

# *Envy and Aristocide in Underdeveloped Countries*

NATHANIEL WEYL

FROM AN EVOLUTIONARY STANDPOINT, man has advanced to his present status by successive increases in intelligence. He owes his domination over both material environment and competitive fauna, not to goodness, ruthlessness, piety or savagery, but to brain. It is as *Homo sapiens* that he rules absolutely. It follows that a study of the forces conducive to the survival and proliferation of viable intellectual elites and a study of those which operate in the contrary direction and hence can be termed *aristocidal* lie at the center of the dynamic processes of history. Yet this is an area which has been almost totally neglected by modern social scientists since it is discordant with the dominant egalitarian creed.

The decay of religious faith has led to a relativistic ethic which is little more than a sociology of morals and which leads logically to a moral environment in which everything is permissible. The Marxist way out of this impasse is an objective ethic which corresponds to the putative class interests of the proletariat. The libertarian solution is to propose an ethic based on the maximization of freedom.

It is equally possible to assert that objective morality must be predicated on the biological goal of species survival and that

the human condition is such that this survival depends on the maximum development and utilization of intelligence and of those cognate positive psychic qualities with which intelligence is normally correlated.

An ethic based on evolution and species survival leads to many conclusions similar to those espoused by libertarians. Open, polymorphous societies with maximum competition among individuals, who freely choose their own channels of action, and with minimal governmental restraint of such action are the best systems yet devised to advance the most able people to positions of leadership, authority and power. Totalitarian systems operate in a contrary direction since they have an in-built tendency to subordinate or exterminate the most intelligent and creative of their citizens.

This last generalization applies primarily to the revolutionary phase of the totalitarian seizure of power and transformation of society. It does not apply equally to bureaucratic Communism of the contemporary Soviet sort. The brain-requirements of a complexly articulated, stable and technologically progressive social order conflict at myriad points of contact with the

underlying Marxist-Leninist philosophy of envy. The "class differentiations" between bureaucracy and laboring mass, against which Djilas and other purists of Communism inveigh, are realistic recognitions of the pragmatic need to base promotion on ability and to relate income and perquisites to status.

From this standpoint, class stratification within the Soviet Union is a progressive development even if the bureaucracy which obtains promotion seems to be as opportunistic, mediocre, mentally shallow and morally meretricious as the pages of *The Cancer Ward* imply. It is possible in fact to view the origin of the great Stalin purge (though not its subsequent monstrous and paranoid growth) as the defensive reaction of an emerging managerial bureaucracy, which based its operations on stability, merit promotion, and the reimposition of class, rank and pay differences, against revolutionary Communists motivated by egalitarianism and envy.

If this is correct, then there was fundamental logic in the Stalinist extermination of Trotskyists. It would also follow that anti-Communists who hail egalitarian critics of the Soviet authoritarian system might do well to consider that what these critics most deplore are forces drawing the Soviet system closer to a regime in which the work incentive is inequality of reward.

#### *Envy in Backward Countries*

In the Arab world and in Negro Africa, one of the most attractive features of Marxism-Leninism is its perfection of the techniques of dictatorial rule. American liberal ideologues are sometimes dismayed to find that some of the new masters of the underdeveloped world believe they have more useful things to learn from Lavrenti Beria than from Thomas Jefferson.

Where national cohesion and loyalty are weak, where citizenries are ignorant, where society lacks such stabilizing forces as independent farmers, a strong native business community and an officer corps imbued

with traditions of loyalty, power tends to be both centralized and precarious. Any democracy that arises on these foundations will tend to be fragile and illusory. Any dictatorship nurtured on this soil must rely on effective propaganda, a powerful and loyal political police and a good espionage system if it is to survive.

There are other and perhaps equally important reasons for the popularity and influence of Marxism-Leninism in the so-called Third World. These are envy and the need for exculpation. In his thought-provoking and pathbreaking study of the role of envy in human societies, Dr. Helmut Schoeck defined this emotion in terms of the resentment which inferiors feel at the higher status and greater rewards of their superiors. He quotes the following definition by Professor William L. Davidson from the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*:

Envy is an emotion that is essentially both selfish and malevolent. It is aimed at persons, and implies dislike of one who possesses what the envious man himself covets or desires, and a wish to harm him. Graspingness for self and ill-will lie at the base of it. There is in it also a consciousness of inferiority to the person envied, and a chafing under this consciousness. . .<sup>1</sup>

Strictly speaking, Marxism-Leninism is not a pure philosophy of envy since it does not consider the proletariat inferior to the bourgeoisie, but, on the contrary, the class which is heir to the future. The motivation of envy, with the element of self-consciousness of inferiority, is more nearly approximated in the anarchocommunist philosophies of the New Left and in the revolutionary nihilism of people like Frantz Fanon.

In primitive and simple societies, envy is directed at the superior or fortunate individual. In advanced, modern societies, envy is depersonalized; it is made collective in its socially significant forms. Race, class and caste resentments prevail and their

combined centrifugal force disrupts societies. The earlier private envies still exist, but they are despised, reprobated and repressed. Generally, the result is not to bind and stifle the superior man by forcing him to conform to the ways of mediocrity; rather social policies are adopted which bestow rewards, status, power and income on the undeserving, that is to say on the envious, not on the envied. This both reduces the rewards for ability and increases the burden of parasitism which the able and productive must support.

