true

for girls. Those who went through Head Start are only one-third as

likely as girls of similar socioeconomic backgrounds to drop out of

high school years later. But for boys, Head Start seems to have no

effect on high school completion rates.104

cite goes to: Mathews and Strauss, 2000.

Mathews, Jay, and Valerie Strauss. 2000. Head Start Works for Girls.

Washington Post, 10 October.


I re-read Murrays description of Head Start studies.

he writes

This brings us to the third-grade follow-up of the national impact assessment of Head Start, submitted to the government in October and released to the public late last year. Head Start has been operating since the 1960s. After decades of evaluations that mostly showed no effects, Congress decided in 1998 to mandate a large-scale, rigorous, independent evaluation of Head Start’s impact, including randomized assignment, representative samplings of programs and a comprehensive set of outcomes observed over time.

Of the 47 outcome measures reported separately for the 3- year-old and 4-year-old cohorts that were selected for the treatment group, 94 separate results in all, only six of them showed a statistically significant difference between the treatment and control group at the .05 level of probability — just a little more than the number you would expect to occur by chance. The evaluators, recognizing this, applied a statistical test that guards against such “false discoveries.” Out of the 94 measures, just two survived that test, one positive and one negative.

The executive summary is here:

In summary, there were initial positive impacts from having access to Head Start, but

by the end of 3rd grade there were very few impacts found for either cohort in any of the four

domains of cognitive, social-emotional, health and parenting practices. The few impacts that

were found did not show a clear pattern of favorable or unfavorable impacts for children.

Head start does NOT WORK.


But the progress that Senator Kennedy wants will come at the

expense of lost opportunities for still more male athletes. From 1985

to 1997, over 21,000 collegiate spots for male athletes disappeared.

Over 359 teams for men have disappeared just since 1992.8

Christine Stolba of the Independent Women’s Forum commented to the

Title IX commission that “Between 1993 and 1999 alone 53 men’s

golf teams, 39 men’s track teams, 43 wrestling teams, and 16 base-

ball teams have been eliminated. The University of Miami’s diving

team, which has produced 15 Olympic athletes, is gone.”9

I didnt know anyone was foolish enuf to have affirmative action for sports…


But the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education

rules that cheerleading and competitive dance are not sports, and

that participants do not count for Title IX compliance purposes.

The principal problem seems to be that cheerleaders and dance teams

usually perform to raise spirit at contests played by other, usually

male, athletes.92 As one ex-cheerleader told me, cheerleading has a

selfless quality—it’s getting people to yell for other people.

Apparently it doesn’t matter if these people compete as well

as cheer for others. The Office of Civil Rights deems that at least

half their appearances must be in a competitive setting, or their activ-

ity is not a sport. In response, the University of Maryland recently

divided its cheerleading team into a “spirit squad” and a competi-

tive squad. The latter group will perform only at competitions and

will be eligible for scholarship money, a move “designed to keep

Maryland in compliance with Title IX while returning some schol-

arships to the school’s eight underfunded men’s programs.”

Senior team member Erin Valenti opted to stay with the spirit

squad, which must fundraise to cover its costs. “They’re splitting

us only so they can convince whoever the head of Title IX is that

cheerleading can be considered a sport,” she said. “To make it a

sport, you’re taking out the whole reason to do cheering to begin

with.” That is, the cheering part.93

The Women’s Sports Foundation’s Web page contains a posi-

tion statement supporting the current policies that deny sports sta-

tus to cheerleaders who compete less than they cheer for others.94

But the Web page also has a “Women’s Sports on TV” section that

includes listings for yoga and aerobics shows.95 If yoga and aero-

bics are sports, why aren’t cheerleading and dance?

I rather universities did not have these sports stuff. Its a US thing, or at least DA universities do not do this. They do something else tho, have science show competitions.

there is a european page about it here:


Not only do these feminists want to limit women’s choices, but

NOW also wants to withhold information that might lead women

to make the “wrong” choices. I noted earlier that many highly edu-

cated women greatly overestimate their chances of getting pregnant

after age forty. In the summer of 2002, the American Society for

Reproductive Medicine wanted to place public service ads in shop-

ping malls and movie theaters that could have helped correct this

misinformation. The ads were designed to enable women to make

reproductive choices based on the facts. In particular, they wanted

to tell women how they could prevent infertility.

The opposition of groups such as NOW aborted the whole

program. The ad that particularly angered NOW contained the mes-

sage: “Advancing Age Decreases Your Ability to Have Children.”

NOW accused the doctors of using “scare tactics.” They further

argued that “the ads sent a negative message to women who might

want to delay or skip childbearing in favor of career pursuits.”139


Some sleep scientists believe that the mothers’ breathing and

heartbeat would help prevent sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS)

if Western mothers slept with their children. This view is controver-

sial with some U.S. doctors who emphasize the instances of adults

inadvertently suffocating babies who share their bed.196 Nonethe-

less, the international comparisons are striking. The U.S. has far and

away the highest rate of SIDS in the world (2 per 1,000)—ten times

higher than Japan and one hundred times higher than Hong Kong,

both countries where mothers routinely sleep with their children. In

most of the world, parents sleep with their young children, and the

lowest incidences of SIDS are in societies with widespread co-sleeping.

Sounds too easy to be true. According to Wiki, it is:


I wrote Meg and asked if she did not think that people have a

tendency to say that things—like marriage—are not all that impor-

tant to them if they think that there is a decent chance they won’t

happen. Psychologically, it’s tough to get through days if things you

desperately want aren’t happening; it seems logical to downplay

their importance. So perhaps it can be tough for women to be hon-

est with themselves about their own desires.

She replied in the affirmative:

I’d say your point about downplaying goals that seem out of reach

is quite valid. The problem is that it’s self-perpetuating; for societal

reasons marriage and family become difficult to obtain, thus women

deny that they want these things, thus they become even more diffi-

cult to obtain because they’ve been deprioritized.



They do not generally understand female-style emotional support.

They are used to helping a pal by downplaying his troubles or giv-

ing advice, not by sympathetically hearing him out. In one study,

98 percent of wives reported that they wanted their husbands to

talk more about their thoughts and feelings.17 For men, problems

call for advice or action, not talk. When told he should show his

wife more affection, one man went home and washed her car.18

Very common problem in M-F relationships, i think.



This is very interesting book. Most interesting I’ve read in a while.




If neither way of verifying the existence of preferences over beliefs

appeals to you, a final one remains. Reverse the direction of reason­

ing. Smoke usually means fire. The more bizarre a mistake is, the

harder it is to attribute to lack of information. Suppose your friend

thinks he is Napoleon. It is conceivable that he got an improbable

coincidence of misleading signals sufficient to convince any of us.

But it is awfully suspicious that he embraces the pleasant view that

he is a world-historic figure, rather than, say, Napoleon’s dishwasher.

Similarly, suppose an adult sees trade as a zero-sum game. Since he

experiences the opposite every day, it is hard to blame his mistake on

“lack of information.” More plausibly, like blaming your team’s defeat

on cheaters, seeing trade as disguised exploitation soothes those who

dislike the market’s outcome.


Common problem with reincarnation reports. Also:




In extreme cases, mistaken beliefs are fatal. A baby-proofed house

illustrates many errors that adults cannot afford to make. It is danger­

ous to think that poisonous substances are candy It is dangerous to

reject the theory of gravity at the top of the stairs. It is dangerous to

hold that sticking forks in electrical sockets is harmless fun.

But false beliefs do not have to be deadly to be costly If the price

of oranges is 50 cents each, but you mistakenly believe it is a dollar,

you buy too few oranges. If bottled water is, contrary to your impres­

sion, neither healthier nor better-tasting than tap water, you may

throw hundreds of dollars down the drain. If your chance of getting

an academic job is lower than you guess, you could waste your twent­

ies in a dead-end Ph.D. program.


There was a recent danish study on the quality of bottled water vs. tap water, and they were found to be the same. Bottled water is seriously waste of money.




Mosca and Jihad. In the Jain example, stubborn belief leads to dis­

comfort. Gaetano Mosca presents a case where stubborn belief leads

to death.


Mohammed, for instance, promises paradise to all who fall in a

holy war. Now if every believer were to guide his conduct by that

assurance in the Koran, every time a Mohammedan army found

itself faced by unbelievers it ought either to conquer or to fall to

the last man. It cannot be denied that a certain number of individu­

als do live up to the letter of the Prophet’s word, but as between

defeat and death followed by eternal bliss, the majority of Moham­

medans normally elect defeat.45


Yes, religious people are irrational, even about their own irrational beliefs:


they should also try to get themselves killed as soon as possible. After all, heaven is infinitely good, so it’s obviously infinitely better than being on earth. An infinite improvement!




If you listen to your fellow citizens, you get the impression that they

disagree. How many times have you heard, “Every vote matters”? But

people are less credulous than they sound. The infamous poll tax—

which restricted the vote to those willing to pay for it—provides a

clean illustration. If individuals acted on the belief that one vote

makes a big difference, they would be willing to pay a lot to partici­

pate. Few are. Historically, poll taxes significantly reduced turnout.65

There is little reason to think that matters are different today. Imagine

setting a poll tax to reduce presidential turnout from 50% to 5%. How

high would it have to be? A couple hundred dollars? What makes the

poll tax alarming is that most of us subconsciously know that most

of us subconsciously know that one vote does not count.


Citizens often talk as if they personally have power over electoral

outcomes. They deliberate about their options as if they were order­

ing dinner. But their actions tell a different tale: They expect to be

served the same meal no matter what they “order.”


What does this imply about the material price a voter pays for polit­

ical irrationality? Let D be the difference between a voter’s willingness

to pay for policy A instead of policy B. Then the expected cost of

voting the wrong way is not D, but the probability of decisiveness p

times D. If p = 0, pD = 0 as well. Intuitively, if one vote cannot change

policy outcomes, the price of irrationality is zero.




But rational irrationality does not require Orwellian underpinnings.

The psychological interpretation can be seriously toned down with­

out changing the model. Above all, the steps should be conceived as

tacit. To get in your car and drive away entails a long series of steps—

take out your keys, unlock and open the door, sit down, put the key

in the ignition, and so on. The thought processes behind these steps

Eire rarely explicit. Yet we know the steps on some level, because when

we observe a would-be driver who fails to take one—by, say, trying to

open a locked door without using his key—it is easy to state which

step he skipped.


Once we recognize that cognitive “steps” are usually tacit, we can

enhance the introspective credibility of the steps themselves. The

process of irrationality can be recast:

Step 1: Be rational on topics where you have no emotional attach­

ment to a particular answer.

Step 2: On topics where you have an emotional attachment to a

particular answer, keep a “lookout” for questions where false be­

liefs imply a substantial material cost for you.

Step 3: If you pay no substantial material costs of error, go with the

flow; believe whatever makes you feel best.

Step 4: If there are substantial material costs of error, raise your level

of intellectual self-discipline in order to become more objective.

Step 5: Balance the emotional trauma of heightened objectivity—

the progressive shattering of your comforting illusions—against

the material costs of error.


There is no need to posit that people start with a clear perception of

the truth, then throw it away. The only requirement is that rationality

remain on “standby,” ready to engage when error is dangerous.


Relevant to the ethics of belief:–.htm




So Classical Public Choice’s stories about rational ignorance prove

too much. But not much too much. By any absolute measure, average

levels of politicsil knowledge Eire low.8 Less than 40% of American

adults know both of their senators’ names.9 Slightly fewer know both

senators’ parties—a particularly significant finding given its oft-cited

informationEil role.10 Much of the public has forgotten—or never

learned—the elementary and unchanging facts taught in every civics

class. About half knows that each state has two senators, and only a

quarter knows the length of their terms in office.11 FEimiliEirity with

politicians’ voting records and policy positions is predictably close

to nil even on high-profile issues, but amazingly good on fun topics

irrelevant to policy. As Delli Carpini and Keeter remark:


During the 1992 presidential campaign 89 percent of the public

knew that Vice President Quayle was feuding with the television

character Murphy Brown, but only 19 percent could characterize

Bill Clinton’s record on the environment. . . 86 percent of the pub­

lic knew that the Bushes’ dog was named Millie, yet only 15 percent

knew that both presidential candidates supported the death pen­

alty. Judge Wapner (host of the television series “People’s Court”)

was identified by more people than were Chief Justices Burger or







Apparently irrational cultural beliefs are quite remarkable:

They do not appear irrational by slightly departing from

common sense, or timidly going beyond what the

evidence allows. They appear, rather, like down-right

provocations against common sense rationality.

—Richard Shwedei1




Economists’ love of qualification is notorious, but most doubt that

the protechnology position needs to be qualified. Technology often

creates new jobs; without the computer, there would be no jobs in

computer programming or software development. But the funda­

mental defense of labor-saving technology is that employing more

workers than you need wastes valuable labor. If you pay a worker to

twiddle his thumbs, you could have paid him to do something socially

useful instead.

