link<\/a><\/em><\/p>\nI ingen specifik r\u00e6kkef\u00f8lge.<\/p>\n
Kilderne til viden og begrundelse. I sektion 4.2 skriver SEP:<\/p>\n
The problem is this. It would seem the only way of acquiring knowledge about the reliability of our perceptual faculties is through memory, through remembering whether they served us well in the past. But should I trust my memory, and should I think that the episodes of perceptual success that I seem to recall were in fact episodes of perceptual success? If I am entitled to answer these questions with \u2018yes’, then I need to have, to begin with, reason to view my memory and my perceptual experiences as reliable. It would seem, therefore, that there is no non-circular way of arguing for the reliability of one’s perceptual faculties.<\/p>\n
Jeg har fundet p\u00e5 en metode til at argumentere for at hukommelsen er p\u00e5lidelig ved brug af perception. Ideen g\u00e5r ud p\u00e5, at skrive det ned n\u00e5r man oplever at hukommelsen fungerede godt i stedet for at bruge hukommelsen til at bevise at hukommelsen som helhed er p\u00e5lidelig (cirkul\u00e6rt). Denne metode lider af nogle andre problemer. Fx er det sv\u00e6rt at sige hvorfor at man skulle tro p\u00e5 hvad papiret siger, hvis man ser bort fra hukommelsen om at man selv har skrevet det.<\/p>\n
I sektion 3.4 skriver SEP:<\/p>\n
Suppose we ask “Why is the sum of two and two four?” Isn’t the answer “It couldn’t be any other way” perfectly satisfactory? So sometimes, at least, a request for explaining the truth of p<\/em> is met in a satisfying way by pointing out that p<\/em> is necessarily<\/em> true. Why, then, should we not be satisfied when independence foundationalists answer the J-question by saying that perceptual experiences are necessarily<\/em> a source of justification?<\/p>\nSEP undrer mig. Hvorfor i alverden skulle “det kunne ikke v\u00e6re p\u00e5 nogen anden m\u00e5de” v\u00e6re et godt svar p\u00e5 at hvad en begrundelse er for p<\/em>? Det er et elendigt svar og det ville enhver matematikl\u00e6rer sige. Hvis nogen ikke tror at p<\/em>, s\u00e5 ville det v\u00e6re begging the question at begrunde det med \u25a1p<\/em> (ikke cirkul\u00e6rt, men mindst liges\u00e5 tvivlsomt). Mange mener, at det g\u00e6lder at matematiske udsagn er n\u00f8dvendigvis sande, dette implicerer ikke, at man kan begrunde alle kontingente matematiske udsagn med at der findes en n\u00f8dvendig variant. Det n\u00e6ste er naturligvis at man skal begrunde den n\u00f8dvendige variant.<\/p>\nI sektion 4.3 skriver SEP:<\/p>\n
Memory is the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past. What one remembers, though, need not be a past event. It may be a present fact, such as one’s telephone number, or a future event, such as the date of the next elections. Memory is, of course, fallible. Not every instance of taking oneself to remember that p is an instance of actually remembering that p. We should distinguish, therefore, between remembering that p (which entails the truth of p) and seeming to remember that p (which does not entail the truth of p).<\/p>\n
Jeg forst\u00e5r godt, at de skelner i mellem at huske p og at tilsyneladende huske p. Men forestil dig dette scenarie: En fremtidig videnskabsmand f\u00e5r person S’s hjerne til at tro, at den husker p. Han putter informationen ind i hjernen. N\u00e5r S v\u00e5gner efter operationen og husker p, ville det s\u00e5 ikke v\u00e6re at huske p? Det mener jeg, men dette implicerer ikke p. S\u00e5 denne skelnen er skidt.<\/p>\n
I sektion 5.2 skriver SEP:<\/p>\n
The Closure Principle<\/strong><\/p>\nIf I know that p, and I know that p entails q, then I know that q.[54]<\/p>\n
This principle is exceedingly plausible. Here’s an example to illustrate it. Suppose you had exactly two beers. Your having had exactly two beers entails that you had less than three beers. If you know both of these things, then you know that you had less than three beers. This much, certainly, seems beyond dispute.<\/p>\n
Det virker muligt at konstruere et modeksempel til dette princip. Jeg ved, at Titanic sank i 1912 og jeg ved at dette implicerer, at den ikke sank i \u00e5r 9812378128 f\u00f8r at jeg skrev det. For f\u00f8r jeg skrev det, havde jeg ingen tro p\u00e5 at det var sandt og dermed ingen viden. Det er samme forst\u00e5else af tro som benyttes her, som jeg benyttede i min kritik af infinitisme.<\/p>\n
En anden mulighed for at vise at princippet er falsk, er at bruge tal der er for store til at kunne begribes af mennesker og som derfor ikke kan troes p\u00e5. N\u00e5r de ikke kan troes p\u00e5, s\u00e5 kan de ikke vides.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Anbefalet l\u00e6sning: Epistemology, SEP, link I ingen specifik r\u00e6kkef\u00f8lge. Kilderne til viden og begrundelse. I sektion 4.2 skriver SEP: The problem is this. It would seem the only way of acquiring knowledge about the reliability of our perceptual faculties is through memory, through remembering whether they served us well in the past. But should I […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27],"tags":[1128,1371],"class_list":["post-559","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-epistemologi","tag-sep","tag-viden"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/559","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=559"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/559\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=559"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=559"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/da\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=559"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}