

If there is a single unifying theme to this book, it lies in the consistent attempt to go beyond patterns of relationship to explain or limit the interpretation. An example of this is the article by Sorensen and Grusky that argues that occupation, not class, is the relevant differentiating identity in modern society and that within occupational classes, occupations have relatively closed boundaries. Some of the articles are particularly important given the debate in public discourse about inequality generated by Charles Murray. Treiman and Lee's analysis of income differences reveals the consistency of income differences among ethnic groups with those of African origin still well below other groups after both human capital and occupational differences have been removed — a strong case for the effect of discrimination on life chances. Tudor's analysis of gender differentiated intelligence demonstrates the importance of gender identity in the identification of moderate retardation with boys more at risk. Both articles add to the evidence that the simple genetic explanations of differences in achievement by race are incorrect. While the cross-cultural contributions are too few to allow this volume to be an important comparative resource, the article on factors contributing to the decline in maternal and infant mortality in China serves as a reminder to us that our theories and explanations are, indeed, culture bound. Increased availability of medical care is the most important predictor, not women's education or employment. The article by Heimer offers an explanation of the persistence of gender roles by differentiating between different kinds of responsibilities, those undertaken as opportunity and those assigned by fate which can neither be shifted nor neglected. Women's responsibilities which contribute to gender role differentiation are those assigned by fate. Evans and Mason qualify this with attention to structural changes in Australia, particularly increasing educational and occupational opportunities for women, and demonstrate their moderating effect on gender role attitudes.

Like most Festschriften, the articles are chosen to represent the work of John Pock's students. They cohere as a unit only at the very abstract level of social differentiation. It is, therefore, difficult to point to a particular audience for this volume. Nevertheless it is a collection of outstanding essays which are a pleasure to read.

### **Intelligence, Political Inequality, and Public Policy.**

*By Elliott White.* Praeger, 1997. 196 pp. Cloth, \$59.95.

*Reviewer:* ROBERT A. GORDON, *Johns Hopkins University*

Stating that "nature herself may be politically incorrect," the editor, political scientist Elliott White, presents thought-provoking articles on human inequality and its implications for political and economic inequality. White himself argues persuasively that persons with similar aptitudes tend increasingly to aggregate self-

selectively, much as members of The Bell Curve's cognitive classes do through societal selection. The aggregations thus produced multiply the advantages and disadvantages of their members so as to increase inequality among aggregates. His valuable article fortifies my evidence for the sociological importance of "intelligence context" in a recent issue of *Intelligence* (Jan./Feb. 1997).

Psychologist Seymour W. Itzkoff extends White's concerns to warn of an increasing economic divide within a United States dependent upon its workforce skills to hold its own in a globally competitive market, which tends to accentuate domestic inequality. Proper diagnosis, he urges, is "90 percent of the cure" for such problems.

Sociologists Martin Rein and Christopher Winship evaluate, loosely, the trivariate relation between "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Academic Establishment: Truth and Values in Social Controversies." They conclude that truth when seen as tentative, ought properly to give way to values. From this, the utility of making unwelcome truths seem more tentative, so that they can be trumped by values, necessarily emerges, and one can read much of the essay as an effort to apply this principle to politically incorrect science while seeming to address the issues in the title. The risk of casuistry whenever values are invoked is not addressed.

Charles Murray and his books, *Losing Ground* and *The Bell Curve* (the latter co-authored by Richard J. Herrnstein), serve as prime exhibits of nonacademic policy entrepreneurship. Rein and Winship express chagrin that Murray has been more influential on welfare policy than academics, whose expert refereeing for scientific publishers both books managed to circumvent. The absence of academic refereeing serves as their main test for policy entrepreneurship, which, otherwise, might be detected among academics, as well. One would think that no hypothesis at first denounced by a scientific establishment, as was Murray's argument that welfare policy had iatrogenic effects, had ever won later acceptance.

Statements are made that seem damaging to Murray when one is unaware of the other side. Extensive criticism of *The Bell Curve*, for example, is cited as evidence of the book's unscientific status. But much of that criticism was so inconsistent with mainstream science on intelligence that 52 experts felt compelled to respond with a corrective editorial in the journal *Intelligence* (cited above). The value of peer review depends on the peers, and Rein and Winship concede repeatedly that sociologists have been close-minded about intelligence.

One wonders why sociology's unscientific stance fails to elicit indignation equal to what they often misdirect toward Murray and Herrnstein, and why, under the circumstances, other scientists do not have a right, nay, an obligation to bypass peer review. After all, Winship has complained elsewhere that close-mindedness has cost sociology "two decades of research" on intelligence (although some of us were in fact active during that time). Unspoken, and more serious, is the possibility that the missing research was replaced by misspecified research, which was then taught to students.