Traditional envy in backward societies puts down creativity, punishes deviations from community behavior patterns and tradition, blocks the introduction of better working techniques, and forces those who earn more through more efficient work to share their surplus with the undeserving. It creates stagnation, stifles progress, prevents innovation and perpetuates poverty. Magic and witchcraft reinforce the demands which envy makes on the successful few. Jahoda writes concerning Ghana:

In addition to the elements of pure envy and hate (real or imaginary) directed against the man who has left others behind, there are claims made on the kinsman with greater status and wealth. These may be very onerous (*e.g.* unlimited hospitality) and sometimes altogether irreconcilable with the new status (marriage to an illiterate cross-cousin.) There is no ready escape from such dilemmas, because the actor generally acknowledges, at least to some extent, the legitimacy of traditional obligations; being unable to fulfil them adequately induces guilt and this increases the likelihood of diffuse anxiety or explicit fears of supernatural reprisals.<sup>2</sup>

The prevalence of traditional envy in Ghana is illustrated by Jahoda's finding that "envy is attributed to small infants who are said to be jealous of their forthcoming sibling before he is even born." Middle school pupils, asked to write about

their life ambitions, gave replies such as these: ". . . if people see that you are going higher they always hate you; sometimes they make gang and kill you at once." Or, ". . . when they saw that you are going too high, they hated you and perish you from the earth or make juju so you may be mad."<sup>3</sup>

The enormous gap between expectations and real possibilities for advancement in tropical Africa ensures a high proportion of failures and a concomitant prevalence of envy. Partly for this reason, witchcraft and magic have increased in sub-Saharan Africa since independence and with the rise of urbanization. Both factors contribute to the breakdown of traditional tribal institutions and to the psychic security system which the latter offered. Urbanization and detribalization produce *anomie*. On the other hand, surveys in Ghana indicate that parents are increasingly critical of the authoritarian, envy-producing methods of child-rearing to which they themselves were exposed.

#### *Modern Envy in Underdeveloped Areas*

Special factors seem to operate to increase the scope and virulence of collective envy in underdeveloped countries. Perhaps the most important of these is the intensely visible gap between the lifestyles of the backward countries and those of the modern world. This gap has existed since time immemorial. What is unique to the present age is that it is highly visible and generally repudiated as immoral. This visibility has been magnified by television, radio, cinema and the mass press. Other things being equal, the curve of envy should rise in response to the magnitude of the gap, to its visibility, and to the general denial of its legitimacy. As modern mass media penetrate the peasantries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they often serve as carriers of envy. The widespread belief that the poor nations are entitled to the same high real income as the rich ones was not characteristic of earlier eras. Staring at the bro-

cade and jewels of episcopal vestments or the tomb effigies of lords and kings in the cathedral which he visited, the medieval peasant would have been made acutely aware of the chasm between his own lifestyle and that of his rulers. But he had also been taught that these riches and luxuries were not for him. Status, rank and equality were prescribed by the laws of God and the state. Whatever feelings of envy he might possess were deflected or moderated by the Christian assurance that he would enjoy equality with the powerful in death, that a virtuous life on earth would give him life everlasting in heaven, while rich malefactors whom he now envied would stew eternally in hell.

All this has, of course, been swept aside. Fire-and-brimstone Christianity is vanishing even from Latin America and Africa. The West has proclaimed the dogma of human equality and it has swept all else before it. The wretched masses of the Orient and the Tropics are taught that neither race nor class should serve as barriers to their advancement. The indoctrination goes beyond this legitimate observation. It adds that genetic differences in intelligence, character and ability are either nugatory or nonexistent; that stock is nothing and that environment or habitat is all. If this is true, the abject poverty of these masses, in contrast to the lavish wealth of life in the West, must be the result of either accident or injustice.

In the specific case of the underdeveloped world, envy and hatred are intimately interrelated. The more the masses are exposed to visible illustrations of the richness of life in the West, as against the poverty of their own existence, the more they demand an end to the contrast. The more they are indoctrinated with egalitarian ideologies, whether by Soviet or Western pundits, the more they conclude that all the special advantages which Western man enjoys should be instantly available to them. Egalitarian and environmentalist teaching makes them believe that their poverty is not due to their own shortcomings. To the extent

that such people have recently emerged from animism and, specifically, from the belief that misfortunes are always due to the illwill of a human being or god, they find it easy to transfer this magical approach to Marxism and to blame their misery and failure on the malevolence of a class of exploiters.

Of course, it is possible for people in these backward areas to realize that the fundamental cause of their troubles may be an objective situation, such as a population explosion in a land of sparse natural resources, or a psychological difficulty, such as the domination of tradition and superstition over rational thought. But solutions of that sort do not provide the same enormous psychic satisfaction as the Marxist-Leninist answer that poverty is caused by class or race exploitation.

Marxism-Leninism has the decisive advantage over other possible explanations of offering a tangible, living human hate-object. Since envy is an emotion which arouses hate, it is best satisfied by an ideology which gives that hate an emotionally satisfactory target. Specifically, the hated object should be one which can be physically destroyed. If possible, that destruction should be hand-to-hand and brutal rather than such a long-range solution as getting the detested foreigners to abandon their properties and go home.

The second advantage of the ideology of class exploitation is that it offers an unambiguous and putatively instantaneous solution to the problem of poverty. Once the exploiters are destroyed, uprooted, liquidated, no major obstacles remain, the subjects of these underdeveloped countries are taught, to their acquiring the riches and adopting the lifestyles of the exterminated enemy class.

