Clear Language, Clear Mind

October 9, 2012

“The naturalistic fallacy” as used in the science literature…

Filed under: Ethics — Tags: , , , — Emil O. W. Kirkegaard @ 00:35

“It goes without saying that our contention that beautiful people are more intelligent is purely scientific (logical and empirical); it is not a prescription for how to treat or judge others. To derive a behavioral prescription (what one ought to do) from a scientific conclusion (what is) would be an example of what Hume (1964/1739) calls the ‘‘naturalistic fallacy.’’”

Why beautiful people are more intelligent

How annoying it is to read stuff like this is the scientific literature. The phrase mentioned was introduced by GE Moore, not Hume. Hume didn’t even call it “fallacy”. Besides, Moore’s use of the phrase is different from what the author is talking about, which is inferring is from ought, i.e. is/ought fallacy. And lastly, since Hume was an ideal observer theorist, he would be inconsistent to claim that “ought” can never be deduced from “is”, since that is precisely what he is claiming that it can. Although from a special kind of “is”.

January 10, 2010

Seneca the younger on suicide, letter 70 and 77

Filed under: Ethics — Tags: , , — Emil O. W. Kirkegaard @ 21:51

Because of their shortity I will replicate them here.

Letter 70:

1. After a long space of time I have seen your beloved Pompeii.[1] I was thus brought again face to face with the days of my youth. And it seemed to me that I could still do, nay, had only done a short time ago, all the things which I did there when a young man. 2. We have sailed past life, Lucilius, as if we were on a voyage, and just as when at sea, to quote from our poet Vergil,

Lands and towns are left astern,[2]

even so, on this journey where time flies with the greatest speed, we put below the horizon first our boyhood and then our youth, and then the space which lies between young manhood and middle age and borders on both, and next, the best years of old age itself. Last of all, we begin to sight the general bourne of the race of man. 3. Fools that we are, we believe this bourne to be a dangerous reef; but it is the harbour, where we must some day put in, which we may never refuse to enter; and if a man has reached this harbour in his early years, he has no more right to complain than a sailor who has made a quick voyage. For some sailors, as you know, are tricked and held back by sluggish winds, and grow weary and sick of the slow-moving calm; while others are carried quickly home by steady gales.

4. You may consider that the same thing happens to us: life has carried some men with the greatest rapidity to the harbour, the harbour they were bound to reach even if they tarried on the way, while others it has fretted and harassed. To such a life, as you are aware, one should not always cling. For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can.[3] 5. He will mark in what place, with whom, and how he is to conduct his existence, and what he is about to do. He always reflects concerning the quality, and not the quantity, of his life. As soon as there are many events in his life that give him trouble and disturb his peace of mind, he sets himself free. And this privilege is his, not only when the crisis is upon him, but as soon as Fortune seems to be playing him false; then he looks about carefully and sees whether he ought, or ought not, to end his life on that account. He holds that it makes no difference to him whether his taking-off be natural or self-inflicted, whether it comes later or earlier. He does not regard it with fear, as if it were a great loss; for no man can lose very much when but a driblet remains. 6. It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well means escape from the danger of living ill.

That is why I regard the words of the well-known Rhodian[4] as most unmanly. This person was thrown into a cage by his tyrant, and fed there like some wild animal. And when a certain man advised him to end his life by fasting, he replied: “A man may hope for anything while he has life.” 7. This may be true; but life is not to be purchased at any price. No matter how great or how well-assured certain rewards may be I shall not strive to attain them at the price of a shameful confession of weakness. Shall I reflect that Fortune has all power over one who lives, rather than reflect that she has no power over one who knows how to die? 8. There are times, nevertheless, when a man, even though certain death impends and he knows that torture is in store for him, will refrain from lending a hand to his own punishment, to himself, however, he would lend a hand.[5] It is folly to die through fear of dying. The executioner is upon you; wait for him. Why anticipate him? Why assume the management of a cruel task that belongs to another? Do you grudge your executioner his privilege, or do you merely relieve him of his task? 9. Socrates might have ended his life by fasting; he might have died by starvation rather than by poison. But instead of this he spent thirty days in prison awaiting death, not with the idea “everything may happen,” or “so long an interval has room for many a hope” but in order that he might show himself submissive to the laws[6] and make the last moments of Socrates an edification to his friends. What would have been more foolish than to scorn death, and yet fear poison?[7]