To further embarrass Murray, Rein and Winship contrast his statement that no errors of fact needed correcting for the recent edition of his 1984 *Losing Ground* with a 1992 review by economist Robert Moffitt, which concluded that welfare had little or no effect on out-of-wedlock births. The criticism is unfair, as Murray never regarded his major hypothesis about such births and welfare as a “fact,” by which he meant specific information of little generality used in a wider argument. In 1993, for example, Murray himself noted in the *Journal of Labor Economics* that no consensus had been reached on any of the causal issues and the matter was “still incompletely understood.”

Rein and Winship’s criticism is also dated. A widely noticed 1995 study by economist Mark Rosenzweig at the University of Pennsylvania tested a model that coincidentally operationalizes rather closely Murray’s Harold-and-Phyllis scenario of 1984, when few studies existed. Rosenzweig’s is one of three studies that Moffitt, in a yet unpublished review, reports as indicating strong effects of welfare on nonmarital fertility. Although Moffitt informed me that since 1992 he has not changed his mind “very much,” in view of the many conflicting results, he does find that the majority of studies now show undesired effects of welfare on marriage and fertility and that there is a rough consensus that such effects exist, the question of their strength aside. Such flawed examples and other forms of petty sniping do not help the authors’ critique of nonacademic policy entrepreneurship.

Political scientist Albert Somit takes *The Bell Curve* to task for policy prescriptions that amount to “pabulum,” ineffective for heading off the book’s more dire predictions should they prove true. IQ researchers confronted by journalists demanding solutions in an environment prejudiced against proposals to raise IQ genetically may sympathize with this aspect of the book. Somit, judging from note 10, seems to understand this himself. Radical solutions receive fairer consideration only as bad problems become more clearly perceived, as every dental patient knows.

Whereas Herrnstein and Murray admitted, as do most IQ experts, only that both genes and environment, in some unknown mixture, were likely involved in race differences, psychologist J. Philippe Rushton argues that patterns of mean differences in numerous variables are “more consistent with gene-based evolutionary theory than . . . with environmental theory.” In support, he presents a vast array of data. His critics often point out that genetic variability on less salient sampled traits can be greater within race than between races, thus calling into question one possible formulation of the race concept. The *Star Trek* series succeeds in conveying a familiar geography-based (planetary) concept of race like Rushton’s, however, using just a few hereditary head modifications and some noticeable mean differences in personality traits, whatever the hidden variability in other characteristics, and despite maintaining an unlikely equality across humanoid races in intelligence. How much stronger would the race impression be if average intelligence varied too?

Finally, professor of government Roger D. Masters and his associates promote the importance of diet, pollution, and brain biochemistry to learning, social behavior, and social status. Their data are often ecological and hence fraught with problems of interpretation for IQ researchers aware of areal differences in intelligence and possible spurious correlation. Unfortunately, the authors advance their claim of importance for an interesting avenue of research with criticisms of Herrnstein, Murray, and Rushton that are too often picky at best.

**The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925.**

*By Elisabeth S. Clemens.* University of Chicago Press, 1997. 459 pp. Cloth, \$58.00; paper, \$19.95.

*Reviewer:* KENT REDDING, *Indiana University*

The early decades of the twentieth century brought forth a new kind of politics in the United States, one in which parties became significantly less important and "interests", especially those associated with business, came to prevail in state and national policy circles. The conventional account is that economic elites were the generators of such changes, dissatisfied as they were with corrupt machine politics which made politicians too unresponsive to the policy concerns of business. This much we know from established Progressive Era political history, according to Elisabeth Clemens' ambitious and impressive new book. But this emphasis on elites, Clemens argues, obscures the fact that during this period, organized women, labor, and farmers were themselves increasingly fed up with the unresponsiveness of party-dominated politics. Moreover, it was these three groups who developed innovative organizational mechanisms and seized on political opportunities outside of parties to bring about a politics and policy development more reflective of their respective concerns. These innovations, which began at the state level for the most part, were central to the reorganizing of American politics and to the rise of interest groups during the Progressive Era.

To tell this story of the rise of interest groups in American politics, Clemens assembles a rich body of evidence, centered on the operations of the three groups in California, Washington, and Wisconsin. This data is organized by a sophisticated conceptual framework derived from the "new" institutionalisms of organizational and political sociology. The first three chapters brilliantly lay out a theoretical scheme for solving certain empirical puzzles, such as why women were so successful vis à vis farmers and labor, in gaining policy developments (the development of the "maternalist" welfare state) in spite of their lack of formal access to power prior to 1920. Clemens sets out to assess the motives, means, and opportunities of the three groups to get what they wanted by changing the "forms and channels of