The third advantage is that Marxism-Leninism automatically exonerates the native ruling bureaucracies, particularly if they are so-called socialist bureaucracies, of any responsibility for their failure to govern honestly, competently or wisely. Their shortcomings can always be imputed

to the heritage of colonialism, to an alleged *divide-et-impera* policy of the hated *ci-devant* foreign exploiter, or to alien class elements which have insidiously infiltrated into the new socialist regime and which can be noisily unmasked and publicly and joyously executed.

In preparing this article, it occurred to me that it might be interesting to see whether any of the post-Lenin revisions of Marxism catered specifically to the envy-hatred syndrome and, if so, whether they had been accepted by large numbers of "intellectuals" in the so-called Third World.

Revisionists such as Djilas, Lukacs and Marcuse are of little appeal or impact. The case is otherwise, however, with Frantz Fanon, the young Martinique-born Negro doctor and psychoanalyst who fought with the Algerian independence forces and died of leukemia at the age of thirty-six.

### *The Wretched of the Earth*

The most popular and the most significant of Fanon's books is *The Wretched of the Earth*.<sup>4</sup> It is directed specifically to the revolutionary forces of the so-called colonial and semi-colonial world. This work, which has apparently had major impact among non-white revolutionaries, is specifically directed toward satisfying the hate-envy emotions of the populations it seeks to arouse. Its author delights in the imagery of violence and annihilation in a way which would have profoundly shocked Marx and Engels, who considered their mission to continue and enrich Western civilization, not to destroy it. This work of violence and nihilism is at variance with Marxism-Leninism in several significant respects. These variances or deviations tend to illustrate the specific role of envy in the revolutionary ferment of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Fanon worships total violence for its own sake and because he believes that it provides illumination and manhood. "The naked truth of decolonization," he writes, "evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from

it. For if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists." (p. 27) Fanon writes of the native revolutionary as "the enemy of all values and in this sense he is the absolute evil." He is "the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality . . ." (p. 32) Decolonization means "total, complete and absolute substitution of one species of men by another species of men." (p. 27) Again, "The native is an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor." (p. 41)

Fanon enthusiastically approves the Mau Mau requirement that each man kill a human being so that his road of return to established society should be permanently blocked. He might have found the same recipe for revolutionary nihilism in Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*. "To work means to work for the death of the settler." (p. 67) "Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leader, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them." Without that violence, there is nothing but "a few reforms at the top, a flag waving; and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly marking time." (p. 118)

This pathological glorification of violence not unexpectedly appealed to Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote an intellectually chaotic introduction to *The Wretched of the Earth*. In this masochistic essay, Sartre made the astonishing observation that "if you set aside Sorel's fascist utterances, you will find that Fanon is the first since Engels to bring the processes of history into the clear light of day." (pp. 12-13) Sartre's tacit assumption that Fanon was a more profound thinker than Lenin tells us something about the quality of his critical judgments.

The glorification of total violence and the strange belief that violence is a talisman,

which in some magical way “makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths,” is, of course, quite remote from Marxism, Leninism or any other comparatively civilized and rational doctrine. It seems to be the continuation of an ancient and somewhat disreputable tradition—that is to say, the worship of evil, destruction, unreason, pure nothingness. If so, Fanon’s progenitors include, not only the diabolists of the Middle Ages, but the “anarchists of the deed” who infested Europe during the last decades of the nineteenth century and whose social base seems to have been an alliance between bohemian intellectuals and the shiftless, unemployed and unemployable dregs of society.

Based on his materialistic conception of history, Marx concluded that the proletariat was destined to inherit power from the bourgeoisie and to usher in a classless society. Hence, it was uniquely the class of the future. Its morality was destined to be the morality of society as a whole. Even where the proletariat was numerically weak, it constituted the only historically conscious element in the social struggle and its class needs, as interpreted, of course, by professional revolutionaries who were rarely of working class origin, determined all strategic and tactical decisions.

Fanon departs completely from this view. In fact, he brands the proletariat as a reactionary class:

It cannot be too strongly stressed that in the colonial territories the proletariat is the nucleus of the colonized population which has been most pampered by the colonial regime. . . . In the colonial countries the working class has everything to lose; in reality, it represents that fraction of the colonial nation which is necessary and irreplaceable if the colonial machine is to run smoothly . . . (p. 86)

Fanon and Sartre consider the peasants and the *Lumpenproletariat* the only true revolutionary forces. “In the colonial countries,” the former writes, “the peasants

alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays.” (p. 47) As for the second group, “It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shanty towns, at the core of the *Lumpenproletariat* that the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the *Lumpenproletariat*, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonial people.” (pp. 102-103)

Marx had a different view of these people, whom even Fanon depicted as thieving, drunken, debauched shanty town drifters. (p. 103) In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, Marx pointed out that the *Lumpenproletariat* of Paris, organized as the Mobile Guard, killed 3,000 revolutionary French workmen in 1848 and captured another 15,000. In *Class Struggles in France*, Marx characterized this supposedly revolutionary element as

a mass strictly differentiated from the industrial proletariat, a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, vagabonds, *gens sans feu et sans aveu*, with differences according to the degree of civilization of the nation to which they belong, but never renouncing their *lazzaroni* character . . .