10. Scribonia, a woman of the stern old type, was an aunt of Drusus Libo.[8] This young man was as stupid as he was well born, with higher ambitions than anyone could have been expected to entertain in that epoch, or a man like himself in any epoch at all. When Libo had been carried away ill from the senate-house in his litter, though certainly with a very scanty train of followers, – for all his kinsfolk undutifully deserted him, when he was no longer a criminal but a corpse, – he began to consider whether he should commit suicide, or await death. Scribonia said to him: “What pleasure do you find in doing another man’s work?” But he did not follow her advice; he laid violent hands upon himself. And he was right, after all; for when a man is doomed to die in two or three days at his enemy’s pleasure, he is really “doing another man’s work” if he continues to live.

11. No general statement can be made, therefore, with regard to the question whether, when a power beyond our control threatens us with death, we should anticipate death, or await it. For there are many arguments to pull us in either direction. If one death is accompanied by torture, and the other is simple and easy, why not snatch the latter? Just as I shall select my ship when I am about to go on a voyage or my house when I propose to take a residence, so I shall choose my death when I am about to depart from life. 12. Moreover, just as a long-drawn out life does not necessarily mean a better one, so a long-drawn-out death necessarily means a worse one. There is no occasion when the soul should be humoured more than at the moment of death. Let the soul depart as it feels itself impelled to go;[9] whether it seeks the sword, or the halter, or some drought that attacks the veins, let it proceed and burst the bonds of its slavery. Every man ought to make his life acceptable to others besides himself, but his death to himself alone. The best form of death is the one we like. 13. Men are foolish who reflect thus: “One person will say that my conduct was not brave enough; another, that I was too headstrong; a third, that a particular kind of death would have betokened more spirit.” What you should really reflect is: “I have under consideration a purpose with which the talk of men has no concern!” Your sole aim should be to escape from Fortune as speedily as possible; otherwise, there will be no lack of persons who will think ill of what you have done.

14. You can find men who have gone so far as to profess wisdom and yet maintain that one should not offer violence to one’s own life, and hold it accursed for a man to be the means of his own destruction; we should wait, say they, for the end decreed by nature. But one who says this does not see that he is shutting off the path to freedom. The best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that it allowed to us one entrance into life, but many exits. 15. Must I await the cruelty either of disease or of man, when I can depart through the midst of torture, and shake off my troubles? This is the one reason why we cannot complain of life; it keeps no one against his will. Humanity is well situated, because no man is unhappy except by his own fault. Live, if you so desire; if not, you may return to the place whence you came. 16. You have often been cupped in order to relieve headaches.[10] You have had veins cut for the purpose of reducing your weight. If you would pierce your heart, a gaping wound is not necessary – a lancet will open the way to that great freedom, and tranquillity can be purchased at the cost of a pin-prick.

What, then, is it which makes us lazy and sluggish? None of us reflects that some day he must depart from this house of life; just so old tenants are kept from moving by fondness for a particular place and by custom, even in spite of ill-treatment. 17. Would you be free from the restraint of your body? Live in it as if you were about to leave it. Keep thinking of the fact that some day you will be deprived of this tenure; then you will be more brave against the necessity of departing. But how will a man take thought of his own end, if he craves all things without end? 18. And yet there is nothing so essential for us to consider. For our training in other things is perhaps superfluous. Our souls have been made ready to meet poverty; but our riches have held out. We have armed ourselves to scorn pain; but we have had the good fortune to possess sound and healthy bodies, and so have never been forced to put this virtue to the test. We have taught ourselves to endure bravely the loss of those we love; but Fortune has preserved to us all whom we loved. 19. It is in this one matter only that the day will come which will require us to test our training.