Economists add that market forces readily convert this potential

social benefit into an actual one. After technology throws people out

of work, they have an incentive to find a new use for their talents. Cox

and Aim aptly describe this process as “churn”: “Through relentless

turmoil, the economy re-creates itself, shifting labor resources to

where they’re needed, replacing old jobs with new ones.”75 They illus­

trate this process with history’s most striking example: The drastic

decline in agricultural employment:


In 1800, it took nearly 95 of every 100 Americans to feed the country.

In 1900, it took 40. Today, it takes just 3…. The workers no longer

needed on farms have been put to use providing new homes, furni­

ture, clothing, computers, pharmaceuticals, appliances, medical

assistance, movies, financial advice, video games, gourmet meals,

and an almost dizzying array of other goods and services.. . . What

we have in place of long hours in the fields is the wealth of goods

and services that come from allowing the churn to work, wherever

and whenever it might occur.76


These arguments sound harsh. That is part of the reason why they are

so unpopular: people would rather feel compassionately than think

logically. Many economists advocate government assistance to cush­

ion displaced workers’ transition, and retain public support for a dy­

namic economy. Alan Blinder recommends extended unemployment

insurance, retraining, and relocation subsidies.77 Other economists

disagree. But almost all economists grant that stopping transitions

has a grave cost.


While this is correct in the general, it does not work in the case where there some jobs that have no possible jobs left, or too few jobs they can perform. Humans are limited by their intelligence, if we can make robots that can do what humans do better or equally well at lower costs, this WILL be a problem.





Economists are especially critical of the antiforeign outlook because

it does not just happen to be wrong; it frequently conflicts with ele­

mentary economics. Textbooks teach that total output increases if

producers specialize and trade. On an individual level, who could

deny it? Imagine how much time it would take to grow your own food,

when a few hours’ wages spent at the grocery store feed you for weeks.

Analogies between individual and social behavior are at times mis­

leading, but this is not one of those times. International trade is, as

Steven Landsburg explains, a technology:


There are two technologies for producing automobiles in America.

One is to manufacture them in Detroit, and the other is to grow

them in Iowa. Everybody knows about the first technology; let me

tell you about the second. First you plant seeds, which are the raw

materials from which automobiles are constructed. You wait a few

months until wheat appears. Then you harvest the wheat, load it

onto ships, and sail the ships westward into the Pacific Ocean. After

a few months, the ships reappear with Toyotas on them.59


Great quote! I will remember that one.




Skipping ahead to the present, Alan Blinder blames opposition to

tradable pollution permits on antimarket bias.39 Why let people “pay

to pollute,” when we can force them to cease and desist? The textbook

answer is that tradable permits get you more pollution abatement for

the same cost. The firms able to cheaply cut their emissions do so,

selling their excess pollution quota to less flexible polluters. End re­

sult: More abatement bang for your buck. A price for pollution is

therefore not a pure transfer; it creates incentives to improve environ­

mental quality as cheaply as possible. But noneconomists disagree—

including relatively sophisticated policy insiders. Blinder discusses a

fascinating survey of 63 environmentalists, congressional staffers,

and industry lobbyists. Not one could explain economists’ standard

rationale for tradable permits.4


Sounds like:




Good intentions are ubiquitous in politics; what is scarce is accu­

rate beliefs. The pertinent question about selective participation is

whether voters are more biased than nonvoters, not whether voters

take advantage of nonvoters.59 Empirically, the opposite holds: The

median voter is less biased than the median nonvoter. One of the

main predictors of turnout, education, substantially increases eco­

nomic literacy. The other two—age and income—have little effect on

economic beliefs.

Though it sounds naive to count on the affluent to look out for the

interests of the needy, that is roughly what the data advise. All kinds

of voters hope to make society better off, but the well educated are

more likely to get the job done.60 Selective turnout widens the gap

between what the public gets and what it wants. But it narrows the

gap between what the public gets and what it needs.


great quote, “Good intentions are ubiquitous in politics; what is scarce is accurate beliefs.”


If people dont vote for self-interest, then representation is not necessary. To complaints about lack of representation are not well-founded, at least to some degree.




In financial and betting markets, there are intrinsic reasons why

clearer heads wield disproportionate influence.61 People who know

more can expect to earn higher profits, giving them a stronger to in­

centive to participate. Furthermore, past winners have more assets to

influence the market price. In contrast, the disproportionate electoral

influence of the well educated is a lucky surprise. Indeed, since the

value of their time is greater, one would expect them to vote less. To

be blunt, the problem with democracy is not that clearer heads have

surplus influence. The problem is that, compared to financial and

betting markets, the surplus is small.


More meritocracy is needed, it seems.




If education causes better economic understanding, there is an ar­

gument for education subsidies—albeit not necessarily higher sub­

sidies than we have now.62 If the connection is not causal, however,

throwing money at education treats a symptom of economic illiteracy,

not the disease. You would get more bang for your buck by defunding

efforts to “get out the vote.”63 One intriguing piece of evidence against

the causal theory is that educational attainment rose substantially in

the postwar era, but political knowledge stayed about the same.64


this indicates that it is g not education that causes greater political knowledge. In other words, g is a common cause of both better education and greater political knowledge. This isnt surprising at all. But it might still be that education has some beneficial effect, the study referred to is faulty in some way. Or that perhaps we’re doing education wrong. Perhaps we need incentives for people to increase their political knowledge? After all, if greater political knowledge causes better democratic results, and better democratic results cause more economic growth for the country, then it does pay for itself. It might even be a good investment.


The cite of 64 is: Delli Carpini, Michael, and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About

Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.


It cant be found on either bookos or libgen, so i cant look it up.





Before studying public opinion, many wonder why democracy does

not work better. After one becomes familiar with the public’s system­

atic biases, however, one is struck by the opposite question: Why does

democracy work as well as it does? How do the unpopular policies

that sustain the prosperity of the West survive? Selective participation

is probably one significant part of the answer. It is easy to criticize

the beliefs of the median voter, but at least he is less deluded than

the median nonvoter.






If voters are systematically mistaken about what policies work,

there is a striking implication: They will not be satisfied by the politi­

cians they elect. A politician who ignores the public’s policy prefer­

ences looks like a corrupt tool of special interests. A politician who

implements the public’s policy preferences looks incompetent be­

cause of the bad consequences. Empirically, the shoe fits: In the GSS,

only 25% agree that “People we elect to Congress try to keep the

promises they have made during the election,” and only 20% agree

that “most government administrators can be trusted to do what is

best for the country.”71 Why does democratic competition yield so few

satisfied customers? Because politicians are damned if they do and

damned if they don’t. The public calls them venal for failing to deliver

the impossible.




As in economics, laymen reject the basics, not merely details. Toxi­

cologists are vastly more likely than the public to affirm that “use of

chemicals has improved our health more than it has harmed it,” to

deny that natural chemicals are less harmful than man-made chemi­

cals, and to reject the view that “it can never be too expensive to

reduce the risks associated with chemicals.”81 While critics might like

to impugn the toxicologists’ objectivity, it is hard to take such accusa­

tions seriously. The public’s views are often patently silly, and toxicol­

ogists who work in industry, academia, and regulatory bureaus largely

see eye to eye.82


seems worth looking up these studies.


81. Kraus, Nancy, Torbjörn Malmfors, and Paul Slovic. “Intuitive toxicology: Expert and lay judgments of chemical risks.” Risk analysis 12.2 (1992): 215-232.


82. Lichter and Rothman (1999) similarly document that cancer research­

ers’ ideology has little effect on their scientific judgment. Liberal cancer re­

searchers who do not work in the private sector still embrace their profes­

sion’s contrarian views. “As a group, the experts—whether conservative or

liberal, Democratic or Republican—viewed cancer risks along roughly the

same lines. Thus, their perspectives on this topic do not appear to be ‘con­

taminated’ by either narrow self-interest or broader ideological commit­

ments” (1999: 116).






Why then does environmental policy put as much emphasis on

dosage as it does? Selective participation is probably part of the story.

Mirroring my results, Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic (1992) find that ed­

ucation makes people think like toxicologists.84 The bulk of the expla­

nation, though, is probably that voters care about economic well-being

as well as safety from toxic substances. Moving from low dosage to

zero is expensive. It might absorb all of GDP. This puts a democratic

leader in a tight spot. If he embraces the public’s doseless worldview

and legislates accordingly, it would spark economic disaster. Over

60% of the public agrees that “It can never be too expensive to reduce

the risks associated with chemicals,”85 but the leader who complied

would be a hated scapegoat once the economy fell to pieces. On the

other hand, a leader who dismisses every low-dose scare as “unscien­

tific” and “paranoid” would soon be a reviled symbol of pedantic in­

sensitivity. Given their incentives, politicians cannot disregard the

public’s misconceptions, but they often drag their feet.


nowhere is this as clear as with pesticides and radiation. The public’s extreme fear of those do not at all mirror the scientific evidence of their harmfulness at low dosages.




Leaders’ incentive to rationally assess the effects of policy might be

perverse, not just weak. Machiavelli counsels the prince “to do evil if

constrained” but at the same time “take great care that nothing goes

out of his mouth which is not full of” “mercy, faith, integrity, humanity

and religion.” One can freely play the hypocrite because “everybody

sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will

not dare oppose themselves to the many.”10 Yet, contra Machiavelli,

psychologists have documented humans’ real if modest ability to de­

tect dishonesty from body language, tone of voice, and more.11 George

Costanza memorably counseled Jerry Seinfeld, “Just remember, it’s

not a lie if you believe it.”12 The honestly mistaken politician appears

more genuine because he is more genuine. This gives leaders who

sincerely share their constituents’ policy views a competitive advan­

tage over Machiavellian rivals.13


I’ve sometimes heard the claim that privately, politicians really do acknowledge that ex. war on drugs does not work and is counter-productive, but that they go along with the voter opinion anyway. Perhaps this isn’t true. Perhaps the politicians really are as deluded as the voters? Or even more! Polls in Denmark show that politicians are firmly against legalization, while the public/voters are slightly positive.




To get ahead in politics, leaders need a blend of naive populism

and realistic cynicism. No wonder the modal politician has a law de­

gree. Dye and Zeigler report that “70 percent of the presidents, vice

presidents, and cabinet officers of the United States and more than

50 percent of the U.S. senators and House members” have been law­

yers.14 The economic role of government has greatly expanded since

the New Deal, but the percentage of congressmen with economic

training remains negligible.15 Economic issues Eire important to vot­

ers, but they do not want politicians with economic expertise—espe­

cially not ones who lecture them and point out their confusions.


no wonder they think new laws can solve everything…




It helps to sell the right kind of favors. Like a journalist with an ax

to grind, a shrewd politician moves along the margins of voter indif­

ference. The public is protectionist, but rarely has strong opinions

about which industries need help. This is a great opportunity for a

politician and a struggling industry to make a deal. Steel manufactur­

ers could pay a politician to take (a) a popular stand against foreigners

combined with (b) a not unpopular stand for American steel. In

maxim form: Do what the public wants when it cares; take bids from

interested parties when its doesn’t. Bear in mind, though, that the

important thing is not how burdensome a concession is, but how bur­

densome voters perceive it to be.


Always lean to the green, as it is said in Congress.




Consider the insurance market failure known as “adverse selec­

tion.” If people who want insurance know their own riskiness, but

insurers only know average riskiness, the market tends to shrink. Low-

risk people drop out, which raises consumers’ average riskiness,

which raises prices, which leads more low-risk customers to drop

out.52 In the worst-case scenario, the market “unravels.” Prices get so

high that no one buys insurance, and consumers get so risky that

firms cannot afford to sell for less.


Interesting. This shud happen to some degree becuz of the new consumer genomics. It may also be illegal for the insurance companies to utilize known information to change rates. For instance, feminists’ ideas about equality of the sexes had the result that it become illegal in the EU to change rates conditional on sex. This means that prices rose for women and fell for men even tho men cause most of the accidents.




The main upshot of my analysis of democracy is that it is a good

idea to rely more on private choice and the free market. But what—if

anything—can be done to improve outcomes, taking the supremacy

of democracy over the market as fixed?. The answer depends on how

flexibly you define “democracy.” Would we still have a “democracy”

if you needed to pass a test of economic literacy to vote? If you needed

a college degree? Both of these measures raise the economic under­

standing of the median voter, leading to more sensible policies. Fran­

chise restrictions were historically used for discriminatory ends, but

that hardly implies that they should never be used again for any rea­

son. A test of voter competence is no more objectionable than a driv­

ing test. Both bad driving and bad voting are dangerous not merely

to the individual who practices them, but to innocent bystanders. As

Frederic Bastiat argues, “The right to suffrage rests on the presump­

tion of capacity”:


And why is incapacity a cause of exclusion? Because it is not the

voter alone who must bear the consequences of his vote; because

each vote involves and affects the whole community; because the

community clearly has the right to require some guarantee as to

the acts on which its welfare and existence depend.56


A more palatable way to raise the economic literacy of the median

voter is by giving extra votes to individuals or groups with greater

economic literacy. Remarkably, until the passage of the Representa­

tion of the People Act of 1949, Britain retained plural voting for gradu­

ates of elite universities and business owners. As Speck explains,

“Graduates had been able to vote for candidates in twelve universities

in addition to those in their own constituencies, and businessmen

with premises in a constituency other than their own domicile could

vote in both.”57 Since more educated voters think more like econo­

mists, there is much to be said for such weighting schemes. I leave it

to the reader to decide whether 1948 Britain counts as a democracy.


wow, never knew this!