Fanon’s revision of Marxism-Leninism may be intellectually somewhat shoddy, but it is apparently having a major impact in the underdeveloped countries and among the advocates of permanent revolution. Its psychological mainspring is envy in an unusually concentrated and virulent form. The shanty town unemployed and the peasant mass are seen as the true revolutionary classes because they have nothing to lose by the utter and total destruction of civilization. In this revolution, “the last shall be first and the first last” (p. 28), that

is to say, the people of talent and ability are to be exterminated and replaced by those without either. In this revolution, "individualism is the first to disappear" (p. 36)—the individual man is to be totally submerged in the inchoate mass.

The expression of this envy is the total destruction of everyone who is more capable, more industrious, better educated, more sensitive and more decent than the most debased elements in the population. Fanon complains that the African intellectual shuns these tribal peasants and shanty-town thieves because he "is terrified by the void, the degradation, and the savagery he sees there." (p. 177)

Fanon was intelligent enough to see that the elimination of European rule often led to a deterioration in living standards for the African people and the degeneration of honest government into kleptocracy. In page after page, he enumerates the sicknesses of "liberated" Africa. Characteristically, he accuses the "colonialists" of setting Moslems and Christians at loggerheads, installing puppet native governments, fomenting graft by paying bribes, and exploiting the free countries economically. These crimes are either committed through the machinations of the colonialists themselves or by Africans so imbued with the colonial mentality that they can be considered as black shadows of the white settlers. One presumes that, after the whites have had their throats cut, those blacks who follow in their footsteps are also to be exterminated.

The presumed recipe is to forge a mystic community in blood in which all are equal because all are equally debased. The cooperative commonwealth to arise from this shambles is sketched only vaguely. Fanon envisages anarchosyndicalist rural and artisan cooperatives, such as those which functioned behind guerrilla lines in the Algerian struggle for independence. The shortest refutation of this blurred utopian vision is that the shared hatred of civil war is such a powerful cement that it can make

inept social and economic organizations function, but only over the short run.

One of the more interesting features of Fanon's book is his summary of the work of Dr. J. C. Carothers on the mind of the native African black and that of Professor Porot and his associates on the mentality of the Algerian native.<sup>5</sup>

In the study he did for the World Health Organization, Carothers concluded that the African Negro brain is essentially auditory rather than visual. He added that "all the peculiarities of African psychiatry can be envisaged in terms of frontal idleness."<sup>6</sup> Carothers added that it was no accident that "the word 'foresight' has a visual connotation, and by no accident that vision, unlike hearing, is dependent on cortical integrity." He thought it "clear that a verbal and musical ability alone must fail to develop most of those faculties that make man preeminent . . ."<sup>7</sup>

Any appraisal of the validity of the ture of native African mind obviously lies outside the scope of this paper. What is in Carothers hypothesis concerning the structure of the brain is that Fanon should have made a careful study of these controversial findings that both the African Negro mind and the North African mind are deficient in that part of the brain which is anatomically newest and best adapted to complex, abstract thought.

One is tempted to infer that Fanon was first swayed by these analyses, then later rejected them. He makes no effort to refute Carothers' findings or controvert his evidence. Any such refutation would have been superfluous in *The Wretched of the Earth* since these theories do not meet the psychic needs of native Africans or of their Western revolutionary supporters. Any theory which attempts to explain the poverty or shortcomings of peoples in terms of their own genetic deficiencies cannot serve to channel envy into hatred of a scapegoat.

Maoism, Trotskyism, some of the anarchocommunist theories of the New Left and other manifestations of contemporary revolutionary thought appear to be conscious

or unconscious efforts to exploit pervading sentiments of envy and to fan envy into aristocide.

To the ruling bureaucracies of newly-fledged, backward nations, these theories may at first seem attractive since they deflect criticism from governments which are venal and incompetent to foreigners and class enemies. On the other hand, poverty and misery will continue to generate envy and that envy will need objects for its hatred. This can open a Pandora's box of hatred and destruction, with the violence turning on the native ruling element once the hated whites have been expelled or slaughtered. Thus, it is dangerous. As the new nations are stabilized, strong forces are set in motion to stifle the Fanon type of thinking or, at the very least, to utilize it against foreigners and then suffocate it if possible.

#### *Leaders of the Movements of Envy*

The originating and leadership element in these revolutions of nihilism is seldom composed of illiterate peasants or enraged *Lumpenproletarians*. It consists more often of alienated intellectuals. It would be quite unrealistic to visualize these people as predestined failures, as people consumed by hatred because they are unable to win for themselves positions of comfort, respect and power in their societies. On the contrary, a man like Fanon would have been eminent and successful had he defended the colonial system instead of attacking it.

These revolutionary intellectuals are frequently characterized by their status as permanent outsiders. They are outcasts from society either because society rejects them or because they imagine that they are not accepted. In the case of Fanon, his overriding ambiguity was his status as a black intellectual.

This sense of ambiguity and hence insecurity of status is likely to occur when a new element moves rapidly into positions of leadership and power. The preeminent position, in relation to their numbers, of

Jews in the political, economic and intellectual elite is in sharp contradiction to their underrepresentation in the social elite. The former represent the present and future; the latter represents the past. This ambiguity of status conduces to insecurity and rebelliousness.

