

point on which, as a student, I challenged Professor Basil Williams. However, as a student, I had not the vast learning on this issue as is portrayed by the author.

This is the best book written on the subject of early Celtic civilisation of Britain and it deserves to be studied by every library and individual interested in the subject.

R. GAYRE OF GAYRE

RITUAL IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF RITUALISM IN MODERN ENGLAND

By Robert Bocoek. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1947. Pp. 209, 29 illustrations. Price £4.

The theme of this book is that there is a far greater need of rituals in modern industrial societies than is generally realised. They provide meaning to the people. Schools, gangs, political parties and trade unions, act as the family, or the clan, used to do. It deals with the relation between religion and ritual in the arts.

The writer is Robert Bocoek, lecturer in sociology at Brunel University since 1966.

A NEW MORALITY FROM SCIENCE: BEYONDISM

By Raymond B. Cattell, Pergamon Press, New York, Toronto, Oxford, 1972. Pp. 482.

The volume under review is a revolutionary and comprehensive attempt to formulate a new system of ethics on the basis of biology, genetics and psychology. It explores some of the implications of this system for the political organisation of the nation-state, co-existence between different cultural, racial and ideological power systems, freedom v. authority, the structure of natural rights, and a variety of other institutions and issues. The author has been in the forefront of the evolving science of psychology over the past 30 years and has pioneered in applying multivariate analysis to human personality.

Dr Cattell proceeds from the basic premise that morality must regain the same sort of objective foundations that it enjoyed during the age of religious faith. If ethics are merely reflections of subjective preference, the mainspring of moral human action is snapped. Cattell concludes essentially (as I did in a recent article)¹ that modern ethics must be predicated on continuing human evolution and on the survival and development of *Homo sapiens* as a species.

Consequences of the most far-reaching sort follow from this disarming major premise. For example, the preservation of primitive human, and for that matter animal, societies and species from extinction remains eminently desirable, provided preservation means keeping enough of them alive so that they can be studied and so that their gene pools are not irretrievably lost. But conservation in the sense of maintaining their approximate numbers means inhibiting those great evolutionary processes which adjust life to its habitats, which involve the emergence and submergence of species and races, and which brings about improved adaptations not merely by the agency of birth, but also by that of death.

Applying some of these considerations to man, Cattell suggests that the mean time-span between the generations will increase substantially.

¹ Nathaniel Weyl, "Evolution and Ethics," THE MANKIND QUARTERLY, Vol. XIII, No. 1, July-September 1972, pp. 34-48.

Society, he believes, will encourage a much larger frequency of pregnancy among the women of the advanced nations. The main agency of natural selection will cease to be the harsh forces of premature death and reproductive disability. Amniocentesis (the extraction of tissue from the embryo and its examination for crippling genetic disabilities) may become the major element in selection, the significantly defective foetuses being aborted.

Dr Cattell's work is a powerful assault on the dominant ideology of egalitarianism in both ethics and the social sciences. He is one of the few contemporary social scientists who shows an awareness of the key rôle of *envy* in reinforcing destructive movements for limitless social welfare, for the lavish support of parasitic classes and racial groups, and for the advance of socialist dogma throughout the modern world. Yet he seems unaware of Helmut Schoeck's classic study of that subject.²

What is probably the most decisive objection to egalitarian ethics and to all the rules of social conduct that follow from it is relegated to a footnote. "The advance of the human species in sheer brain capacity during the next thousand years," Cattell writes, "may well make the difference between survival and catastrophe, since quite complex problems from the crowding of our own planet will challenge our intelligence. Such a demand for genetic selection in a comparatively short time can certainly be met, granted a readiness to re-examine our values in favor of evolutionary goals."³

There is the implication that human groups which lack the mental capacity to adapt to the increasingly exigent demands which man's habitat imposes on his intelligence should be humanely phased out by restricting their reproduction. Dr Cattell notes that British resentment of massive immigration of West Indians and Pakistanis has been aimed impartially at both groups despite the fact that the injection of low-I.Q. elements is primarily due to the West Indian, and not the Asian, infusion. On broader grounds, he suggests (p. 365) that "purely economic laws" should not hold sway in the area of immigration, but that "the idealism of a country in pursuing its own culturo-genetic experiment should override economics. . . . If one agrees with Shakespeare about 'this happy breed of men' who made English culture a force for good around the world, he will hesitate to being a party to changing it at its very source. . . ."

