Interpretation I earlier wrote of the logical interpretation of subjects.1 There I suggested, following Russell, that the subject of a descriptive, active, meaningful (DAM) sentence should be interpreted as an existential quantifier (∃x) but I now believe that that this seems to depend on who made the utterance and in which situation. Suppose for instance […]

[Discussing the type/token distinction or ambiguity] “I shall not in general try to eliminate these ambiguities by explicitly stating which sense is intended. Sometimes both senses are intended, sometimes not. In general the context is sufficient to indicate what is meant. I shall be more specific only when there is need to be so; if […]

Abstract I invent and explore a terminology about degrees of sentences, I explore how to negate sentences and sentence parts in english, I distinguish between verbs that can be used in sup-sentence parts and verbs that cannot, I discuss some problems with the verb “ought”, and lastly I explore the relationship between this terminology and […]

I was recently made aware of an odd fact. Modern logic’s inventor, Frege, was not as adorable as many people perhaps think he was. Quoting IEP: Although he was a fierce, sometimes even satirical, polemicist, Frege himself was a quiet, reserved man. He was right-wing in his political views, and like many conservatives of his […]

“Falling in love is not at all the most stupid thing that people do — but gravitation cannot be held responsible for it.” Jotted (in German) on the margins of a letter to him (1933). As quoted in Albert Einstein, The Human Side : New Glimpses From His Archives (1981) ISBN 0691023689 Wikiquote link.

Consider this set of propositions: P1. The sentence “The current king of France is bald.” expresses a proposition. P2. The sentence “The current king of France is not bald.” expresses a proposition. P3. The propositions expressed by the sentences “The current king of France is bald.”and “The current king of France is not bald.” are […]

“[W]hat follows from a true premiss must be true” (The Problems of Philosophy, p. 60, link) Wrote Russell as an example of a principle of logic that is more self-evident than the inductive principle. If we were to formalize this we would perhaps write it like this: E1. □[([∀P][Q∧Q⇒P])→P]1 Or perhaps just just in propositional […]

In Longman’s texts Talking about the present, and Talking about the Past it is claimed that some verbs cannot be used in the present and past progressive. But they can. Here is the list of verbs it is calimed that cannot be used: (to) be, have, see, believe, like, agree, know, love, disagree, recognize, hate, […]

What is the present progressive? It is a sentence form. Longman Dictionary of Comtemporary English explains it like this: “You make the present progressive by using a form of the verb be in the present tense, followed by the main verb with an  ing ending, for example l am waiting, she is coming.” Later in […]