

NEWMAN, BERNARD. *Epics of Espionage*. Pp. 270. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. \$4.50.

This book is not a study of the institution of espionage, but a popular account of leading spies; it deals with actions more than motivations, with strategems and techniques to a greater extent than with the organization of spy systems. The time span is from Moses to Klaus Fuchs. The absorbing interest of the material outweighs carelessness as to style and silence as to sources. Newman does not overwrite; he does not gush; he does not romanticize the frequently sinister and sordid figures who crowd his pages.

A well-known British authority on the bizarre world of spycraft, Newman is at his best in dealing with pre-Soviet European espionage. Avoiding the over-publicized and rather inept Mata Hari, he concentrates on the *strategic* spies—those whose activity was on a sufficiently grand scale to turn the tide of wars, not merely battles. From Napoleon's Schulmeister, who was "all brains and no heart," he turns to Stieber, the creator of the Bismarckian espionage bureaucracy. There is a succinct treatment of the Dreyfus case. Colonel Alfred Redl, the homosexual who betrayed the Dual Monarchy to the Czar from within the Austrian military counterintelligence, emerges as one of the most resourceful agents in modern history. Newman is also to be commended for giving Tyler Kent the place he deserves in any international gallery of infamy. This minor American diplomatic official betrayed both the "unbreakable" State Department code and the Churchill-Roosevelt cables to the Nazis. Had he remained undetected, he might have won the war for Hitler. The espionage accomplishment of Alger Hiss is minor by comparison.

Lucid and interesting accounts of the gallant Polish underground organization which saved London from V-bomb demolition, of the fantastic Trebitsch Lincoln, of Paul Dukes who served England from inside Lenin's Cheka, and of many others are interspersed with much firsthand information.

A minor weakness of the book is its

treatment of the American War Between the States. A major weakness is the routine exposition of Soviet spying. Projecting his vast knowledge of espionage on the new canvas of Soviet Communism, Newman tends to search for identities, rather than significant differences. To be sure, he is aware of the fact that the professional spy is becoming obsolete and is giving place to the indoctrinated traitor in high places. The changes brought about by atomic warfare, however, are not analyzed. For the first time in history, subversion of the outstanding scientific minds of a nation—minds which are normally incorruptible—has become the primary target. Technological and other factors may have made espionage most decisive in prewar, rather than in actual combat, conditions.

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MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA, VICE-ADMIRAL THE EARL. *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander: South-East Asia 1943-1945*. Pp xi, 280, 47 maps and charts, New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. \$12.00.

This is a literarily unadorned, factual official report, generally chronological in make-up and subdivided into: Introduction, Strategy and Operations, Civil Affairs, and Conclusions. Not designed for light reading, it will be a primary source for historians and students of the South-East Asia Theater, the one least known to Americans and one whose priority on troops and supplies was low.

The military student will discover a brilliant ground campaign in almost roadless country planned and executed by General Sir William Slim, now Chief of the British Imperial Staff, against numerically superior Japanese forces possessing better communications. His troops were principally British-led Indian, East African, and West African. Their exploits remind us that good soldiers are limited to no race but are the products of morale, leadership, training, and adequate equipment.