Among the other implications which flow from Dr Cattell's basic premise are that altruism is not necessarily a virtue. Where it is directed to parasitic social elements, which either refuse to make any productive contribution to society or are unable to do so, it may encourage their misconduct or their biological proliferation. Either is immoral.

Natural rights are non-existent as universals in the Cattell scheme of things, since the overriding requirements of species survival and evolutionary adaptation demand different responses under different circumstances.

Cattell draws a sharp distinction between within-group and among-groups morality. This is based partly on his supposition that a certain degree of racial and cultural isolation should be encouraged, so that different types of societies and peoples may emerge and stabilize themselves into subspecies. This, he considers, will create varying types of response to evolutionary challenge and preclude a state of affairs in which man's continued existence depends on only one set of responses, one cultural and racial structure, and one ideological system.

² Helmut Schoeck, *Envy: a Theory of Social Behaviour*, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1969.

³ Page 110, fn. (5).

For a variety of reasons, this basic distinction seems difficult to defend. The implied analogy with animal race-formation is vitiated by the facts that human societies are becoming increasingly monocultural, that ethnic mixture within nations is increasingly prevalent, and that the nation in no real sense corresponds to the evolving mammalian species. For one thing, multiracial nations and even multireligious nations seem to develop centrifugal forces they cannot control. Patriotism, the feeling and belief that nationality is the primary social bond, characterizes only those states and peoples who enjoy a threshold level of ethnic homogeneity and of shared history, institutions, beliefs and values.

Dr Cattell proceeds to elaborate an intricate system of human institutional relationships based on the ethics of 'Beyondism. Unfortunately, this seems to involve a transition from the objective level (that is to say, necessary inferences from the basic requirement of species survival) to the subjective. Moreover, Cattell claims for psychology, armed with the tools of multivariate analysis, a scientific authority which few observers believe it possesses.

The book under review would, I believe, have been more powerful had it been confined to an examination of the basic moral principles flowing from an evolutionary approach. Once that foundation had been firmly established, work on the superstructure could have proceeded. Nevertheless, it is an important work, one of several which has not received a fraction of the attention and acclaim it deserves.

NATHANIEL WEYL

GENETICS AND EDUCATION

By Arthur R. Jensen. Harper and Row, New York, pp. 378. Price \$10.00.

As readers of *THE MANKIND QUARTERLY* no doubt know, Professor Arthur R. Jensen published a 123-page article in the *Harvard Educational Review* for winter 1969 which aroused nationwide controversy and made its author the victim of scurrilous, unprincipled and, one must assume, deliberately mendacious attacks by leftwing professors and students.¹ The fury of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other rowdy organizations of mindless Marxism was reminiscent of the actions of Nazi student organizations some 40 years previously. Jensen's life was threatened; his classes had to be held secretly at times and with guards posted; he was accused of racism, nazism and the general litany of ideological offenses that the communistic element apply in these instances.

The *Harvard Educational Review* had invited Jensen to write the article, had suggested that he include a discussion of race in his paper, and had agreed to devote an entire issue to his contribution. Under pressure, the editors of that distinguished liberal quarterly took fright. They had devoted most of the issue following that in which Jensen's article appeared to rebuttal by his critics.² In the succeeding issue, more outside views were published and Jensen's rejoinder appeared. Under attack for having given Jensen such a magnificent forum, the editors first refused to make reprints of his article available, going to the extreme of declining to sell them to Dr Jensen. They then retreated to the equally untenable position that they would sell Jensen reprints only with the views of his critics appended. This involved the insulting implication that scholars were unable to judge the

¹ "How much can we boast I.Q. and scholastic achievement," *Harvard Educational Review*, Winter 1969, 39, 1-123.

² These critics, particularly such distinguished ones as James F. Crow and Carl Bereiter, tended to disagree on secondary issues or on matters of emphasis.