You need not think that none but great men have had the strength to burst the bonds of human servitude; you need not believe that this cannot be done except by a Cato, – Cato, who with his hand dragged forth the spirit which he had not succeeded in freeing by the sword. Nay, men of the meanest lot in life have by a mighty impulse escaped to safety, and when they were not allowed to die at their own convenience, or to suit themselves in their choice of the instruments of death, they have snatched up whatever was lying ready to hand, and by sheer strength have turned objects which were by nature harmless into weapons of their own. 20. For example, there was lately in a training-school for wild-beast gladiators a German, who was making ready for the morning exhibition; he withdrew in order to relieve himself, – the only thing which he was allowed to do in secret and without the presence of a guard. While so engaged, he seized the stick of wood, tipped with a sponge, which was devoted to the vilest uses, and stuffed it, just as it was, down his throat; thus he blocked up his windpipe, and choked the breath from his body. That was truly to insult death! 21. Yes, indeed; it was not a very elegant or becoming way to die; but what is more foolish than to be over-nice about dying? What a brave fellow! He surely deserved to be allowed to choose his fate! How bravely he would have wielded a sword! With what courage he would have hurled himself into the depths of the sea, or down a precipice! Cut off from resources on every hand, he yet found a way to furnish himself with death, and with a weapon for death. Hence you can understand that nothing but the will need postpone death. Let each man judge the deed of this most zealous fellow as he likes, provided we agree on this point, – that the foulest death is preferable to the fairest slavery.

22. Inasmuch as I began with an illustration taken from humble life I shall keep on with that sort. For men will make greater demands upon themselves, if they see that death can be despised even by the most despised class of men. The Catos, the Scipios, and the others whose names we are wont to hear with admiration, we regard as beyond the sphere of imitation; but I shall now prove to you that the virtue of which I speak is found as frequently in the gladiators’ training-school as among the leaders in a civil war. 23. Lately a gladiator, who had been sent forth to the morning exhibition, was being conveyed in a cart along with the other prisoners;[11] nodding as if he were heavy with sleep, he let his head fall over so far that it was caught in the spokes; then he kept his body in position long enough to break his neck by the revolution of the wheel. So he made his escape by means of the very wagon which was carrying him to his punishment.

24. When a man desires to burst forth and take his departure, nothing stands in his way. It is an open space in which Nature guards us. When our plight is such as to permit it, we may look about us for an easy exit. If you have many opportunities ready to hand, by means of which you may liberate yourself, you may make a selection and think over the best way of gaining freedom; but if a chance is hard to find, instead of the best, snatch the next best, even though it be something unheard of, something new. If you do not lack the courage, you will not lack the cleverness, to die. 25. See how even the lowest class of slave, when suffering goads him on, is aroused and discovers a way to deceive even the most watchful guards! He is truly great who not only has given himself the order to die, but has also found the means.

I have promised you, however, some more illustrations drawn from the same games. 26. During the second event in a sham sea-fight one of the barbarians sank deep into his own throat a spear which had been given him for use against his foe. “Why, oh why,” he said, “have I not long ago escaped from all this torture and all this mockery? Why should I be armed and yet wait for death to come?” This exhibition was all the more striking because of the lesson men learn from it that dying is more honourable than killing.

27. What then? If such a spirit is possessed by abandoned and dangerous men, shall it not be possessed also by those who have trained themselves to meet such contingencies by long meditation, and by reason, the mistress of all things? It is reason which teaches us that fate has various ways of approach, but the same end, and that it makes no difference at what point the inevitable event begins. 28. Reason, too, advises us to die, if we may, according to our taste; if this cannot be, she advises us to die according to our ability, and to seize upon whatever means shall offer itself for doing violence to ourselves. It is criminal to “live by robbery”;[12] but, on the other hand, it is most noble to “die by robbery.” Farewell.