Since well-educated people are better voters, another tempting way

to improve democracy is to give voters more education. Maybe it

would work. But it would be expensive, Eind as mentioned in the pre­

vious chapter, education may be a proxy for intelligence or curiosity.

A cheaper strategy, and one where a causal effect is more credible, is

changing the curriculum. Steven Pinker Eirgues that schools should

try to “provide students with the cognitive skills that are most im­

portant for grasping the modern world and that are most unlike the

cognitive tools they Eire born with,” by emphasizing “economics, evo­

lutionary biology, and probability and statistics.”60 Pinker essentially

wants to give schools a new mission: rooting out the biased beliefs

that students arrive with, especially beliefs that impinge on govern­

ment policy.61 What should be cut to make room for the new material?


There are only twenty-four hours in a day, and a decision to teach

one subject is also a decision not to teach another one. The ques­

tion is not whether trigonometry is important, but whether it is

more important than statistics; not whether an educated person

should know the classics, but whether it is more important for an

educated person to know the classics than elementary economics.62







This book turned out to be not what i had expected, but still interesting. Not sure why it got all the bad press. It’s behavior realistic but focuses on the environment which is what the author finds interesting. I think genetics is more interesting, but this is interesting too.
The Nurture Assumption Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do, Revised and Updated Judith Rich Harris

Donald of the Apes

Donald was ten months old, and Gua seven and a half months, when she

came to live with the Kelloggs in 1931. Right from the start she was treated

like a human baby—that is, the way human babies were treated in the 1930s.

The Kelloggs put clothes on her, and the stiff shoes that babies wore in those

days. She wasn’t caged or tied up, which meant that she had to be watched

every second except when she was asleep (but then, the same was true of

Donald). She was potty trained. Her teeth were brushed. She was fed the same

foods as Donald and had the same naptimes and bathtimes. There is a photo­

graph in the Kelloggs’ book of Gua and Donald sitting side by side, dressed

identically in footed pajamas of the kind my mother used to call “Dr. Den-

tons.” Donald is frowning; Gua’s lips are curved upward in a modest smile.

They are holding hands.

Aside from the difference in temperament recorded in that revealing photo,

the two were remarkably well matched. Chimpanzees develop more rapidly in

infancy than humans, but Donald was two and a half months older and that

helped to even things up. They played together like siblings, chasing each

other around the furniture, roughhousing and giggling. Donald had a walker,

a big heavy thing, and one of his favorite sports, according to his parents, was

“to rush at the ape in this rumbling Juggernaut and laugh as she scurried to

keep from being run over, often without success.” But Gua didn’t hold grudges

and she enjoyed rough-and-tumble play. In fact, the two got along better

than most siblings. I f one o f them cried, the other would offer pats or hugs of

consolation. If Gua got up from her nap before Donald, she “could hardly be

kept from the door o f his room.” 1

Gua was more fun than a barrel full of Donalds. When the Kelloggs tickled

her or swung her around, she would laugh just like a human baby. If they tried

swinging Donald, he would cry. Gua was more affectionate (expressing her

affection with hugs and kisses) and more cooperative. While being dressed, the

ape—but not the boy—would push her arms into open sleeves and bend her

head to allow her bib to be tied on. If she did something wrong and was

scolded for it, she would utter plaintive “00-00” cries and throw herself into

the scolder’s arms, offering a “kiss of reconciliation” and uttering an audible

sigh of relief when she was permitted to bestow it.

In mastering the challenges of civilized life, Gua often caught on a little

faster than the stolid Donald. She was ahead in obeying spoken commands,

learning to feed herself with a spoon, and giving a warning signal when she

needed to use the potty (unfortunately, though, her potty training never

became completely reliable). The ape equaled or exceeded the child in most of

the tests that Dr. Kellogg devised: she was as adept as Donald at figuring out

how to use a hoe-shaped implement to pull a piece of apple toward her, and

learned more quickly to use a chair to reach a cookie suspended from the ceil­

ing. When the chair was moved to a new starting point, so that it had to be

pushed in a different direction to reach the cookie, Donald continued to

push it in the same direction as before, whereas Gua kept her eye on the

cookie and claimed the prize.2

There was one thing, however, in which the boy was clearly superior: Don­

ald was the better imitator. Does that surprise you? According to Frans de

Waal, a Dutch primatologist who spent several years observing the chim­

panzees and their human visitors at a Netherlands zoo, “Contrary to general

belief, humans imitate apes more than the reverse.”3

This was clearly the case with Donald and Gua. “It was Gua, in fact, who

was almost always the aggressor or leader in finding new toys to play with and

new methods o f play; while the human was inclined to take up the role of the

imitator or follower.”4 Thus, Donald picked up Gua’s annoying habit of biting

the wall. He also picked up a fair amount of chimpanzee language—the food

bark, for instance. How did Luella Kellogg feel, I wonder, when her fourteen-

month-old son ran to her with an orange in his hands, grunting “uhuh, uhuh,


The average American child can produce more than fifty words at nineteen

months5 and is starting to put them together to form phrases. At nineteen

months, Donald could speak only three English words.* At this point the

experiment was terminated and Gua went back to the zoo.

The Kelloggs had tried to train an ape to be a human. Instead, it seemed

that Gua was training their son to be an ape. Their experiment tells us more

about human nature than about the nature of the chimpanzee, but it also tells

us that there is remarkably little difference between them—at least in the first

nineteen months. In this chapter I will look at some of the differences between

chimpanzee nature and human nature that appear after the age of nineteen

months, and at some o f the similarities that remain.


One of the things that characterize these exceptional classrooms is the atti­

tude the students adopt toward the slower learners among them. Instead of

making fun of them, they cheer them on. There was a boy with reading prob­

lems in one of Rodriguez’s classes and when he started making progress the

whole class celebrated: “Every time he made a small step, the class would give

him a round of applause.”

[04:20:33] Emil – Deleet: using this effect was something Khan suggested

[04:20:37] Emil – Deleet: Khan from Khan Academy

[04:20:47] Emil – Deleet: to get the smarter kids to help the less smart

[04:20:57] Emil – Deleet: he suggested whole class achievements

[04:21:12] Emil – Deleet: so that the entire group benefits when everybody masters something

[04:21:20] Emil – Deleet: creating incentives for the smarter to help the others

[04:21:50] Emil – Deleet: teaching something also helps the teacher master it better, so both parties benefit

[04:21:51] Emil – Deleet: in theory

i would very much like to see experiments with this.


A well-dressed man often sports nothing more than a string around his waist to

which is tied the stretched-out foreskin of his penis. As a young boy matures, he

starts to act masculine by tying his penis to his waist string, and the Yanomamo

use this developmental phase to signify a boy’s age: “My son is now tying up his

penis.” A certain amount of teasing takes place at that age, since an inexperi­

enced youth will have trouble controlling his penis. It takes a while for the fore­

skin to stretch to the length required to keep it tied securely, and until then it is

likely to slip out of the string, much to the embarrassment of its owner and the

mirth of older boys and men.


In societies where education is compulsory, children rank “being left back

in school” as the third most scary thing they can think of, beaten out only by

“losing a parent” and “going blind.” “Wetting my pants in school” comes in

fourth.4 A Yanomamo boy with his penis not tied up is like an American child

who has wet his pants in school: he is a boy who has been left back. It would

be humiliating to walk around with a dangling penis when other boys his age

or younger were already tying theirs up. When the Yanomamo boy ties his

foreskin to the string around his waist, he’s not pretending to be his father: he’s

concerned about maintaining his status among the other children in the vil­

lage. It is the mirth of the older boys that provides the stick. It is the respect of

the younger ones that provides the carrot.

Then the mother, with the other women, accompanies her daughter into the

woods to adorn her.. . . One woman begins to rub a little red urucu over all her

body, which becomes pink. They then design wavy black lines, brown on her

face and body; they make lovely designs. When she is completely painted, they

push through the large hole in her ear those strips of young assai

leaves. . . . Then they take coloured feathers and push them through the holes

which they have at the corners of their mouths and in the middle of the lower

lip. One woman also prepares a long, thin, white stick, very smooth, which she

puts in the hole that they have between their nostrils. The young girl is really

lovely, painted and decorated like this! The women say: “Now let’s go.” The girl

walks ahead, and after her come the other women and the little girls.6

The parade wends slowly through the center of the village so that everyone

can admire the debutante. Though she is probably no more than fifteen years

old (menarche comes later to girls in tribal societies), she is now considered old

enough to marry. I f her father has already promised her to someone she will

take up residence with her new husband. She went into the cage a girl and

came out a woman, as though a magician had waved his magic wand: Poof,

you’re a woman!



They are supposed to behave that way in some societies. Yanomamo men,

if they don’t like the way their wife is behaving, hit her with a stick or shoot an

arrow into some part of her anatomy they can do without. Ask Helena, the

Brazilian girl who was kidnapped by the Yanomamo. When Helena came of

age she was claimed by a Yanomamo headman, Fusiwe, who already had four

wives. Fusiwe was a nice guy by Yanomamo standards—reader, she loved

him!—but he got angry at her once for something that wasn’t her fault and he

broke her arm.


According to the editorial in the Journal o f the American Medical Association,

Carl McElhinney was a child murderer. No, not a murderer of children, but a

seven-year-old boy who had committed a murder. The editorial was written in

1896; it was reprinted in JAMA a hundred years later as a historical curiosity.

I cannot give you any details of Carl’s crime because the focus of the edito­

rial was not on the murderer himself but on his mother.

Before Carl’s birth Mrs. McElhinney was an assiduous reader of novels. Morn­

ing, noon and night her mind was preoccupied with imaginative crimes of the

most bloody sort. Being a woman of fine and delicate perception, she appreci­

ated to an extent almost equaling reality the extravagant miseries, motive, vil­

lainies set down in novels, so that her mind was miserably contorted weeks

before the birth of her child Carl. The boy was an abnormal development of

criminality. He has a delight in the inhuman. It takes intense horror to please

this peculiar appetite. . . . I believe criminal record does not show a case so

remarkable as this. As the boy matures these mental conditions will mature. He

is dangerous to the community.

The cause of Carl’s abnormal development, according to the physician

who wrote the editorial, was the impression made on his mother’s mind by the

books she read while she was carrying him. Strong impressions on a woman’s

mind “may pervert or stop the growth, or cause defect in the child with which

she is pregnant.”

The editorial concluded, as editorials are wont to do, with a moral:

We as scientific physicians . . . should teach our patrons how to care for our

pregnant women, and the danger from maternal influences. The Spartans bred

warriors, and I believe this generation can breed a better people. One of the

future advances to help the generations to come, will be to teach them the

power of maternal influences, with better care of our pregnant women.1

The “better care of our pregnant women” would presumably include care­

ful screening of the reading material permitted to them.


Not so fast. It turns out that the ability of a criminal adoptive family to pro­

duce a criminal child—given suitable material to work with—depends on

where the family happens to live. The increase in criminality among Danish

adoptees reared in criminal homes was found only for a minority of the sub­

jects in this study: those who grew up in or around Copenhagen. In small

towns and rural areas, an adoptee reared in a criminal home was no more

likely to become a criminal than one reared by honest adoptive parents.14

It wasn’t the criminal adoptive parents who made the biological son of

criminals into a criminal: it was the neighborhood in which they reared him.

Neighborhoods differ in rates of criminal behavior, and I would guess that

neighborhoods with high rates of criminal behavior are exceedingly hard to

find in rural areas of Denmark.

she is correct:

data here (danish):


The links between divorce, personality problems in the parents, and trou­

blesome behavior in the children are complex: the effects go every which way.

People with personality problems are difficult to live with so they’re more

likely to get divorced; the same people are more likely, for genetic reasons, to

have difficult kids. There might even be a child-to-parent effect: a difficult kid

can put a real strain on a marriage. Earlier in the chapter I quoted the joke

about Johnny, the kid who could break any home, but it is not funny if you

have a kid like Johnny. Some children make every member of the family wish

they could get out. Judith Wallerstein talks about the heavy load o f guilt the

children o f divorcing parents are burdened with—the kids think their parents’

divorce was their fault. What Wallerstein doesn’t consider is that sometimes

there may be an element of truth in what the kids think. Divorce occurs less

often in families that contain a son than in those that only have daughters.38

The presence of that boy either makes the parents happier or makes the father

more reluctant to walk out. But what if the boy is not a satisfying kid? What if

he is nothing but trouble?

didnt know that. altho im not supersurprised, since a lot of people have told me that they prefer to have male children. “easier to handle” they say.