The leaders of these revolutionary movements are above all intellectuals. Therefore, they cannot express their envy of well-established elites in spontaneous violence. They need to construct or accept a philosophy of history and society which makes that violence appear to be supremely moral and right. It is only after this has been done that they are capable of committing crimes and enormities on a terrifying scale. Mere hatred, brutality and callousness cannot cause stupendous crimes. For that, it is necessary that the perpetrators have a religiously or politically motivated utopian philosophy, one that teaches that the promised land can be reached only by wading through blood.

The motivation for revolution in the case of ethnic minorities is probably to eliminate their own feelings of *anomie*. The Jewish revolutionary and the pampered and honored black intellectual both envy their psychically more secure counterparts who belong by blood to the dominant ethnic strain of their society.

These revolutionaries are also in the role of men envied because of their superiority. The Jews feel the weight of this potential Gentile envy at all times. Millenia of persecution teach them that this fear is never irrational. The black intellectual, such as Fanon, may have an equally intense fear of envy by the far less gifted majority of his own ethnic stock, a fear which has deep roots, of which Fanon was keenly aware, in the tribal heritage of magic and witchcraft.

This fear on the part of the envied may at first assume exclusively the form of rational self-protection against a potential external enemy. However, it evolves into an internal and somewhat masochistic moral rejection of the more privileged status and



lifestyle enjoyed by the envied person. This latter form may in time become so dominant that the original motivation of personal fear is discarded and forgotten, so much so that the ethnic outcast turned revolutionary may believe that it never existed.

What do these leveller revolutionaries of minority origin see as the solution to their own personal problem? Or, if they are unaware of the nature of their personal motivations, what sort of future world do they regard as desirable? How does the shape of this world relate to their problem?

Feeling insecure in any stratified society, believing, whether rightly or wrongly that it will reject them, levellers of the Fanon type want a classless, raceless society, one in which mankind is an undifferentiated mass. This is not very different from the primitive Christian reaction to feelings of *anomie* and exclusion *vis-à-vis* Roman society. The Jewish revolutionaries, or rather those who are revolutionary to escape their Jewishness, share this infantile aspiration. They believe they see this ideal actualized in such revolutionary struggles as those of Castro's *guerrilleros* in the Sierra Maestra. The early Christians saw a similar ideal in the unity of the *agape*.

Societies based on undifferentiated fraternity, however, survive only under exceptional social conditions. They are successful when persecution, fear and conflict dominate the scene. The danger or hatred must be so intense that all latent animosity is channeled toward the enemy or that fear is so great that all internecine squabbles must be tabled and set aside in the interests of group survival.

Once these particular tensions, hatreds, fears or dangers have been removed, the ideal of fraternity dissolves. The utopian societies in nineteenth century America and elsewhere were strangled in the cradle by prosperity. By contrast, the Mormons—exemplifying intense group solidarity, but not equality—thrived because they were persecuted.

Where old-established class or race gradations have been done away with, new cri-

teria and symbols of social differentiation and pecking order take their place. In the sphere of ethnic homogenizing, the case of Brazil is instructive. The absence of firm barriers against black-white intermarriage in Portuguese culture did not create the harmonious new Brazilian multiracial society that Gilberto Freyre envisaged. The destruction of barriers against miscegenation led merely to a far more complex ethnic classification than prevailed in the Protestant countries with a slave-holding past. These classifications in turn were highly correlated with status.<sup>8</sup>

The ethnic outcast turned revolutionary in some ways parallels the declassed revolutionaries of anarchism of the deed of the previous century. In both instances, there are indications of psychic disorder masquerading as philosophy. In both instances, the need is to destroy the entire social order and, specifically, to reduce all those members of society who enjoy superior status, position or respect to the common level. This may imply nothing less than the physical extermination of most of those who are endowed with superior intelligence and with those cognate qualities needed for the creation and development of civilizations.

#### *Aristocide in the "Third World"*

A somewhat cursory survey of recent revolutions, civil wars and wars of invasion in the underdeveloped world suggests that aristocide has not been occurring there on the massive scale that might have been expected on *a priori* grounds.

In Latin America, there have been no wars between the nations of the area since the bloody Gran Chaco conflict between Bolivia and Chile in the 1920's. As I have already indicated, the existence of a tacitly accepted hierarchical system based on race has tended to make power struggles of short duration and small cost. The centripetal nature of the Spanish governmental heritage has brought centralization of power. While this may paralyze local initiative, it limits

the cost and scope of upheavals and civil wars.

The apparent exception—the Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro—was primarily an armed struggle of intellectuals and truants from the upper classes. Large masses of peasants were involved only in its final, largely ceremonial stages. While a significant portion of the professionals, intellectuals and middle-to-upper-class opponents of the regime were executed after show trials or in punitive action against rebellions, the human cost of the Castro revolution has been quantitatively insignificant compared with the Soviet Union, China or some of the Balko-Danubian states.

In Africa, aristocide often occurs in connection with intertribal struggles. Of these, the ruthless suppression of the Biafrans at the cost of at least a million lives is a flagrant instance. The Ibos are better educated, more enterprising and more successful than other Nigerian tribes. On the eve of the conflict, they were disproportionately represented as students in secondary schools and universities, in the government service, and as skilled workers, artisans and merchants.<sup>9</sup> Yet the suppression of Biafra appears to have been primarily a tribal struggle for power, intensified by the presence of rich oil reserves in Biafran waters and by consequent big-power involvement.

The assassinations, rebellions, tribal conflicts, *coups d'état*, and civil wars, which have constituted such a monotonous and persistent element in the history of free Negro Africa, show components of envy and genocide most clearly when they are under Communist leadership or ideological influence.