Footnotes

  1. Probably the birthplace of Lucilius.
  2. Aeneid, iii. 72.
  3. Although Socrates says (Phaedo, 61 f.) that the philosopher must, according to Philolaus, not take his own life against the will of God, the Stoics interpreted the problem in different ways. Some held that a noble purpose justified suicide; others, that any reason was good enough. Cf. Ep. lxxvii. 5 ff.
  4. Telesphorus of Rhodes, threatened by the tyrant Lysimachus. On the proverb see Cicero, Ad Att. ix. 10. 3, and Terence, Heauton. 981 modo liceat vivere, est spes.
  5. i.e., if he must choose between helping along his punishment by suicide, or helping himself stay alive under torture and practising the virtues thus brought into play, he will choose the latter, – sibi commodare.
  6. See the imaginary dialogue in Plato’s Crito (50 ff.) between Socrates and the Laws – a passage which develops this thought.
  7. And to commit suicide in order to escape poisoning.
  8. For a more complete account of this tragedy see Tacitus, Annals, ii. 27 ff. Libo was duped by Firmius Catus (16 A.D.) into seeking imperial power, was detected, and finally forced by Tiberius to commit suicide.
  9. When the “natural advantages” (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν) of living are outweighed by the corresponding disadvantages, the honourable man may, according to the general Stoic view, take his departure. Socrates and Cato were right in so doing, according to Seneca; but he condemns (Ep. xxiv. 25) those contemporaries who had recourse to suicide as a mere whim of fashion.
  10. By means of the cucurbita, or cupping-glass. Cf. Juvenal, xiv. 58 caput ventosa cucurbita quaerat. It was often used as a remedy for insanity or delirium.
  11. Custodia in the sense of “prisoner” (abstract for concrete) is a post-Augustan usage. See. Ep. v. 7, and Summers’ note.
  12. i.e., by robbing oneself of life; but the antithesis to Vergil’s phrase (Aen. ix. 613) is artificial.”

Letter 77:

1. Suddenly there came into our view to-day the “Alexandrian” ships, – I mean those which are usually sent ahead to announce the coming of the fleet; they are called “mail-boats.” The Campanians are glad to see them; all the rabble of Puteoli[1] stand on the docks, and can recognize the “Alexandrian” boats, no matter how great the crowd of vessels, by the very trim of their sails. For they alone may keep spread their topsails, which all ships use when out at sea, 2. because nothing sends a ship along so well as its upper canvas; that is where most of the speed is obtained. So when the breeze has stiffened and becomes stronger than is comfortable, they set their yards lower; for the wind has less force near the surface of the water. Accordingly, when they have made Capreae and the headland whence

Tall Pallas watches on the stormy peak,[2]

all other vessels are bidden to be content with the mainsail, and the topsail stands out conspicuously on the “Alexandrian” mail-boats.

3. While everybody was bustling about and hurrying to the water-front, I felt great pleasure in my laziness, because, although I was soon to receive letters from my friends, I was in no hurry to know how my affairs were progressing abroad, or what news the letters were bringing; for some time now I have had no losses, nor gains either. Even if I were not an old man, I could not have helped feeling pleasure at this; but as it is, my pleasure was far greater. For, however small my possessions might be, I should still have left over more travelling-money than journey to travel, especially since this journey upon which we have set out is one which need not be followed to the end. 4. An expedition will be incomplete if one stops half-way, or anywhere on this side of one’s destination; but life is not incomplete if it is honourable. At whatever point you leave off living, provided you leave off nobly, your life is a whole.[3] Often, however, one must leave off bravely, and our reasons therefore need not be momentous; for neither are the reasons momentous which hold us here.

