By sentence theory I just mean a theory of truth carriers that implies that some sentences are true or some are false. Not necessarily a monist sentence theory (=theory that implies that sentences are the only kind of truth carriers) or a theory of sentences as primary truth carriers (=theory that implies that sentences are […]

1. For all things, that it is a truth carrier logically implies that it is a sentence. 2. There exists a thing such that it is a truth carrier and that it is logically necessarily the case. Thus, 3. There exists a thing such that it is a sentence and that it is logically necessarily […]

Primary truth bearers are the kind of entities that are always true or false. This is in contrast to secondary truth bearers that are only sometimes true or false. It seems possible that there are no primary truth bearers but that there are two or more secondary (= non-primary) truth bearers. All the theories that […]

It seems to me that monist sentence theories are too implausible, but might it not nonetheless be the case that some sentences are true/false? In this essay I will discuss sentences as secondary truth bearers. Pragmatic value I can see that it has some pragmatic value to say that sentences are also sometimes true/false in […]

The truth bearers are the kind of entities that have the property true. It is thought that it is the same kind of entities that have the property false too. They are sometimes referred to as the bearers of truth/falsity. I shall just refer to them as “truth bearers”. Theories of truth bearers There are […]

I think there are numerous problems with the sentence theory of truth bearers. Here I will touch on one problem, that is, the problem of ambiguity. I start by assuming the sentence theory of truth bearers. The problem Consider the sentence: S. It is logically possible that I exist and that I do not exist. […]