I see it in the news all the time; it always makes me angry. The Smith kid gets

into trouble and the judge threatens to throw his parents in jail. The Jones kid

burglarizes a house and his parents are fined for their failure to “exercise rea­

sonable control” over his activities. The Williams kid gets pregnant and her

parents are criticized for not keeping track of where she was and what she was

doing. One set of parents, when they found it impossible to keep their teenage

daughter out of trouble, chained her to the radiator. They were arrested for

child abuse.61

cant win…


Good things tend to go together. So do bad things. These are correlations.

Educational psychologist Howard Gardner would have us believe that there

are several different “intelligences” and that someone who was stinted on one

might have gotten a generous helping of another. But the fact is that people

who score low on tests o f one kind of intelligence are also likely to score low

on tests of other kinds.68 We are pleased when we hear about a child who is

mentally retarded in most respects but who is a whiz at drawing or calculating:

it appeals to our sense of fairness. But such cases are uncommon. Far more

commonly, nature is unfair to mentally retarded children by giving them no

talents and making them physically clumsy as well. That is why they compete

in the Special Olympics instead of the regular Olympics.


“Everything is related to everything else,” said a psychologist whose spe­

cialty was statistics. He told the story of a pair of researchers who collected

data on 57,000 high school students in Minnesota. The researchers asked the

kids about their leisure activities and educational plans, whether they liked

school, and how many siblings they had. They asked about their fathers’

occupation, their mothers’ and fathers’ education, and their families’ atti­

tudes toward college. There were fifteen items in all and 105 possible correla­

tions between pairs of items.* All 105 yielded significant correlations, most at

levels of significance that would be expected by chance less than .000001 of

the time.69

with the power of n=57k, sure, one can find even very small correlations!


On the other hand, I don’t want to raise false hopes. So let me begin with a

true story, told by my late colleague David Lykken, about a pair of reared-apart

twins—one of the pairs studied at the University of Minnesota by the research

team of which he was a member.

They are identical twins separated in infancy; they grew up in different

adoptive homes. One became a concert pianist, talented enough to perform as

a soloist with the Minnesota Orchestra. The other cannot play a note.

Since these women have the same genes, the disparity must be due to a dif­

ference in their environments. Sure enough, one of the adoptive mothers was

a music teacher who gave piano lessons in her home. The parents who adopted

the other twin were not musical at all.

Only it was the nonmusical parents who produced the concert pianist and

the piano teacher whose daughter cannot play a note.1


Not that being rejected by one’s peers is the end of the world. It hurts like

hell while it’s happening and it does leave permanent scars, but it doesn’t

keep a kid from being socialized (you can identify even with a group that

rejects you), and I’ve noticed that many interesting people went through a

period of rejection during childhood. Or got moved around a lot, which has

similar effects. I was moved around a lot as a child and went through four

years of rejection, and there is no doubt that I would have been a different per­

son if it hadn’t happened. A more sociable person, but more superficial. Cer­

tainly not a writer o f books—a job that has as its first requirement the

willingness to spend a good deal of time alone. The biologist and author E. O.

Wilson recalls his childhood this way:

I was an only child whose family moved around quite a bit in southern Alabama

and northwestern Florida. I attended 14 different schools in 11 years. So it was,

perhaps, inevitable that I grew up as something of a solitary and found nature

my most reliable companion. In the beginning, nature provided adventure;

later, it was the source of much deeper emotional and aesthetic pleasure.17

I attended 4 different ground schools, so i fit the pattern as well.



In general, this was a short and interesting read. Made me want to read other material by Anne Campbell. The last chapter is skipable, just as Kanazawa said when he reviewed the book.




Women’s “natural” empathy is seen not as an obstacle to impartial observa-

tion but rather as an asset that affords them a different “way of knowing”

(Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986). This empathy is endorsed

even in the nonhuman sciences; “If you want to understand about a tumour,

you’ve got to be a tumour” (Goodfield, 1981, p. 213). Allied to this is an ori-

entation toward the idiographic or at least an avoidance of generalization:

Each woman is unique, and sweeping statements about women in general

or classes of women are viewed with suspicion.


This is the most stupid claim of ‘personal experience’-favoring people ive ever read.




The second strand of thought is an explicit acknowledgment of the po-

litical nature of feminist research (Cole & Phillips, 1995). Its aim is to im-

prove the lives of women (“The information-gathering purpose of research

thus takes second place to a facilitative and liberatory one” [Burr, 1998,

p. 139]), rather than to serve existing patriarchal institutions. Because no

firm line is drawn between the researcher and the researched, the fruits of

feminist research benefit the former as much as the latter (“Inquiry, as I have

portrayed it, is an uncertain, vulnerable process with immense potential for

personal growth and intellectual creativity” [Marshall, 1986, p. 208]). It is

clear that the feminist political agenda takes precedence over “malestream”

social science. Psychologist Celia Kitzinger (1990, pp. 121–122) is blunt in

her denouncement: “Having identified psychology as incompatible with

feminism because of its refusal to deal with political realities, and its pre-

tence at objectivity, feminists with a professional involvement in the disci-

pline then sought to redefine and harness psychology for the feminist cause.”

In extremis, this has lead to the wholesale rejection of psychology as con-

flicting with feminist ideology: “The antipsychology approach [which grants

all psychological data and theories a severely limited validity, or even rejects

them completely] is the one which I shall argue offers most to feminist psy-

chology” (Squire, 1990, p. 79).


They are beyond hope. But the wording is good, “malestream science”, ill have to remember that when pointing out that males are dominating in science.


Its apparently not completely niche:


See also a random article that uses it here:


The above is complaining about the underrepresentation of women in films and theater, apparently missing the obvious ideas:


As a prepubescent actress at an all-girls’ school I had the chance to play a plethora of roles.  In fact, I mostly cross-dressed: from a Scottish medieval knight to a chain-smoking, juvenile delinquent.  The opportunity to be whoever I wanted to be, to dream up characters far removed from myself is what turned me onto acting.  Inevitably, the real world burst that creative bubble.  On work experience at the Royal Court Theatre, I had the mind-numbing task of separating acting CVs into male and female.  The exercise proved instructive: the women’s pile doubled the men’s.  There was no mistaking the visual metaphor: the odds were quite literally stacked against me.

The issue isn’t that there are more women actors than men; it’s the double bind that there are far fewer roles for women than men.  Women are not proportionally represented, even though the majority of the viewing public, for both theatre and television, is female.

As an art form, theatre purports to be progressive.  Yet, a 2006 study by Sphinx theatre company[1] showed that out of 140 national theatre productions, 62% of roles were for men and 38% for women.  Although more women go to the theatre than men, they are still watching plays in which men play central roles.  It’s no coincidence that 70% of these plays were written by and 69% directed by men.  Despite the significant numbers of female actors, writers and directors, the industry remains male-dominated.


Does it occur to her that women might just not be as interesting characters? They certainly are not if we look at history. Since they, according to her, are the majority of the viewers, perhaps they just like to watch men? These are obviously hypotheses to me.


It still astounds me that casting is so overtly and unashamedly discriminatory.  Unlike any other industry, more often than not, an actor is primarily hired on the basis of sex, race and appearance.  In this past week, I analysed breakdowns from several casting websites to which I subscribe: 72% sought male actors, while just 28% advertised for women.  It’s not only the number of roles available to women; it’s the quality of these roles, which often perpetuate patriarchal stereotypes and/or sexually objectify women.  Here are a few gems:

Ah, the sociologist’s second fallacy! Which i will expand to not just racism, but any discrimination. There are some obvious solutions for complainer above: Become a screenwriter and start writing plays with more women. Become a director, start making films with more women. Convince other women not to go into acting (thus increasing demand and wages for those there).




This question of whether ideas that are promulgated through discourse

are veridical is one that constructionists finesse because they reject the

methods by which “facts” and “truth” are established. But in a crucial way,

their avoidance of this question places them in a very awkward position in

relation to their aims of both representing women’s experiences and im-

proving women’s lives. Constructionists’ analyses of women’s experiences

are negotiable, provisional, and subjective “glosses” of women’s negotiable,

provisional, and subjective discourse about themselves. Since there is no

“self,” aside from its situated constitution in text, it makes no sense to lay

claim to “accuracy” in any description of women’s lives since the term is

meaningless without a criterion for factuality. In addition, if there are no

facts (encapsulated in Derrida’s famous dictum “There is nothing outside the

text”), then constructionists are forced to concede that men’s historical op-

pression of women, the suffering of abused wives, and working women’s in-

ability to break through the glass ceiling are not facts but situated social







Social constructionists not only refuse to seriously address the possibil-

ity of a social reality beyond the text (that may or may not be accurately rep-

resented in discourse) but are equally reluctant to consider the origins of

everyday discourses. If the stronger male sex drive is a collective fiction, then

where did it originate? Which sex benefits from it? Why is it not discon-

firmed by thousands of women’s own experience? At what age and how do

young people acquire it? These are, we are told, illegitimate “mechanical”



But to assume the mechanical reproduction of discourse requires ask-

ing how it got to be like that in the first place. And that question is in

danger of throwing theory back into answers according to the terms

of biological, Oedipal or social and economic determinisms. (Hollway,

1984, pp. 238–239)


This reminds me of Jussim et al’s article The Unbearable Accuracy of Stereotypes. Quotes here. Where do stereotypes come from? Usually, they come from the shared experiences of many, many people. Although they can be invented as well. But since they are usually grounded in facts, they are reasonably accurate.




At the biological heart of sex differences lies anisogamy—the vastly un-

equal size (and consequent energetic cost) of gametes contributed by male

and female in sexual reproduction. As Williams (1996, p. 118) points out,

anisogamy marks the start of male exploitation of females. “When egg-

producers reproduce, they must bear the entire nutritional burden of nur-

turing the offspring. By contrast, the sperm-makers reproduce for free. A

sperm is not a contribution to the next generation; it is a claim on contribu-

tions put into the egg by another individual. Males of most species make no

investments in the next generation, but merely compete with one another

for the opportunity to exploit investments made by females.” When com-

bined with internal fertilization, the stage is set for an even greater inequal-

ity in parental investment for two main reasons. First, the cost to the female

of abandoning the embryo or newborn is far greater than to the male. At any

given point in time she has made the greater commitment to the offspring

(in terms of time and energy) and will suffer a higher replacement cost if she

deserts it (all the more true in humans, where her reproductive future is

truncated by menopause). Second, internal fertilization introduces uncer-

tainty about paternity. While a female need never doubt that the offspring

to which she gives birth is her own, males must entertain the possibility of

cuckoldry. The degree of paternal care depends, across species, on the male’s

certainty that he is the biological father. Doubt reduces the likelihood of

male investment and leaves the mother “holding the baby.” For these rea-

sons, in over 90% of mammals, it is the female who exclusively cares for the

young. As primates, humans are remarkable on three counts. First, they

must cope with a very protracted period of infant dependency. Babies are

born, biologically speaking, about nine months prematurely so that the huge

cranium can pass through the pelvis—a channel that could not grow larger

without compromising the mother’s bipedal locomotion. Sexual maturity is

not attained for 12 to 14 years because an extensive learning period is re-

quired to master the complexity of the social environment that humans

must navigate. Second, humans display a very high degree of paternal care

relative to other primates. Men did not elect this route as a favor to

women—selection does not favor strategies that selflessly benefit others at a

net cost to the donor. Polygyny (men taking multiple mates) can offer huge

reproductive benefits to a man, but the sheer mathematics of the situation

mean that a high proportion of the less desirable will fail to reproduce at

all—and may not even survive the intense degree of male competition that

polygyny engenders. The prizes are high, but the odds are strongly stacked

against winning. For most men, it would be more advantageous to remain

with one woman and increase the likelihood of their joint offspring surviv-

ing than to court multiple women whose offspring had a low survival prob-

ability for lack of male investment. Third, human males are also notable for

the degree of control that they exercise over their mates. These three facts

are not unconnected. The high and protracted dependence of young grow-

ing humans means that they benefit from care by both parents. These long-

term costs are only likely to be met by males who have high levels of paternal

certainty. That certainty requires close mate guarding of female partners.


About the differences in preproductive outcome. The classical source given is:


where it is written (was said):

The Most Underappreciated Fact

            The firstbig, basic difference has to do with what I consider to be the most underappreciatedfact about gender. Consider this question: What percent of our ancestors werewomen?

It’s not a trick question, and it’snot 50%. True, about half the people who ever lived were women, but that’s notthe question. We’re asking about all the people who ever lived who have a descendant living today. Or, put another way, yes,every baby has both a mother and a father, but some of those parents hadmultiple children.

            Recentresearch using DNA analysis answered this question about two years ago. Today’s human population is descended fromtwice as many women as men.

            I thinkthis difference is the single most underappreciated fact about gender. To getthat kind of difference, you had to have something like, throughout the entirehistory of the human race, maybe 80% of women but only 40% of men reproduced.


He cites no specific study. But see: Favre, Maroussia, and Didier Sornette. “Strong gender differences in reproductive success variance, and the times to the most recent common ancestors.Journal of Theoretical Biology (2012).