5. Tullius Marcellinus,[4] a man whom you knew very well, who in youth was a quiet soul and became old prematurely, fell ill of a disease which was by no means hopeless; but it was protracted and troublesome, and it demanded much attention; hence he began to think about dying. He called many of his friends together. Each one of them gave Marcellinus advice, – the timid friend urging him to do what he had made up his mind to do; the flattering and wheedling friend giving counsel which he supposed would be more pleasing to Marcellinus when he came to think the matter over; 6. but our Stoic friend, a rare man, and, to praise him in language which he deserves, a man of courage and vigour[5] admonished him best of all, as it seems to me. For he began as follows: “Do not torment yourself, my dear Marcellinus, as if the question which you are weighing were a matter of importance. It is not an important matter to live; all your slaves live, and so do all animals; but it is important to die honourably, sensibly, bravely. Reflect how long you have been doing the same thing: food, sleep, lust, – this is one’s daily round. The desire to die may be felt, not only by the sensible man or the brave or unhappy man, but even by the man who is merely surfeited.”

7. Marcellinus did not need someone to urge him, but rather someone to help him; his slaves refused to do his bidding. The Stoic therefore removed their fears, showing them that there was no risk involved for the household except when it was uncertain whether the master’s death was self-sought or not; besides, it was as bad a practice to kill one’s master as it was to prevent him forcibly from killing himself. 8. Then he suggested to Marcellinus himself that it would be a kindly act to distribute gifts to those who had attended him throughout his whole life, when that life was finished, just as, when a banquet is finished,[6] the remaining portion is divided among the attendants who stand about the table. Marcellinus was of a compliant and generous disposition, even when it was a question of his own property; so he distributed little sums among his sorrowing slaves, and comforted them besides. 9. No need had he of sword or of bloodshed; for three days he fasted and had a tent put up in his very bedroom.[7] Then a tub was brought in; he lay in it for a long time, and, as the hot water was continually poured over him, he gradually passed away, not without a feeling of pleasure, as he himself remarked, – such a feeling as a slow dissolution is wont to give. Those of us who have ever fainted know from experience what this feeling is.

10. This little anecdote into which I have digressed will not be displeasing to you. For you will see that your friend departed neither with difficulty nor with suffering. Though he committed suicide, yet he withdrew most gently, gliding out of life. The anecdote may also be of some use; for often a crisis demands just such examples. There are times when we ought to die and are unwilling; sometimes we die and are unwilling. 11. No one is so ignorant as not to know that we must at some time die; nevertheless, when one draws near death, one turns to flight, trembles, and laments. Would you not think him an utter fool who wept because he was not alive a thousand years ago? And is he not just as much of a fool who weeps because he will not be alive a thousand years from now? It is all the same; you will not be, and you were not. Neither of these periods of time belongs to you. 12. You have been cast upon this point of time;[8] if you would make it longer, how much longer shall you make it? Why weep? Why pray? You are taking pains to no purpose.

Give over thinking that your prayers can bend
Divine decrees from their predestined end.[9]

These decrees are unalterable and fixed; they are governed by a mighty and everlasting compulsion. Your goal will be the goal of all things. What is there strange in this to you? You were born to be subject to this law; this fate befell your father, your mother, your ancestors, all who came before you; and it will befall all who shall come after you. A sequence which cannot be broken or altered by any power binds all things together and draws all things in its course. 13. Think of the multitudes of men doomed to death who will come after you, of the multitudes who will go with you! You would die more bravely, I suppose, in the company of many thousands; and yet there are many thousands, both of men and of animals, who at this very moment, while you are irresolute about death, are breathing their last, in their several ways. But you, – did you believe that you would not some day reach the goal towards which you have always been travelling? No journey but has its end.