In terms of aristocide, the most salient case is the Simba rebellion in the Congo in 1964/65. The rebels were supplied with both Soviet and Chinese arms. Acting on Mao's statement, "If we can take the Congo, we can hold the whole of Africa,"<sup>10</sup> Chinese Communists provided military leadership.

The victims of the Simbas were killed with "extreme cruelty," including "disem-

bowelment of living persons and the eating of their hearts, livers and genitals while still warm in accordance with the requirements of ritual cannibalism."<sup>11</sup> Others were forced to swallow gasoline; then their bellies were slit open and they were set afire.<sup>12</sup>

The victims were preferentially "intellectuals, 'counterrevolutionaries' and 'American agents.'" To deal with these people, "villagers would be assembled as a 'people's court'. A prisoner would be brought forward and the crowd would be asked whether the accused was innocent or guilty. There was seldom any doubt about the verdict."<sup>13</sup> Execution was generally by burning to death.

Self-evidently, genocide was attempted against virtually the entire white population, including several hundred refugees held at Stanleyville and Belgian nuns in the countryside. Within Congolese society, the executions were selective. "One survivor estimated that 4,000 Congolese were killed in Paulis—mostly the town's 'intellectuals' (clerks, teachers, civil servants). 'They started by killing anyone who was well-dressed,' said a railway employee who got out alive. 'In this country the well-dressed are the well-educated.'"<sup>14</sup>

The unofficial representative of Katanga in the United States stated privately that the selective genocide of the more literate inhabitants of the Simba-ravaged area had so gutted the region of brains that he believed it would take a generation for it to get back on its feet.

The Chinese Communist objective seems to have been to make *tabula rasa* of the native Congolese so-called intellectuals either to prepare the way for the sort of total social revolution envisaged by Fanon or else to facilitate Chinese settlement in and domination of the Congo.

Despite this instance, the evidence for systematic aristocide in Negro Africa is fragmentary. Where *ci-devant* ruling tribes are being slaughtered by their former slaves, the process seems to be more a continuation of tribal war than systematic extirpation of elites. The spasmodic and im-

pulsive nature of the African mind may preclude devising and carrying out any such long-range strategy. Ché Guevara's experience in the Congo convinced him that the human material necessary for a revolution and a protracted guerrilla struggle simply did not exist there.

In Asia, the suppression of Bangla Desh by the troops of West Pakistan involved both genocide and aristocide. *Time* reported on May 3, 1971:

The dead of Dacca included some of East Pakistan's most prominent educators and businessmen, as well as some five hundred students. Among at least seven University of Dacca professors who were executed without apparent reason was the head of the philosophy department, Govinda Chandra Dev, 65, a gentle Hindu who believed in unity in diversity. Another victim was Jogesh Chandra Ghosh, 86, the invalid millionaire chemist.

Intellectuals and businessmen were murdered in a general slaughter which may have cost a million lives. If there was a selective concentration on the intellectual and business elites, the reasons probably included the desire for loot in an area where many businessmen had no faith in banks and kept bullion in their homes. Other probable causes were the conviction that the independence movement could best be destroyed by silencing its brains and, finally, the congenital Moslem antipathy to education and scholarship.

### *The Human Cost of Communism*

The distinguished British expert on the Soviet Union, Robert Conquest, estimated the human cost of Russian Communism as including "over 20,000,000 human beings . . . executed or killed in other ways by the Soviet Communist authorities since the revolution."<sup>15</sup> Conquest considers this a conservative estimate which might well be increased by fifty percent. It does not include the nine million Russians who lost their

lives during the civil war or the five million others who perished in the 1921 famine. The twenty million were casualties of terror. As Lenin put it, "The energy and mass nature of the terror must be encouraged."

In the fall of 1970, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee asked Professor Richard L. Walker, Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, to prepare a parallel study of the human cost of Chinese Communism. Dr. Walker found that from 1927 to date Chinese Communism had caused a minimum of 34 million deaths and a maximum of 64 million. This is in conformity with the recent charge by Radio Moscow that "in the course of ten years, more than 25,000,000 people in China were exterminated . . . During 1960 alone, Mao Tse-tung's government exterminated more Chinese than were killed in the entire war against Japan."

Regardless of which estimate is accepted, Mao Tse-tung emerges with the peculiar distinction of having slaughtered more of his subjects than any other ruler in history.

From the standpoint of this paper, the significant issue is not the extent of the total genocide, but its selective concentration on intellectual and managerial elites. Dr. Walker stresses the burning of Chinese libraries and the selective liquidation of Chinese intellectuals. He quotes Professor Yang Shih-chan's injudicious letter to the *Yangtze Daily*, published during the brief "Hundred Flowers" era of liberalization of the regime:

During the social reforms campaign, unable to endure the spiritual torture and humiliation imposed by the struggle, the intellectuals who chose to die by jumping from tall buildings, drowning in rivers, swallowing poison, cutting their throats, or by other methods, were innumerable.<sup>16</sup>

The Cultural Revolution of 1966-68 continued the war of extermination against China's intellectuals. Ken ling, a young