The Time to the Most Recent Common Ancestor (TMRCA) based on human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is estimated to be twice that based on the non-recombining part of the Y chromosome (NRY). These TMRCAs have special demographic implications because mtDNA is transmitted only from mother to child, while NRY is passed along from father to son. Therefore, the former locus reflects female history, and the latter, male history. To investigate what caused the two-to-one female–male TMRCA ratio rF/M=TF/TMrF/M=TF/TM in humans, we develop a forward-looking agent-based model (ABM) with overlapping generations. Our ABM simulates agents with individual life cycles, including life events such as reaching maturity or menopause. We implemented two main mating systems: polygynandry and polygyny with different degrees in between. In each mating system, the male population can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous. In the latter case, some males are ‘alphas’ and others are ‘betas’, which reflects the extent to which they are favored by female mates. A heterogeneous male population implies a competition among males with the purpose of signaling as alpha males. The introduction of a heterogeneous male population is found to reduce by a factor 2 the probability of finding equal female and male TMRCAs and shifts the distribution of rF/MrF/M to higher values. In order to account for the empirical observation of the factor 2, a high level of heterogeneity in the male population is needed: less than half the males can be alphas and betas can have at most half the fitness of alphas for the TMRCA ratio to depart significantly from 1. In addition, we find that, in the modes that maximize the probability of having 1.5<rF/M<2.51.5<rF/M<2.5, the present generation has 1.4 times as many female as male ancestors. We also tested the effect of sex-biased migration and sex-specific death rates and found that these are unlikely to explain alone the sex-biased TMRCA ratio observed in humans. Our results support the view that we are descended from males who were successful in a highly competitive context, while females were facing a much smaller female–female competition.


Back to the book!




Socialization explanations of sex differences are built on the foundation of

the tabula rasa infant shaped, rewarded, and punished until it conforms to

societal demands for sex-appropriate behavior. They first took shape in the

era of behaviorist learning theory. The account was a simple one; parents

treat boys and girls differently, reinforcing the correct behavior in each. Boys

are encouraged to fight, climb trees, and play football. Girls are forced to

wear dresses, play with dolls, and share. The “Baby X” paradigm was hailed

as conclusive evidence of socialization differences (e.g., Will, Self, & Datan,

1976). A six-month-old baby was wrapped in a blue or a pink blanket, iden-

tified as a boy or a girl, then handed to a woman who was asked to look after

it for a few minutes. When told it was a girl, the women more often offered

the infant a doll in preference to other toys. Surely this showed that parents

treat infants differently as a function of their biological sex?


But there was a problem. Despite many attempts at replication, the ef-

fect seemed even weaker than it had on first sight appeared (and recall the

effect was found only for toy selection—there were no differences in social

behavior to the infant). It was certainly not strong enough to support the

whole edifice of sex differences (Stern & Karraker, 1989). And even if par-

ents gave their children different toys, such a finding would be trivial unless

it could be shown that the toys changed the child’s subsequent behavior. But

the real challenge came when Lytton and Romney (1991) collected from

around the world 172 studies that had examined the way in which parents

treat their sons and daughters. Considering them all together, the evidence

for differential treatment was virtually nil. Parents did not differ in the

amount of interaction with the child, the warmth they showed, their ten-

dency to encourage either dependency or achievement, their restrictiveness,

their use of discipline, their tendency to reason with the child, or the amount

of aggression that they tolerated. There was one area that showed a differ-

ence. Parents tended to give their children sex-appropriate toys. But sex-

differentiated toy preference has been found in infants from nine months of

age (Campbell, Shirley, Heywood, & Crook, 2000). Children play more

with sex-appropriate toys even when their parents do not specifically en-

courage them to do so (Caldera, Huston, & O’Brien, 1989). It is quite likely

that parents are not using toys to turn their children into gender conformists

but are simply responding to the child’s own preferences.


Didnt know of that meta-analysis. Heres the abstract:


A meta-analysis of 172 studies attempted to resolve the conflict between previous narrative reviews on whether parents make systematic differences in their rearing of boys and girls. Most effect sizes were found to be nonsignificant and small. In North American studies, the only socialization area of 19 to display a significant effect for both parents is encouragement of sex-typed activities. In other Western countries, physical punishment is applied significantly more to boys. Fathers tend to differentiate more than mothers between boys and girls. Over all socialization areas, effect size is not related to sample size or year of publication. Effect size decreases with child’s age and increases with higher quality. No grouping by any of these variables changes a nonsignificant effect to a significant effect. Because little differential socialization for social behavior or abilities can be found, other factors that may explain the genesis of documented sex differences are discussed.


Probably, a newer one exist by now. But interesting nonetheless.




Anyway, if parents’ behavior toward their children was being guided by

their desire for them to conform to traditional gender stereotypes than we

would expect to find that the most sex-typed adults have the most sex-typed

children. Yet studies find that there is no relationship between traditional

household division of labor, parents’ attitudes to sex-typing, their sex-

typical activities, and their reactions to children’s behavior on one hand

and children’s degree of sex-typing on the other (Maccoby, 1998)


So much for those typical explanations…




Following these early views of the child shaped by selective reinforce-

ment came social learning theory, which emphasized a hitherto neglected

(but altogether central primate) capacity—imitation. This was co-opted into

an explanation of sex differences by proposing that children selectively im-

itate their same-sex parent. Laboratory studies were done in which children

were exposed to adult “models” performing a variety of novel behaviors. If

social learning theorists were right, then the statistical analysis would show

a significant interaction between sex-of-model and sex-of-child—girls would

imitate women and boys would imitate men. Dozens of such studies failed

to find such an effect (Huston, 1983; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). Perry and

Bussey (1979) devised an ingenious experiment that avoided the pitfalls of

the previous studies, where children had a one-off exposure to an adult

model. They showed children a film of eight adults selecting a preferred

fruit. In one condition all four men made one choice (e.g., orange), while all

four women made another (e.g., apple). In another condition, three men and

one woman chose an orange while three women and one man chose an

apple. In another condition half the men chose oranges and half the women

chose apples. They found that the extent to which children copied an adult

preference depended upon the proportion of their sex that made that

choice. In the first condition, there was a high degree of same-sex imitation,

in the second a much smaller amount, and in the third, there was no signif-

icant difference between the girls and boys in their choices. What this sug-

gested was that children were not slavishly imitating a same-sex adult but

rather judging the appropriateness of a particular (in this case wholly arbi-

trary) preference on the basis of the proportion of male or female adults who

made it. These results helped to make sense of previous work, which had

already shown that children tended to imitate activities that they already

knew to be sex-typed regardless of the sex of the model who was currently

engaged in it (Barkley, Ullman, Otto, & Brecht, 1977). What was important

was the child’s internal working model of gender and behavior.






Many developmentalists had already rebelled against the thoroughly passive

view of the child constructed by learning theory. Martin and Halverson

(1981) argued that children have a natural tendency to think categorically.

They form categories about all sorts of things, from animals to sports, and it

would be surprising if they did not, very early in life, form categories of male

and female. Once these categories are formed, all incoming information that

is gender-related gets shunted into the correct binary slot, and over time a

stereotype is built up about what males and females look like, do, and enjoy.

It is this internal model or gender schema, not the surveillance of parents,

which drives the child toward sex-appropriate behavior. At the very same

time that this proposal was being offered for child development, Bem

(1974) was proposing an identical scheme to explain adult differences in

sex-typing. The degree to which we “type” information as gender-relevant

is an individual difference variable. Women who strongly sex-type informa-

tion become more stereotypically feminine than women who are less in-

clined to tag information with gender labels. The cognitive revolution had

come to sex differences: it was not a matter of behavioral training, it was a

matter of mental categorizing, organizing, and recalling.


But gender schema theory was so cognitive that it left no room for an

adapted mind. The cracks inevitably began to appear. One problem was tim-

ing: sex differences in toy choice, play styles, activity levels, and aggression

are found as early as two years of age (Brooks & Lewis, 1974; Fagot, 1991;

Freedman, 1974; Howes, 1988; Kohnstamm, 1989; O’Brien & Huston,

1985; Roopnarine, 1986), but children are not able to correctly sort pic-

tures of boys and girls into piles until their third year (Weinraub, Clements,

Sockloff, Ethridge, & Myers, 1984). Children prefer sex-congruent toys

before they are able to say whether the toy is more appropriate for a boy or

a girl (Blakemore, LaRue, & Olejnik, 1979). They prefer to interact with

members of their own sex and show sex differences in social behavior before

they can label different behaviors as being more common among boys or

girls (Serbin, Moller, Gulko, Powlishta, & Colburne, 1994; Smetana &

Letourneau, 1984). Longitudinal studies confirm that sex-typed behavior

does not wait upon gender labeling (Campbell, Shirley, & Candy, under re-

view; Fagot & Leinbach, 1989; Trautner, 1992). A second problem was

correspondence: even when children’s gender stereotypes crystallize and

peak at about seven years of age, there is no relationship between a child’s

gender knowledge and how sex-stereotypic their own behavior is (Serbin

et al., 1994; Martin, 1994; Powlishta, 1995). Children seem to need neither

the ability to discriminate the sexes nor an understanding of gender stereo-

typic behavior to show sex differences.


Didnt know this! Very cool.




During the last twenty years there has been a significant change in the

nature of women’s labor, as women have moved into many arenas tradi-

tionally occupied by men. We might therefore expect to see a shift in both

stereotypes and self-perceptions by men and women. No such shift has

occurred (Helmreich, Spence, & Gibson, 1982; Lewin & Tragos, 1987;

Lueptow, 1985; Lueptow, Garovich, & Lueptow, 1995). Furthermore, we

would expect to see a fair degree of cultural specificity, with “traditional” so-

cieties showing more marked stereotypes than more egalitarian ones. We do

not (Williams & Best, 1982). Social role theory supposes that sex differences

are responsive to stereotypes and hence that stereotypes should be more ex-

treme and polarized than actual sex differences. They are not (Swim, 1994).

We are left with the alternative suggestion that stereotypes are reasonably

accurate assessments of the typical differences between men and women.

Rather than stereotypes causing sex differences, the reverse is the case. If this

is true, then we at least have a means of explaining the typical division of

labor between the sexes (women elect to spend more time than men do in

parenting activities). Although Eagly acknowledges that two biological fac-

tors (gestation and lactation in women, and size and strength in men) may

be implicated in the division of labor, for her biology stops at the neck: “This

viewpoint assumes that men and women have inherited the same evolved

psychological dispositions” (Eagly & Wood, 1999, p. 224). While anisogamy

may have forced the reproductive burden upon women, Eagly and Wood

make the implausible argument that there has been no commensurate adap-

tation of their goals, strategies, or preferences.


Nobody can seriously doubt that environmental and cultural factors in-

fluence the expression of sex differences. But to acknowledge the impact of

culture upon the surface structure of femininity is not to say that gender has

no biological basis and that the nature of men and women is wholly con-

structed by society. The problem with such a position is that it fails to ad-

dress the issue of why sex differences take the particular form that they do.

If gender differences are arbitrary, it is a curious coincidence that they fol-

low such a similar pattern around the world (Brown, 1991; Murdock, 1981).

Even if sex differences were driven by differential parental treatment, we

would still want to ask why a trait is considered more desirable for one sex

than another. If they were driven by selective imitation, we would still want

to ask why children might show an untutored interest in their own sex. If

driven by gender schema, we would need to ask why sex-specific conformity

is so attractive to children. If driven by the division of labor, we still need to

explain the preference of men and women for agentic and expressive occu-

pational roles. Liberal feminists explain the transmission of the status quo—

but without asking where it came from.


For newer data about this, see:, especially the summary here: (english)


In the more egalitarian countries, sex differences are larger not smaller! It would seem that the more free women are made, the more they choose interests and work closer to their natural inclinations.




It is hard to know what to make of Fausto-Sterling’s (1992, p. 199)

claim that “there is no single undisputed claim about universal human be-

havior (sexual or otherwise).” Presumably even the most ardent cultural rel-

ativist would accept that everywhere people live in societies, that they eat,

sleep, and make love, and that women give birth and men do not. Some fem-

inist biologists refuse to engage in any debate about the evolved nature of

psychological sex differences by denying that two sexes even exist. Muldoon

and Reilly (1998, p. 55) believe that “the objectivity of “hard science” in this

area can be questioned, so much so that the biological definition of sex itself

becomes untenable.” They suggest that there is no biological basis for our

belief in male and female as “dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories”

(see also Bem, 1993). Notwithstanding these authors’ uncertainty, most

feminists accept that the vast majority of the population belongs to one of

two biologically distinct sexes. Indeed, most feminists acknowledge that the

reproductive differences between them are the result of evolution.


