The issue is what the truth maker is of a certain type (subset), L, of propositions. A proposition belongs to L iff it has the form “X is the correct way to spell the word.”. Truth makers and truth guides A truth maker is what makes something true. ‘makes’ here is a semantic relation. What […]
A little experiment using another style of writing. My inspiration is this short story by Smullyan.1 It is very good. Some background knowledge of epistemology is advised. First is the dialogue. Then there is some additional promotion I wrote together with a friend when we were waiting for a train to arrive. Dialogue Mr. Language […]
It sometimes happens that one is analyzing some theory and one discovers that the theory in some sense implies something meaningless. But that doesn’t make sense when we think about it. Meaningfulness/meaninglessness is only applicable to sentences, and not to propositions. Implication is only defined in relation to propositions. So when we encounter the scenario […]
In case someone wants to read this book, I have reformatted it to a neat PDF version. It can be found in the download section and here.
I’ve read many times and places that an argument is sound iff 1. The argument is valid. 2. All the premises of the argument are true.  Let’s call this the standard definition of a sound argument. Now consider this argument: 1. If the Earth is a planet, then there is a satellite above Denmark […]
I posted this text a long time ago in Danish and I translated it and used it on the forum. I think I forgot to post the English version here as well. I apologize for the low quality English in the text. – I have earlier written a short article about why the stone-paradox not […]
Opening paragraph: “I was reading XKCD along with a friend and we came across a comic. He wanted to continue reading but I wanted to solve it! […]” Extensive mathematical symbols necessitates a PDF file. XKCD’s NP-Complete ETA: Some of the data in the PDF is missing it seems. I do not have a backup.
I thought about how induction relates to the probability of something, and I came up with this formula. Induction is here taken as repeated confirming observations of some theory or hypothesis. Formula. When the amount of confirmed observations, O, of a hypothesis goes towards infinity, then the probability of the hypothesis given the observations, Pr(H|O), […]
Determinism is a fairly broad thesis, and some formulations of it does not “work” with Swartz’s regularity theory. Below I have outlined some different deterministic theses. Minimal Causal Determinism (MCD): All events are caused. Necessarian Causal Determinism (NCD): “[G]iven a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed […]
Here’s a little paradox that I’ve come across while thinking. It’s about worldviews and knowing that at least one thing I currently believe to be true is actually false. The argument 1. For all x, if x is a belief in my worldview, then I hold that belief. [Premise] 2. If for all x, if […]