Chinese refugee who took a prominent part in that movement, describes some of its aspects. The teachers in Ling's school were forced to parade around the athletic field wearing dunce caps, shouting that they were blackhearted reactionaries, and begging forgiveness on their knees. This was alternated with prolonged beatings, being forced to kneel on broken glass, being compelled to eat bugs and human excrement. Several attempted suicide; one was beaten to death. These teachers had been competent, diligent and well-liked, Ling relates. The motivation he gives for his active participation in this persecution and in the many others that followed is an almost classic expression of the mentality of envy. "I wanted to destroy things so I could say, 'I have done all that.' . . . If we could not enjoy something, then we would destroy it so that everyone would be equal."<sup>17</sup>

By now, it is fairly generally recognized that the Cultural Revolution in China was not merely part of the personal power struggle between Chief of State Liu Shao-chi and Chairman Mao, but a momentous battle over fundamental principles and revolutionary direction. The Cultural Revolution was directed against the increasing bureaucratization of the Chinese state and the emergence of "an urban-based managerial and professional elite, preoccupied with its careers and privileges and out of touch with the farm and factory laborers." Fearing that China was moving in the "revisionist" and reformist direction of the Soviet Union, Mao Tse-tung unleashed the regimented youth of China to shatter the power of the emerging bureaucracy and intelligentsia and "rebuild the country on more egalitarian lines."<sup>18</sup>

The most sinister aspect of aristocide in the People's Republic of China is not only its vast extent, but the fact that it has continued long past the period of the revolutionary struggle for power.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of aristocide is that intellectuals, officers, officials, executives, business leaders (except for the minority among them which works for the

revolution) are either part of the exploiting class or its apologists and retainers. The success of the revolution requires that they be liquidated.

The practical advantages of this wholesale liquidation are considerable. Those who look back with yearning to better times are physically destroyed and thus incapable of reminding the masses that life was better under the old regime or of fighting for greater freedom. The new masters of society comprise veteran Communists and fellow travellers and people from the lowest strata of society. Neither group has anything to gain from counterrevolution. Therefore, their loyalty can be counted on. Ancillary advantages are that the revolutionary element is bound together by blood guilt and that the sort of people who are thrust into power come largely from the less intelligent social strata and are therefore more likely to serve as docile instruments of the totalitarian state and credulous mouthpieces for its propaganda.

Aristocide, however, is not an unopposed force in Communist societies. It is most acute and pervasive during the early period of revolutionary consolidation of power and liquidation of the middle classes. Once the Communist society reaches the scientific, technological and educational level of the Soviet Union today, aristocide becomes an impediment to material progress. It must be offset by the efficient selection of the best minds and the outstanding potential leaders to man the bureaucracy and the professions.

Nevertheless, if a reversal of direction occurs, it is not complete. The authoritarian nature of the state requires the suppression of dissent when that dissent becomes dangerous and challenges the fundamental principles of the social order. As the society becomes more prosperous and more intricately articulated, greater freedom for the managerial, scientific and professional classes becomes a prerequisite of progress. Millions of minds are opened to critical winds from abroad. When this freedom results in opposition to the system, the

weapon of aristocide is again brought into use. The new aristocide may affect only a small fraction of the millions who perished in Stalinist labor camps. It may take such comparatively mild forms as mind-destroying chemotherapy rather than a bullet in the skull in an NKVD cellar. But it is still there and it still operates. As Marxists would say, we have here a permanent contradiction within the system.

By the time aristocide has ceased to operate on a vast scale, irreparable genetic havoc may have been inflicted on the population. We have no accurate way of appraising the precise extent to which the successive purges in the Soviet Union, including the destruction of the kulaks as a class, were genetically catastrophic. It is pertinent in this context, however, to compare Russian creative achievements under the last Czars with those under Bolshevism. In literature, no contemporary Russians rank with Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Those who tower above the prevailing level of mediocrity are men like Pasternak and Solzhenitsin, who are branded as enemies of the regime and who may also descend from the exploiting classes and be partly Jewish. In music, there is no one who ranks with Tchaikovsky, Stravinsky or Borodin. We search in vain for great and original scientific minds such as Mendeleev, Lobachevski and Sonya Kovalevski. The impressive Soviet progress in such specialized fields as rocketry and the exploration of outer space seems to contradict the hypothesis of massive genetic damage through purges and terror. But this progress is, to a great extent, the work of Jewish scientists and is the result of a formidable concentration of the best brains on military science and technology. As I wrote five years ago: "Thus, the Soviet Union can be regarded as a vast, as yet uncompleted, *dysgenic* experiment, not only in direct terms by liquidating members of the elite, but perhaps indirectly by creating environments so hostile to the residual elite that they react by limiting their progeny."<sup>19</sup>

In the Chinese case, we have even less ability to gauge the genetic havoc. The eco-

nomically backward character of the country and the irrational thought processes of Mao Tse-tung<sup>20</sup> no doubt served to remove commonsense limitations on the butchery of the talented. The extirpation of the so-called landlords meant the elimination of the entire stratum in rural China which had most ambition, worked hardest, used the most modern farming methods available, and applied intelligence to its tasks. In rural countries, the peasantry is the most important reservoir from which men of outstanding ability and even genius are drawn. But the People's Republic of China has decapitated even its peasantry.

The future will reveal the extent of the genetic damage inflicted by the Maoist policies of aristocide. We will discover whether the mental resources of the Chinese people are sufficient to withstand even this genetic outrage or whether the population has been reduced to intellectual mediocrity by the dysgenic policies of the regime.