The problems seem to arise when we move from biological functioning

of the body to the biological functioning of the brain—which are seen as

quite unrelated (Bem, 1993). Though everywhere women are the principle

caretakers of children, the fact that there may be variation in how that task

is fulfilled leads some anthropologists to conclude that mothering is not uni-

versal (Moore, 1988). This is analogous to arguing that because people eat

different food in different parts of the world, eating is not universal. Fortu-

nately, Donald Brown (1991), trained in the standard ethnographic tradi-

tion, has documented the extent of human universals. Of special interest to

the study of gender we find: binary distinctions between men and women,

division of labor by sex, more child-care by women, more aggression and

violence by men, and acknowledgment of different natures of men and



Even though the brain is the most expensive organ in the human body

in terms of calorie consumption, even though feminists accept that hominid

brain size itself was a result of natural selection, and even though the pro-

duction of the very hormones that orchestrate bodily differences originate

in the brain, many social science feminists reject the notion that evolution

could have had an impact on the minds of the two sexes. Though success-

ful reproduction is the reason for our existence today and though the sexes

play vital and different roles in that process, they reject any notion that their

minds may have been sculpted by millions of years of evolution to set dif-

ferent goals or pursue different strategies.


This reminds me of the similar claims made about races. Everybody acknowledge that racial differences in skin color and the like are due to evolution. Things like racially affected diseases are also mainstream:,


But when it comes to mental attributes, surely, they deny evolution any significant change over the last thousands of years since africans separated from non-africans out of Africa, or Asians from Caucasians, and so on. Jensen wrote in The g Factor p. 433 that:


Of the approximately 100,000 human polymorphic genes, about 50,000 are

functional in the brain and about 30,000 are unique to brain functions.1121 The

brain is by far the structurally and functionally most complex organ in the human

body and the greater part of this complexity resides in the neural structures of

the cerebral hemispheres, which, in humans, are much larger relative to total

brain size than in any other species. A general principle of neural organization

states that, within a given species, the size and complexity of a structure reflect

the behavioral importance of that structure. The reason, again, is that structure

and function have evolved conjointly as an integrated adaptive mechanism. But

as there are only some 50,000 genes involved in the brain’s development and

there are at least 200 billion neurons and trillions of synaptic connections in the

brain, it is clear that any single gene must influence some huge number of

neurons— not just any neurons selected at random, but complex systems of

neurons organized to serve special functions related to behavioral capacities.

It is extremely improbable that the evolution of racial differences since the

advent of Homo sapiens excluded allelic changes only in those 50,000 genes

that are involved with the brain.


An analogous case is true for another biological group distinction: men and women. Given the possibility of sex-linked genes, it seems entirely unreasonable to expect evolution never to make use of this for the brain. Indeed, we know this isnt the case because hormones are partly controlled in the brain. Why then apriori exclude other sex-linked genes for the brain? It makes no sense at all, and is a clear case of prejudiced opinions.


That being said, it is now known that there are actually fewer genes in humans than estimated when Jensen wrote that in 1998. This however does little to affect the above theoretical reasoning.




The first is the “Show me the gene” argument, which maintains that we

need not accept the hereditary basis of any trait until biologists locate the

gene responsible. As I have just discussed, phenotypic behavior is not re-

ducible to a gene; it depends upon incredibly complex cascades of interac-

tions with the environment. We will never find a one-to-one relationship

between a gene and a life history strategy (e.g., mature early and breed plen-

tifully versus mature late and invest heavily) because all members of a

species have the ability to take either route and the one that is selected is a

function of environmental factors such as crowding, stress, status, and deve-

lopmental experiences. Even discounting environmental effects, the bio-

logical (to say nothing of psychological) development of a single trait could

not be a straightforward mapping exercise because of pleiotropy (where

a single gene affects two or more apparently unrelated traits), polygenics

(where a single trait is controlled by many genes), nonadditivity (where

genes at different loci interact) and switch genes (higher-order genes control

the action of many others). These complexities aside, evolutionary psychol-

ogists are not geneticists, and it is unreasonable to expect them to be. But

this does not mean that psychologists must remain gagged until then. When

we see universal complexities of psychological design that suggest an adap-

tation, it is reasonable to test such a proposal—just as alternative formula-

tions (e.g., sex differences are absent where children possess no cognitive

categories for male and female) are free to test theirs.


This objection is particularly stupid. It is also made with respect to races. I wonder if people also make it with respect to evolution? After all, Darwin had no good idea of the gene, and the biological basis for it wasnt even discovered until 1950ish.


Its a case of setting irrationally high evidence requirements for a claim inconsistent with one’s current beliefs.




The real attack on Wilson’s book started in the fall of 1975 with a letter from

the Sociobiology Study Group to the New York Review of Books (Allen et al.,

1975). In that letter, Sociobiologywas being connected to nazism and racism,

and Wilson was said to support a conservative agenda by emphasizing the

genetic underpinnings of human behavior. Actually, though Wilson’s book

was more than 500 pages long, only the last chapter was devoted to the

human species. There he argued that a number of behaviors, including sex

roles, aggression, altruism, and even moral and religious beliefs, could well

have a biological basis. To boost this argument, he drew parallels to the

behavior of other primates and invoked research on selected traits from be-

havioral genetics and twin studies, suggesting that additional traits may turn

out to have a similar genetic foundation. The critics, however, argued that

Wilson had no evidence and that his statements supported a biological de-

terminist view of humans. For them, such a view implied that social in-

equality was “in our genes,” which would make social measures to diminish

inequality futile.


Almost makes me want to read the original book, but surely something newer on sociobiology has come out in the last 38 years?




But what Wilson wanted to present as exciting new findings his critics

declared to be “bad” and dangerous ideologically influenced science. And

among his critics could be found two of Wilson’s Harvard colleagues,

Richard Lewontin and Stephen J. Gould, who were members of the Socio-

biology Study Group, which had formed soon after Wilson’s book was an-

nounced as news on the front page of the New York Times in late May 1975.

This group organized many critical activities, starting with a letter in the

New York Review of Books signed by a number of Boston-area academics. The

high point of criticism was a sociobiology symposium at the 1978 meeting

of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washing-

ton, DC, where a group of activists (from the antiracist group Committee

Against Racism) chanted “Racist Wilson, you can’t hide, we charge you

with genocide!” whereupon two of them poured a pitcher of ice water on

Wilson’s neck, shouting, “Wilson, you are all wet!”






In 1975 the critics benefited from the political climate in which bio-

logical explanations of humans were taboo. This was a time when the lib-

eral credo reigned. There was the spirit of the post–World War II UNESCO

declaration stating that no evidence for racial differences existed, and the

general agreement to restrict genetic explanations of humans to the field of

medicine. This was also the time of postwar “environmentalism” (or, rather,

culturalism); people like Margaret Mead in anthropology and B. F. Skinner

in psychology were still held in high regard. And just before the sociobiology

debate, as a warning for all, there had been the controversy about IQ around

psychologist Arthur Jensen’s (1969) suggestion that the 15-point difference

in measured IQ between whites and blacks could have a genetic explana-

tion. Wilson had actually been careful with IQ and race in his book, and even

covered his back by citing Lewontin’s (1972) discovery that variation be-

tween populations (races) is much smaller than variation within a popula-

tion (race), a point that was widely regarded as undermining the usefulness

of race as a biological concept. But for the critics, that was not enough. What

mattered to them was the fact that Wilson had dared discuss biological un-

derpinnings for human behavior at all. This is why he had to be forcefully

denounced as a “bad” scientist, both morally and scientifically.


In 1975 many believed the critics when it came to Wilson’s political

motives. Very few ever read his book or asked about his actual agenda—or,

for that matter, about the critics’ agenda.


The treatment of the various IQ researchers is also worth reading about. I refer to Nyborg, Helmuth. “The greatest collective scientific fraud of the 20th century: The demolition of differential psychology and eugenics.” Mankind Quarterly, Spring Issue (2011).




The members of Science for the People were genuinely convinced that so-

ciobiology was, indeed, evil. (Of course, for academic activists, the fight

against sociobiology was also a welcome cause to rally around after the IQ

controversy.) The working logic of the critics is worth examining more

closely. It involved a type of “cognitive coupling” between three things: bad

science, ideological influences, and bad consequences. Moreover, there was

a clear connection between the critics’ criticism of sociobiology and their

conception that “bad,” and only “bad,” science would be socially abused.


What, then, was “bad” science? It turned out to be the kind of science

that the critics disliked: sociobiology, behavioral genetics, IQ research. Bad

science was never the kind of science that the critics did themselves in their

own labs. Bad science was science that involved working with models and

statistics of various sorts, not science at the molecular, reductionist level.

For many critics, the molecular level was where the “real” truth lay. Mod-

eling would never really yield reliable, serious science—only objective-

seeming, dangerous pseudoscience. This was Lewontin’s (1975a) position.

As Lewontin had already declared about those who studied cognitive traits,

they “could not” be interested in genuine science, because real science had

to do with the molecular level. Therefore they “must” be pursuing their re-

search for ideological reasons—which could also explain the “shoddiness” of

their science (Lewontin, 1975b).




Other evolutionary psychologists have made similar statements (see

Dennett, 1995, p. 537; Daly and Wilson, 1988, p. 12). Not only do evolu-

tionary psychologists acknowledge the existence of by-products and noise;

they also explicitly test by-product hypotheses (e.g., Kurzban, Tooby, &

Cosmides, 2001; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). In addition, they acknowledge

that adaptationist claims must be backed by evidence: “To show that an or-

ganism has cognitive procedures that are adaptations . . . one must also

show that their design features are not more parsimoniously explained as

by-products” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p. 180).


Ironically, in the same volume of essays in which Gould and Rose’s

comments appear (Rose & Rose, 2000), Fausto-Sterling makes exactly the

reverse criticism. She takes issue with Don Symons’s (1979) speculation that

the female orgasm might be a by-product rather than an adaptation (Fausto-

Sterling, 2000, p. 211), existing only because of the male orgasm, with the

design “carried over” to the other sex. Whichever view proves to be correct,

Fausto-Sterling here seems guilty of precisely the sins of which evolution-

ary psychologists stand accused, while Symons is as pluralistic as Gould

could ask.


Ironic indeed.




Elsewhere, however, it is clear that parents do sometimes neglect,

abuse, and even abandon their children (see Hrdy, 1999 for many exam-

ples). Often, one sex of offspring is more likely to be neglected, abused, or

even killed than the other. Female infanticide is the most common pattern

(see Dickemann, 1979b for an evolutionary analysis), but male-biased in-

fanticide has also been reported (e.g., among the Ayoreo of Bolivia by

Bugos & McCarthy, 1984). Much of my own research has focused on a pat-

tern of daughter favoritism among the Mukogodo of Kenya, an impover-

ished and low-status group of Maasai-speaking pastoralists (Cronk, 1989,

1991b, 2000). Although there is absolutely no evidence that the Mukogodo

abuse their children or have ever practiced infanticide, I have documented

in a variety of ways a broad tendency on the part of Mukogodo parents to

favor their daughters over their sons. For example, Mukogodo mothers and

other caregivers tend to hold infant girls more often than infant boys and to

remain closer to them when not holding them. In addition, girls are nursed

longer and more frequently and are more likely to be taken for medical care

than boys. The results of this favoritism include better growth performance

by Mukogodo girls than boys (measured as height-for-age, weight-for-age,

and weight-for-height). Survivorship among young girls is so much better

than among boys that the sex ratio of children ages 0–4 years is 67 boys to

every 100 girls.


A number of explanations for this daughter favoritism are possible. For

example, it might be that Mukogodo parents favor their daughters because

of the bridewealth payments, usually consisting of several head of cattle and

some sheep and goats, that they attract. However, there is no correlation

between how many daughters a man has married off and either his herd

size, the number of wives that he himself is subsequently able to marry, or

the number of wives that his sons are subsequently able to marry. Further-

more, although all of the groups surrounding the Mukogodo also demand

bridewealth payments, they show no signs of daughter favoritism. A better

explanation is that the Mukogodo are responding to the relatively good

prospects of their daughters compared to their sons. Mukogodo women vir-

tually all get married, often to wealthy men from neighboring ethnic

groups. Mukogodo men, on the other hand, often have a hard time accu-

mulating the necessary bridewealth and frequently must delay marriage

until middle age or forgo marriage entirely because of their general poverty

and low ethnic status.


The Mukogodo pattern of daughter favoritism fits predictions made

by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers and mathematician Dan Willard

(1973). They noted that if the reproductive prospects of male and female

offspring differ in a way that is predictable from the parents’ condition dur-

ing the time of investment, natural selection would favor parents who invest

more heavily in that sex with the better reproductive prospects. Because in

many species the variance in reproductive success is greater for males than

for females, the conditions faced by an individual during development will

typically have a greater impact on the reproductive success of males than

females. The net result is often that males reared when conditions are good

will outreproduce their sisters, while females reared when conditions are

bad will outreproduce their brothers. The Mukogodo appear to be in the

latter situation: Due to their poverty and low status, girls’ prospects are

much better than boys’, and it makes sense for Mukogodo parents to favor

their daughters. Although this pattern of daughter favoritism increases

Mukogodo parents’ numbers of grandchildren, this is not simply a demon-

stration of the common folk wisdom that people like to have many grand-

children. In two surveys of Mukogodo women’s reproductive goals and

preferences, I have found that they express a bias in favor of sons, not daugh-

ters, and Mukogodo parents appear to be entirely unaware of the daughter

favoritism in their behavior. Mukogodo daughter favoritism seems to be not

a conscious strategy for enhancing one’s number of grandoffspring but,

rather, a deeply rooted evolved predisposition shared by a wide variety of

species that is triggered by specific environmental circumstances. This

demonstrates the value of an evolutionary approach in identifying circum-

stances that lead to patterns of child neglect of which even the parents them-

selves may not be aware.