14. You think, I suppose, that it is now in order for me to cite some examples of great men. No, I shall cite rather the case of a boy. The story of the Spartan lad has been preserved: taken captive while still a stripling, he kept crying in his Doric dialect, “I will not be a slave!” and he made good his word; for the very first time he was ordered to perform a menial and degrading service, – and the command was to fetch a chamber-pot, – he dashed out his brains against the wall.[10] 15. So near at hand is freedom, and is anyone still a slave? Would you not rather have your own son die thus than reach old age by weakly yielding? Why therefore are you distressed, when even a boy can die so bravely? Suppose that you refuse to follow him; you will be led. Take into your own control that which is now under the control of another. Will you not borrow that boy’s courage, and say: “I am no slave!”? Unhappy fellow, you are a slave to men, you are a slave to your business, you are a slave to life. For life, if courage to die be lacking, is slavery.

16. Have you anything worth waiting for? Your very pleasures, which cause you to tarry and hold you back, have already been exhausted by you. None of them is a novelty to you, and there is none that has not already become hateful because you are cloyed with it. You know the taste of wine and cordials. It makes no difference whether a hundred or a thousand measures[11] pass through your bladder; you are nothing but a wine-strainer.[12] You are a connoisseur in the flavour of the oyster and of the mullet;[13] your luxury has not left you anything untasted for the years that are to come; and yet these are the things from which you are torn away unwillingly. 17. What else is there which you would regret to have taken from you? Friends? But who can be a friend to you? Country? What? Do you think enough of your country to be late to dinner? The light of the sun? You would extinguish it, if you could; for what have you ever done that was fit to be seen in the light? Confess the truth; it is not because you long for the senate chamber or the forum, or even for the world of nature, that you would fain put off dying; it is because you are loth to leave the fish-market, though you have exhausted its stores.[14]

18. You are afraid of death; but how can you scorn it in the midst of a mushroom supper?[15] You wish to live; well, do you know how lo live? You are afraid to die. But come now: is this life of yours anything but death? Gaius Caesar was passing along the Via Latina, when a man stepped out from the ranks of the prisoners, his grey beard hanging down even to his breast, and begged to be put to death. “What!” said Caesar, “are you alive now?” That is the answer which should be given to men to whom death would come as a relief. “You are afraid to die; what! are you alive now?” 19. “But,” says one, “I wish to live, for I am engaged in many honourable pursuits. I am loth to leave life’s duties, which I am fulfilling with loyalty and zeal.” Surely you are aware that dying is also one of life’s duties? You are deserting no duty; for there is no definite number established which you are bound to complete. 20. There is no life that is not short. Compared with the world of nature, even Nestor’s life was a short one, or Sattia’s,[16] the woman who bade carve on her tombstone that she had lived ninety and nine years. Some persons, you see, boast of their long lives; but who could have endured the old lady if she had had the luck to complete her hundredth year? It is with life as it is with a play, – it matters not how long the action is spun out, but how good the acting is. It makes no difference at what point you stop. Stop whenever you choose; only see to it that the closing period is well turned.[17] Farewell.

Footnotes

  1. Puteoli, in the bay of Naples, was the head-quarters in Italy of the important grain-trade with Egypt, on which the Roman magistrates relied to feed the populace.
  2. Author unknown.
  3. This thought, found in Ep. xii. 6 and often elsewhere, is a favourite with Seneca.
  4. It is not likely that this Marcellinus is the same person as the Marcellinus Ep. xxix., because of their different views on philosophy (Summers). But there is no definite evidence for or against.
  5. A Roman compliment; the Greeks would have used καλὸς κἀγαθός; cf. Horace, Ep. i. 7. 46

    Strenuus et fortis causisque Philippus agendis
    Clarus.