The conclusion which this article suggests is that Communism is the chief source of aristocide in the contemporary world and, together with Nazism, perhaps the greatest dysgenic force in history. It is a devastatingly efficient system for the impairment of man's genetic resources through selective extermination of gifted people. This process is most virulent in the revolutionary phase of the seizure and consolidation of power and is particularly so in economically backward countries which can function fairly effectively without a large and capable intellectual elite. As Communist regimes become technologically complex and stabilize into managerial bureaucracies, these dysgenic policies tend to become subordinated to the systematic search for people of above-average intelligence and ability to form part of the ruling class.\*

\*This article is based on a paper presented at the Second Symposium on Human Differentiation entitled, "The Nature and Consequences of Egalitarian Ideology," sponsored by the Institute for Humane Studies, Inc., of Menlo Park, California, and held in Gstaad, Switzerland, September 10-14, 1972.

<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Schoeck, *Envy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 15.

<sup>2</sup>Gustav Jahoda, "Social Aspirations, Magic and Witchcraft in Ghana: a Social Psychological Interpretation," in P. C. Lloyd (editor), *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 207.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 209.

<sup>4</sup>London, Penguin, 1967. The English title is taken from the opening lines of the *International*: "Arise, ye prisoners of starvation; arise, ye wretched of the earth." The original French title, *Les damnés de la terre*, derives from the same source.

<sup>5</sup>J. C. Carothers, *The African Mind in Health and Disease: A Study in Ethnopsychiatry* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1953).

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>7</sup>J. C. Carothers, *Journal of Medical Sciences*, 97 (1951), 12.

<sup>8</sup>Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves* (New York: Knopf, 1946); Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen* (New York: Knopf, 1947); Marvin Harris, *Patterns of Race in America* (New York: Walker, 1964).

<sup>9</sup>"Biafra," Andreski wrote, "has a larger and much better educated population than most African states and by all standards of professed political ethics eminently qualifies for sovereignty." Stanislaw Andreski, *The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernization* (London: Michael Joseph, 1968), 77.

<sup>10</sup>*Africa Review*, London, February 1966, 6. Moscow landed an IL-18 in Uganda on October 31, 1964, from which three truckloads of arms were taken to rebel territory. Soviet, Czech and Chinese arms reached the Simbas through such friendly African states as Sudan, Algeria, UAR and Tanzania.

<sup>11</sup>Ernest W. Lefever, *Spear and Scepter* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1970), 110; M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," *Africa Report*, (April 1965), 6-11.

<sup>12</sup>*Time*, November 13, 1964, 51.

<sup>13</sup>*Time*, November 27, 1964, 42.

<sup>14</sup>*Time*, December 4, 1964, 30.

<sup>15</sup>Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, *Report for the Fiscal Year Ending Feb. 29, 1972*, summarizing Conquest's study for the Committee, *The Human Cost of Soviet Communism*, published in 1971. Also see Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 17. It is worth noting that Professor Yang Shih-chan was a member of the Chinese Communist Party.

<sup>17</sup>Ken Ling, *The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese* (New York: Putnam, 1972).

<sup>18</sup>Warren H. Phillips, "Changing China," *Wall Street Journal*, October 30, 1972, 1, 18.

<sup>19</sup>Nathaniel Weyl, "Aristocide as a Force in History," *Intercollegiate Review*, Spring 1967, 237-245.

<sup>20</sup>v. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970), 467-470.

# Ramiro de Maeztu on Money and Wealth in America

ENRIQUE FERNANDEZ-BARROS

FROM HIS YOUTH Ramiro de Maeztu was fascinated by the prosperity of the Anglo-Saxon countries, Britain and the United States.<sup>1</sup> His residence in Cuba (1891-1894) made him keenly aware of the growing economic power of the "Colossus of the North." There he witnessed the wonder of the Cubans before the amazing material progress of their powerful neighbor and he could foresee, with prophetic vision, the end of Spanish domination in Cuba, as well as the consequences of a military confrontation between Spain and the United States. Of those of his generation, Maeztu was the first to recognize America's vast power and resources and the one who sought most zealously to discover the basic reasons for the economic greatness of the United States.

In his book *Toward Another Spain*, so characteristic of the generation of 1898, Maeztu attributes the defeat of Spain and the consequent loss of her colonies, in large part, to the great economic superiority of the United States. He closes his book with words which link his Spanish sorrow at the defeat and his faith in the power of money:

When money triumphs over the sword  
of the warrior, the cross of the saint, and

the scales of justice, it is certainly due to the fact that money inevitably possesses a superior force, a greatness mightier than that of any of those other symbols of human striving and attainment. How short-sighted are those who do not perceive this! Shall we not sing paeans of praise to gold? Gold, however despised by many, will transform the dry, yellow face of our land, imparting a lush, pleasing appearance. Gold, however mean in the eyes of many, will in time fashion the new Spain!<sup>2</sup>

Maeztu's journey to England and his residence of fourteen years in that country, as correspondent of Spanish and Spanish-American newspapers, were due in large part to the writer's intense desire to acquaint himself with English life and institutions. Thus he hoped to discover the secret of the prosperity and superiority of the Anglo-Saxons. When in 1925 Maeztu came to the United States as visiting professor of Hispanic civilization at Middlebury College in Vermont, this same zeal to experience and become intimately acquainted with American life was the impelling force that drew him to these shores.<sup>3</sup> This concern was to remain a lifelong preoccupation. In the