Interesting case study.




There is no single biosocial approach to the study of human behavior any more than there is a single environmental approach. David Buss (1990) identifies three general biosocial approaches to the study of human behav- ior: evolutionary, behavior genetic, and physiological. Although they em- ploy different theories and methods, work with different units of analysis, and invoke different levels of causation, they are not the contradictory stew we find when we survey the plethora of strictly environmental theories in sociology. Besides having in common the tremendous potential to illumi- nate human nature, biosocial approaches are vertically integrated; i.e., their principles are conceptually consistent across all three levels of analy- sis. Although I concentrate on evolutionary psychology, all biosocial ap- proaches are so “environment-friendly” that I am tempted to call them “biologically-informed environmental approaches.” Evolutionary psycho- logy will not (and cannot) cannibalize the social sciences. We will always need the social sciences, Barkow (1992, p. 635) assures us, but he also re- minds us that “psychology underlies culture and society, and biological evo- lution underlies psychology.” That is all I am asking criminologists to accept.

Possibly too much for them to accept.


Few social scientists balk at the notion that human anatomy and physiology are products of evolution. We observe some aspect of complex morphology and infer that it was selected over alternate designs because it best served some particular function that proved useful in assisting the proliferation of its owners’ genes. Although there is no other scientifically viable explana- tion for the origin of basic behavioral design, most social scientists probably dismiss the idea of human behavioral patterns as products of the same nat- ural process. If we accept the notion that evolution shaped our minds and our behavior, we have to accept that many of our less admirable traits such as deception, cheating, and violence owe their present existence to the fact that they were useful to the reproductive success (the total number of an or- ganism’s descendants, and thus its genes) of our distant ancestors, as were more positive traits such as altruism, nurturance, and love.

Can’t get the one without the other. So it is for the qualities that make men aggressive. Make make useful combatants, useful researchers and so on, but also criminals. It is the price society pays.


How can criminal behavior, including such heterogeneous acts as murder, theft, rape, and assault, be conceived of as an evolved adaptation when it is clearly maladaptive in modern environments? First, because a behavior is currently maladaptive does not mean that mechanisms underlying it are not evolved adaptations (designed by natural selection to solve some environmental problem). Our modern environments are so different in many re- spects from the environments our species evolved in that traits and behav- iors selected for their adaptive value then may not be adaptive at all today. Conversely, traits and behaviors that appear to be adaptive today may not have a history of natural selection (Barkow, 1984; Daly, 1996; Mealey, 1995). An adaptation is a current feature with a past; a feature that is cur- rently adaptive may or may not have a future. Second, the specifics of crim- inal behavior (or of any other social behavior for that matter) are not themselves adaptations: “Genes do not code themselves for jimmying a lock or stealing a car. . . . The genome does not waste precious DNA encoding the specifics” (Rowe, 1996, p. 285).

The author is right, but has anyone tested whether it actually is adaptive today as well? Do criminals have more kids than non-criminals? That seems quite likely! Which would mean that we are actually breeding for more criminal behavior!


How do cheats manage to continue to follow their strategy given how grudgers respond to them when they are unmasked? In computer simula- tions of interactions between populations of cheats, suckers, and grudgers, cheats are always driven to extinction, as evolutionary theory would predict (Raine, 1993; Allman, 1994). The problem with such simulations is that players are constrained to operate within the same environment in which their reputations quickly become known. In the real world, cheats can move from location to location meeting and cheating a series of grudgers who are susceptible to one-time deception. This is exactly what we observe among the more psychopathic criminals. They move from place to place, job to job, and relationship to relationship, leaving a trail of misery behind them before their reputation catches up to them (Hare, 1993; Lykken, 1995). In mod- ern societies, cheats are much more likely to prosper in large cities than in small traditional communities, where the threat of exposure and retaliation is great (Ellis & Walsh, 1997; Machalek & Cohen, 1991; Mealey, 1995).

Good observation about the ‘psychopaths’ and cheaters. We really are setting up a good environment for cheaters. Interesting. The lack of ability to delete things from the internet will however counter this to some degree.


It is a central tenet of evolutionary theory that the human brain evolved in the context of overwhelming concerns for resource and mate acquisition. When food, territory, and mates are plentiful, pursuing them violently is an unnecessary waste of energy involving the risk of serious injury or death. When resources become scarce, however, acquiring them any way one can may become worth the risk (Barkow, 1989). Among our ancestral males, those who were most successful in acquiring resources gained rank and sta- tus and, thereby, access to a disproportionate number of females. As Daly and Wilson (1988a, p. 132) have remarked: “Homo sapiens is very clearly a creature for whom differential social status has consistently been associated with variations in reproductive success.” Today status is not necessarily as- sociated with aggression and violence (typically, quite the opposite today in most modern societies), but it almost certainly was more so in our ancestral environments (Chagnon, 1996; Wrangham & Peterson, 1998). As the species moved from a nomadic lifestyle to civilization, it was typically the most successful warriors that became a nation’s aristocracy (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Because females prefer males with rank and status, genes inclining males to aggressively pursue their interests (which sometimes meant becoming violent) enjoyed greater representation in subsequent gen- erations. From the evolutionary point of view, violence is something human males (as well as males in numerous other species) are designed by nature to do. Wherever we look in the world, males are far more likely than fe- males to be both the victims and the perpetrators of all kinds of violent acts (Badcock, 2000; Barak, 1998; Campbell, 1999).

Actually a study found that being bullied predicts lack of dating. Being bullied is clearly a sign of low status. So, we should expect high status to predict dating.


Early hominids (Australopithecus anemensis and afarenis) were also 50% to 100% larger than females (Geary, 2000). The low degree of sexual di- morphism among modern Homo sapiens (males are only about 10% larger than females, on average) indicates an evolutionary shift from violent male competition for mates to a more monogamous mating system and an in- crease in paternal investment (Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997). However, there is evidence in the archeological literature indicating that homicide was much more common in evolutionary environments than it is today (Edgerton, 1992). In cultures where polygyny and low paternal investment still exist, we find homicide rates greatly exceeding those of any modern society. The Agta have a rate of 326 per 100,000, and the Yanomamo one of 166 per 100,000 (Ellis & Walsh, 2000, p. 71). Chagnon (1996) also presents data showing that homicide rates in many of today’s pre-state societies are many times greater than in any modern industrial society. Indeed, because the Yanomamo practice polygyny, homicide translates directly into reproduc- tive success; males who have killed the most in intervillage warfare (and are thus the most respected) have about three times as many wives and chil- dren than those who have killed least or not at all (Chagnon, 1988).

They must be very war like, breeding for such behavior for many years.


We can accept without question that forced copulation increases fitness among nonhuman animals, but may find it distasteful to apply similar rea- soning to humans. If we claim that rape (or any other violent behavior) is a product of natural selection, aren’t we justifying it and implying that it is morally acceptable? No, we are not; and to claim that we are is to commit the naturalistic fallacy, the confusion of is with ought.Nature simply is, what ought to be is a moral judgment, and to say that forced copulation is natural mammalian behavior no more constitutes moral approval than to claim that we approve of disease and death because we call these unwelcome events natural also. Rape in a modern context is a maladaptive consequence of a mating strategy that may have been adaptive in the environments in which our species evolved; it is a morally reprehensible crime that requires strong preventative legal sanctions. Calling something “natural” does not dignify it or place it beyond the power of culture to modify, as manifestly it is not.

Like with their previous comments, perhaps whatever makes males rape is actually still adaptive. One would have to check to see if rapists have more children than non-rapists. Probably need to rely on anonymous surveys, since not all rapists are actually in prison (they might have been).


A third predictor of a person’s reproductive strategy according to AAT (but not considered a factor in other evolutionary theories of crime) is in- telligence, with those of relatively high intelligence generally opting for par- enting effort and those of relatively low intelligence generally opting for mating effort. It is not assumed that low intelligence is intrinsically antiso- cial (or high intelligence intrinsically prosocial, for that matter), only that it makes the procurement of resources needed to advertise parental effort to prospective females problematic. Low intelligence also makes it difficult to learn and appreciate the moral norms of society. Thus, a strategy emphasiz- ing mating effort is similar to criminal behavior in that direct and immedi- ate methods are used to procure resources illegitimately; little thought is given to the consequences either to the self or to the victim (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Conversely, parenting effort is embedded in a prosocial lifestyle in which resource procurement relies on the patient and intelligent accumulation of social and occupational skills that are attractive to females. Thus, reproductive strategies mirror antisocial/prosocial behavior in terms of emphases on immediate versus delayed gratification.

This is a question open to testing, and it has been. g is a stronger (negative) predictor of crime than is income, so the effect of g is not completely mediated by resources measured by income.

There is also another question to test. It is known that there is a crime hotspot in IQ. From Jensen 1998:

The above-mentioned correlation between crime and IQ is clearly nonlinear. That is, the rate of serious crimes against persons, such as robbery, assault, rape, and homicide, is very low and nearly constant across IQ levels above IQ 100, but below IQ 100 the rate rises steeply, and then declines rapidly below IQ 70. The peak crime rate occurs in the IQ range from 75 to 90, with the highest rate for violent crime in the IQ range from 80 to 90. The vast majority of both petty crimes and violent crimes are committed by the segment of the population ranging from IQ 60 to 100. (So-called white-collar criminals and leaders of organized crime generally have IQs above 100.) These findings apply to both males and females, although the rate for most types of antisocial behavior is much lower for females, especially violent crime.

On the evolutionary account, one would expect the hotspot to move when the population average moves. This is testable. In countries with all blacks in SS Africa, is the crime also committed by people 10 to 30 below the average?

National IQ’s predict national crime rates too, which favors g theory. Here’s the table from Lynn 2012:

[TABLE 9.1]


The major concern of feminist criminology has long been to explain the uni- versal fact that women are far less likely than men to involve themselves in criminal activity (Price & Sokoloff, 1995, p. 3). Whenever and wherever records have been kept, it has been found that males commit the over- whelming proportion of criminal offenses, and the more serious and violent the offense, the more males dominate in its commission (Campbell, 1999). This fact is not in dispute, although explanations of it are. The traditional sociological view of gender differences in crime and other forms of deviant behavior is that they are products of differential socialization: that men are socialized to be aggressive, ambitious, and dominant, women to be nurtur- ing and passive; and that women will be as antisocial and criminal as men with female emancipation. The majority of studies relating to this issue, however, actually support the opposite of the emancipation hypothesis: that is, as the trend toward gender equality has increased, females have tended to commit fewer rather than more crimes relative to males (Ellis & Walsh, 2000, p. 388).

This makes me wonder why, in their view, that they would WANT to ‘emancipate’ women more, if the outcome is that women become just as violent as men! Are feminists inadvertently promoting more violence?


Jerome Barkow asks us to “imagine evolutionary biology and population genetics as one island continent, and the social-behavioral sciences as an- other. Now is the time for ending false dichotomies and for emphasizing continuities. Now is the time to position the social-behavioral sciences in their proper place as a seamless continuation of biology” (1989, p. 18). To become vertically integrated in the way envisioned does not mean that crim- inologists need to become expert evolutionary psychologists, behavior ge- neticists, endocrinologists, or neuroscientists in order to study crime and criminality. They must at least be students of those sciences, however, if they are to develop theories that maintain vertical consistency with them. If they do not they will become irrelevant, as Alice Rossi (1984) warned bio- logically ignorant sex-role researchers in her 1983 presidential address to the American Sociological Association. In this “decade of the brain” and in the age of the Human Genome and Human Genetic Diversity Projects, biolog- ical data relevant to understanding criminal behavior are pouring in at a re- markable rate. Criminologists have an unprecedented opportunity to join other scientists in interdisciplinary analyses of criminal behavior with these data. If criminologists pass up this opportunity, we can be sure that the torch will be passed to other disciplines—the study of criminality is too important to remain mired in premodern science.


School Choice, Universal Vouchers and Native Flight from Local Schools


Using data from Copenhagen school registers and other sources, I test the hypothesis that

Danes are more likely to opt out of their local public school if it has a large concentration

of immigrant pupils. The results suggest that, when a rich set of covariates at student,

school, and neighbourhood levels is controlled for, up to an immigrant concentration of

about 35 per cent in the local school, opting out decisions of Danes are not affected.

But, Danes are far more likely to opt out as soon as the concentration exceeds 35 per cent.

However, only the 20 per cent of the immigrant population who speak Danish at home

respond to higher immigrant concentrations by opting out. These results lend support

to the native-flight-from-immigrants hypothesis and suggest that ethnic segregation across

schools is increased by Danes’ and immigrants’ differing behaviour.