  6. For this frequent “banquet of life” simile see Ep. xcviii. 15 ipse vitae plenus est, etc.
  7. So that the steam might not escape. One thinks of Seneca’s last hours: Tac. Ann. xv. 64 stagnum calidae aquae introiit . . . exin balneo inlatus et vapore eius exanimatus.
  8. For the same thought cf. Ep. xlix. 3 punctum est quod vivimus et adhuc puncto minus.
  9. Vergil, Aeneid, vi. 376.
  10. See Plutarch, Mor. 234 b, for a similar act of the Spartan boy captured by King Antigonus. Hense (Rhein. Mus. xlvii. pp. 220 f.) thinks that this story may be taken from Bion, the third-century satirist and moral philosopher.
  11. About 5¾ gallons.
  12. Cf. Pliny, xiv. 22 quin immo ut plus capiamus, sacco frangimus vires. Strained wine could be drunk in greater quantities without intoxication.
  13. Cf. Dio Cassius, xl. 54, for the exiled Milo’s enjoyment of the mullets of Marseilles.
  14. Probably the strong tone of disapproval used in this paragraph is directed against the Roman in general rather than against the industrious Lucilius. It is characteristic of the diatribe.
  15. Seneca may be recalling the death of the Emperor Claudius.
  16. A traditional example of old age, mentioned by Martial and the elder Pliny.
  17. Compare the last words of the Emperor Augustus: amicos percontatus ecquid iis videretur mimum vitae commode transegisse (Suet. Aug. 99).”
See also Seneca on Wikipedia. And one of Hume’s writings on suicide is also worth reading.

September 12, 2009

Quote day

Filed under: Philosophy — Tags: , , , , — Emil O. W. Kirkegaard @ 18:05

I går bestilte jeg en t-shirt med disse citater på ryggen.

“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.” –Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953), § 109.

“Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.” –David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Of The Understanding, Part 4 Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy, Sect. 7 Conclusion of this book

“Most people would die sooner than think — in fact they do so.” –Bertrand Russell, The ABC of Relativity (1925), p. 166.

“Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.” –Bertrand Russell, Commandment 7 of “A Liberal Decalogue”, from “The Best Answer to Fanaticism: Liberalism,” The New York Times (1951-12-16); later printed in The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (1969), vol. 3: 1944-1967, pp. 71-2.

Og! Med denne her på maven. Awesome!

Captain Obvious

June 9, 2009

The recent controversy about Hume's Maxim against justified belief in miracles

Contrary to what I normally do I’m not going to argue anything in this article. My goal is to spread useful information, mostly in form of links about Hume’s maxim.

Hume’s maxim

Hume mentions this in his essay An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.[i]:

91. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.” When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. (Section X, part 1, 91)

John Earman’s critique

Recently a professor has been arguing against Hume’s maxim.[ii] The first thing to find our is whether he is a waste of time or not. So, I looked him up on Wikipedia:

John Earman (born 1942) is a philosopher of physics. He is currently a professor in the History and Philosophy of Science department at the University of Pittsburgh. He has also taught at UCLA, the Rockefeller University, and the University of Minnesota,[1] and is president of the Philosophy of Science Association.[2] He received his PhD from Princeton in 1968.[3] [iii]

He doesn’t seem like a waste of time. But people who are not a waste of time sometimes write books that are a waste of time. So, let’s check some reviews of his book. There are six reviews on Amazon. All of them are positive. Five reviews with five stars and one with four. One of the reviews is an alleged professor (of what?) and one is a Christian nutcase.

David Johnson’s critique

Also somewhat recently another professor has challenged Hume’s maxim.[iv] Again, let’s see if he is worth our time. Wikipedia writes:

David A. Johnson (born 1952) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yeshiva University and has previously taught at UCLA and Syracuse University. Raised in Nebraska, he earned his BA from the University of Nebraska, where he studied under Robert Audi, and his PhD from Princeton University. His areas of concentration are Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. His brother, Edward, is Professor of Philosophy at University of New Orleans.[v]

The answer is therefore probably yes. Is his book worth our time? Amazon has one positive review of it, giving it four stars. So, maybe. Not enough data.