This study examines whether a high concentration of schoolchildren of non-Western origin is a factor behind the decision to opt out of local public schools in Copenhagen, Denmark. 1 In the past 15 years, Copenhagen has experienced a substantial increase in schoolchildren with an immigrant back- ground (from 16 per cent to almost 30 per cent), and major changes in their regions of origin. A recent study (Rangvid, 2007a) examines the extent and patterns of ethnic segregation across schools in Copenhagen. This study takes the previous analysis a step further by considering a possible factor behind families’ choice of school: the percentage of immigrant children in the school. I ask whether the decision to opt out of the local public school is related to the concentration of immigrant pupils in that school, and if so, whether there is evidence of a threshold or ‘tipping point’ in response to the percentage of immigrant pupils (e.g. Clotfelter, 1976) after which families start opting for alternatives to the local school.

Crazy. Remember that the ethnicity of school children (in public schools) give an estimate of the future ethnicity of the city as a whole. And this study is from 2009, 4 years ago. Who knows what the current numbers are. Sad to see this happen to Copenhagen. :(


Despite a growing literature on the influence of the concentration of ethnic minorities in schools on white flight, there seems to be no consensus in the literature on whether ‘white flight’ actually exists (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1992; Lankford, Lee and Wyckoff, 1995; Lankford and Wyckoff, 1997; Buddin, Cordes and Kirby, 1998; Figlio and Stone, 2001). Most of the white flight literature is concerned with the choice between public and private alternatives (e.g. Lankford, Lee and Wyckoff, 1995; Betts and Fairlie, 2003; Campbell, West and Peterson, 2005; Brunner, Imazeki and Ross, 2006), which is probably due to the fact that public school choice is restricted in the United States. However, in school systems with more choice, the decision of native children to opt out from local public schools with many immigrants into other public schools with fewer immigrants poses an additional, potentially serious, threat to integration at school. Thus, the impact of segregation not only stems from the choice of private school, but also that of public school. To my knowledge, there are no studies on the joint impact of high immigrant concentration in the local school on opting out in favour of private or other public schools.

It seems very odd to deny white flight. Part of the general mantra of denying problems with low-g immigrants or rationally justified disbelief?


Since the existing literature focuses on the US experience, the main issue there is white flight from minorities (one exception is Betts and Fairlie, 2003). However, for most European countries, the related issue of native flight from immigrant schoolchildren is probably more relevant. To my knowledge, there is no European study on native flight from schools with high immigrant levels. While many considerations are similar to the white flight perspective, additional considerations include the effects of immigrant school- children on school resources and teaching methods due to their limited language proficiency. As Betts and Fairlie suggest, a substantial increase in a school of children with limited proficiency in the language of the host country can take away teaching resources from native children, due to such factors as a need for special classes for pupils with limited language skills. Alternatively, if immigrant children are in regular classes, teachers may decide to spend additional time helping them at the expense of other pupils in the class. A recent study of Copenhagen schools suggests that high numbers of immigrants in schools are related to lower test scores for native Danes and immigrants alike (Rangvid, 2006).

Or the native danes living among immigrants are lower than average g. This would be expected since the highest g natives would have the most money and thus an easier time moving to a safer, whiter area.


The Copenhagen school system has a number of features that make it an interesting case for analysis. First, even though in principle a formal mechanism assigns children to specific public schools based on residence in the school catchment area, parents can apply for admission to other public schools or to about eighty private schools. In practice, 52 per cent of all children do not attend their local public school: 26 per cent attend an alternative public school, while the remaining 26 per cent attend private schools. Thus, while a great deal of attention in the literature is typically focused on the choice of a private school, the choice between public schools is equally important in Copenhagen. Secondly, in many previous analyses of school choice, only a few children in the district have typically been affected. In Copenhagen, however, more than half the school population is involved in some form of school choice. Thirdly, because immi- grant and disadvantaged children are over-represented in Copenhagen, I was able to explore the impact of choice within an environment about which there is heightened concern.

Quite high numbers there for private schools.


To test the ‘native flight’ hypothesis, I use reduced- form equations to estimate the probability of opting out. The main objective of this study is to investigate the role played by the concentration of immigrants at school on opting out. However, this raises the question of whether it is ethnicity per se that is driving families away, since it is a well-established fact that ethnicity is correlated with a number of other characteristics that may also factor into the decisions of families, most notably socio-economic background and the academic standards of the school. Therefore, I include two additional measures in the regressions: (i) a measure of the pupils’ average socio-economic status and (ii) a measure of average achievement. Principal component analysis is used to create a con- tinuous SES index (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001) using fathers’ and mothers’ level of education and income. The first principal component accounts for 50 per cent of the variance in the set of four variables and is used to derive weights for the SES index. The highest weights were given to mother’s and father’s level of education (0.55 and 0.53), while mother’s and father’s income were given slightly lower weights (0.46 and 0.44). For the second measure, the average marks in written Danish and maths tests from the national school leaving exams after the ninth year of education (15–16-year-olds) in the 4 years 2000–2003 (summer) are used. These are the years before our point of data (2003, autumn). 10

Note how these correlations correspond to the correlations between g and education and income. The correlation between g and education is higher than the one between g and income. So this variable (based on factor analysis), is probably a measure of intelligence mixed with other stuff. In other words, it’s a contaminated/impure g factor.


When a set of dummies indicating whether at least one parent has an upper secondary or tertiary educa- tion is interacted with the number of immigrants at the local school (with both parents having only lower secondary education as the reference category), the results suggest that, among Danish pupils, those with medium and well-educated parents respond more strongly to increases in the immigrant percentage in the local school than those with poorly educated parents (since the interaction effects are both sig- nificantly different from zero; Table 2, upper panel). For immigrants, only families with well-educated parents show a stronger response to rising immigrant percentages when compared to those with poorly- educated parents (the reference category), while medium educated families do not. A test of the sum of the coefficients of the main effect (0.004) and the interaction effect for well-educated parents (0.019) shows that the effect of increasing immigrant percen- tages on opting out probabilities is weakly different from zero for well-educated immigrants (with a p-value of 0.09). Thus, Danes, no matter whether they come from poorly, medium or well-educated homes are responsive to the percentage of immigrants in their local school, but medium and well-educated families respond much more strongly than poorly educated families. Among immigrants, only the well- educated show evidence of similar behaviour, but the strength of their response and the statistical signifi- cance of the estimated coefficient is much weaker than that of Danes.

Seems to fit perfectly with my alternative hypothesis above.


To sum up, for Danes of any educational family background, opting out is a response to the number of immigrants at the local school, but better educated families are more likely to opt out. For immigrants, it is the language dimension which divides them into two groups in their opting out behaviour: those who speak Danish at home tend to opt out from schools with many immigrant pupils, while children who speak another language than Danish at home are not responsive to the composition of the school. To conclude, the subsample analysis reveals that not only does opting out increase ethnic segregation, but also increases segregation between students with well and poorly educated parents (mostly in the case of Danes) and between more and less language-proficient immigrants.

The language proficieny of the immigrants is probably also g loaded to some extent. Smarter immigrants would learn the language faster.


In the following, I investigate question 4, i.e. is there a threshold above which students start to opt out as a response to increasing immigrant shares? To shed light on this, instead of entering the immigrant percentage as a continuous variable as in the previous section, I create a set of indicator variables (0–10 per cent, 10–15 per cent, 15–20 per cent, … ,475 per cent) with ‘0–10 per cent’ immigrants being the reference category. Figure 1 illustrates the coefficient estimates of the set of indicators from separate estimations for Danes and immigrants (see also Table A2). The pattern for Danes in the upper panel of Figure 1 suggests that there are three distinct zones: up to an immi- grant percentage of around 35, there is generally no significant difference in opting out compared to the reference group of schools with no or only very few immigrants (0–10 per cent). For immigrant concentra- tions above 35 per cent, opting out is far more likely and significantly different from the reference group. Yet, while at a higher level than before, opting out does not seem to increase over the 35–55 per cent range. Thereafter, opting out stabilizes at even higher levels. The size of the effect is substantial: for immigrant levels between 35–55 per cent, the prob- ability of opting out increases by 0.30–0.45 compared to the reference category; and for even higher levels, the increase is between 0.50 and 0.55. These results show that Danes respond to higher immigrant levels in schools when more than one out of three pupils in the school are immigrants.

The figure she is talking about is this one:

I note that for some reason she didn’t insert regression lines for the Danish sample, but did for the immigrant sample. It makes little sense. Neither did she test for significance between 30-35 and 35-40 categories. Perhaps it’s just a statistical fluke, and not a real threshold. A replication of the study would show which hypothesis is true.


There are some more numbers in the back of the paper, hidden away sort of. Though I’m still unsure about the threshold hypothesis. I will contact the author to see if she was updated numbers.

Relevance of education and intelligence for the political development of nations Democracy, rule of law and political liberty



Two relevant effects of education and cognitive

ability on politics could be distinguished: a cognitive

effect (competence to make rational choices, better

information processing etc.) and an ethical effect

(support of democratic values, freedom, human rights

etc.), which itself depends on cognitive ability (cogni-

tive development being a prerequisite for moral

development) and probably the other way round (a

willingness to think and learn furthers cognitive


A similar position is held by the OECD (2000),

which postulates an influence of education on the qu-

ality of voting decisions and intensity of political

participation: “People with more schooling are likely

to make more informed choices when voting and to

participate more actively in their communities.” (p. 81)

Simpson (1997) stressed not only the relevance of

education, but pointed to cognitive abilities as the cen-

tral mechanism (“information-processing-capacity” or

“cognitive capacity”; p. 157): “Democracy depends on a

public who can process complex information and

actively participate in politics” (similarly, see Friedman,





At the individual level, Milligan, Moretti and

Oreopoulos (2004) support the education-and-ability-

further-political-participation-thesis: The findings show

that education supports democracy both by increasing

the quantity of citizens’ involvement in the electoral

process (increased probability of voting) as well as the

quality of that involvement (increased information on

politics). In the US, education increases registration and

by this voting. In the US and in the UK educated people

follow more politics on TV and in newspapers, attend

political meetings, discuss political matters and try to

persuade others, in the US, they even trust more the

federal government and people in general and do not

believe that “federal officials are crooked”. Similar

results for the US but with different data sets are found

by Dee (2004).Educatedpeoplehaveahigher

probability of voting, of reading newspapers and

support free speech (e.g. for communists, anti-religio-

nists, homosexuals, militarists, and racists).


Interesting correlation altho not surprising at all with free speech and intelligence.




Intelligence is important for politics not only at the

individual level, but also at the macro-social level:

intelligence is required for institutionalized political

decision-making, effective administration, the legal

system, bureaucracy, and economic institutions (“gov-

ernment effectiveness”; Kaufmann, 2003). The func-

tioning of public institutions per se is a condition for the

rule of law. These all are rational institutions that

depend on an intelligent culture. And political leader-

ship is a cognitively highly demanding task (Suedfeld,

Guttieri, & Tetlock, 2003, p. 255). It is therefore not

surprising that McDaniel (2006) found a positive cor-

relation of r=.34 between cognitive ability and “govern-

ment effectiveness” at the state level in the USA.


Last but not least, the intelligence of people and voters

on the one hand and the intelligence of leaders and their

political success and moral standards in government on

the other hand are correlated (Simonton, 1985, 2006a,b).

People prefer to elect persons as leaders who are about 20

IQ points more intelligent than themselves, but not more

(Gibb, 1969), and the intelligence of leaders is correlated

with their political success and moral standards. Gener-

ally, people prefer persons as leaders who are similar to

them (Rushton, 2005).




The rule of law produces a predictable social world in

which problems can be solved and aims be reached by

effort, by the use of intelligence and good formal

qualifications, rather than by coercion, personal con-

nections and bribery. By favoring meritocracy through-

out society, and this includes the educational system, the

rule of law tends to support the development of

cognitive abilities. Under such circumstances learning

is a good investment of time and effort. This is

demonstrated by two negative examples: in Georgia

(Caucasus) students could get in the 1990s a place at

university by bribery (Flitner, 2006); and in Brazil about

50% of all university theses are said to be plagiarized,

either by individual students or with the help of

specialized companies that sell the theses to students

(Hart, 2006). Such means to success undermine the

normative basis of education and cognitive ability and

they further other efforts than learning and thinking.


Wtf Brazil?!




Democracy in this view and as confirmed by the

empirical results is a phenomenon attributable to factors

given within a country and depending on its citizens. If

these internal conditions are not given, it would be

impossible or at least very difficult to import democracy

from the outside with the help of armed forces (see

experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq and the history of

Liberia, which was planned as an institutional copy of

the USA). Social and political institutions are not

irrelevant, but they depend in their development in the

past and in their functionality in the present on the

characteristics of the people. Democracy is more a way

of living and thinking (see Dewey, 1997/1916) than a

specific attribute of institutions. If institutions in an

independent country are missing or faulty, people and

their leaders, using their education and abilities, will and

can develop them. One important test case of the

education-intelligence-furthers-democracy-thesis will

be the political development of China during the 21st

century. If the positive influence of high cognitive

ability on democratization is a general phenomenon,

China will become democratic.


Let’s see about that prediction. Perhaps China is too big to get easy reforms, similarly to the US.