Jordan Howard Sobel’s defense

Sobel defends Hume’s maxim.[vi] There is no Wikipedia article on Sober, but one can read his persona CV. He’s a doctor of philosophy and a professor of philosophy.[vii] His book has a single five star positive review on Amazon, and Theodore M. Drange (also a professor) has written a positive review of his book.[viii]

Robert J. Fogelin’s defense

In the most recent book mentioned in this article Fogelin defends Hume’s Maxim against the criticism of the aforementioned authors.[ix] Fogelin has no Wikipedia article, but he is mentioned on a list of philosophers.[x] One his personal homepage one can read that:

Robert J. Fogelin is Professor of Philosophy and Sherman Fairchild Professor in the Humanities at Dartmouth College.[xi]

The book has two positive five star reviews on Amazon.

A combined review

A review of Earman’s, Johnson’s and Fogelin’s books can be found here.[xii]

Sean’s writings on Hume’s maxim

Sean has written four articles on Hume’s maxim that I have been allowed to reprint here, so to speak.

hume_maxim
bayes-theorem-cards-and-miracles

Warning: These have been converted from the original HTML version and may contain errors and dead links.


[i] David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748, Section X. “Of Miracles”, http://www.infidels.org/library/hist…rstanding.html

[ii]John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles, 2000 http://www.amazon.com/Humes-Abject-Failure-Argument-Miracles/dp/0195127382

[iii] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Earman

[iv] David Johnson, Hume, Holism, and Miracles, 1999, http://www.amazon.com/Miracles-Corne…ref=pd_sim_b_2

[v] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Alan_Johnson

[vi] Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God, Cambridge University Press, 2004 (xix + 652).

[vii] http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~sobel/cv.pdf

[viii] http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/sobel.html

[ix] Robert J. Fogelin, A Defense of Hume on Miracles, 2005, http://www.amazon.com/Defense-Miracl…ref=pd_sim_b_7

[x] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_philosophers_(D%E2%80%93H)

[xi] http://www.robertfogelin.com/

[xii] http://philreview.dukejournals.org/c…17/1/142?rss=1 (starting at page 142, or 24 in the document)

April 20, 2009

Motivation, reason, the impossible

Inspired by reading of David Hume’s Enquiry concerning the principles of Morals (EPM) edited by Tom L. Beauchamp.1

“Hume is often interpreted as arguing that no value judgment–however extreme, obscene, or cruel–is reasonable or unreasonable, just as no value judgment is factual. This interpretation needs careful assessment. A passion is ‘unreasonable’ for Hume not because the passion is inappropriate, as we suggest today when we say, ‘It was unreasonable of him to be angry’, but because the passion is based on an erroneous judgment, as when we say, ‘It is unreasonable to have a desire to do what is impossible’. For example, if I desire to see my dead grandfather at a restaurant tonight and this desire together with my peculiar belief that he will be there lead me to go to the restaurant, my desire is unreasonable because the judgment that he is alive and will be at the restaurant is unreasonable. Hume thinks that the judgment, not the desire, is unreasonable.”(Ibid. 47)

It is not Hume’s idea I will comment on here but I agree with it.

It is the idea of the commentator that desiring something impossible in unreasonable. His grandfather example seems fine though. Here are two counter-examples:

It is impossible to achieve a perfect society and not unreasonable to desire.

It is impossible to remove all suffering in the world and not unreasonable to desire.2

One way to defend his view is that the case is some continuum such as the perfectness of society or the amount of suffering in the view, the claim does not hold.

1This one: http://www.elounge.com/pages/ProductDetails.aspx?ProductIndeks=1891812

2I’m using possible in the same collateral sense that he is, not any strict logical sense.

January 21, 2009

Quote: David Hume

Filed under: Philosophy — Tags: , , , — Emil O. W. Kirkegaard @ 21:27

Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.

Source: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) Part 4 Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy, Sect. 7 Conclusion of this book

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