{"id":1907,"date":"2009-11-21T21:03:03","date_gmt":"2009-11-21T20:03:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=1907"},"modified":"2009-11-21T21:05:48","modified_gmt":"2009-11-21T20:05:48","slug":"beliefs-as-secondary-truth-bearers-in-a-pluralistic-proposition-theory","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2009\/11\/beliefs-as-secondary-truth-bearers-in-a-pluralistic-proposition-theory\/","title":{"rendered":"Beliefs as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory"},"content":{"rendered":"

It is common to speak of true beliefs. As an example think of the JTB analyses of knowledge<\/a>. JTB, that is, justified true belief<\/em>. One could see \u201ctrue belief\u201d as a shorthand for \u201ca belief in a true proposition\u201d. This seems to be the case. It is common to call the theory for the JTB analysis of knowledge, but when writing down the three necessary and sufficient<\/span> conditions, one does not write \u201chas a true belief\u201d but \u201cp is true\u201d.<\/p>\n

But perhaps it is a good idea to allow for some or all beliefs to be true\/false while still maintaining that it is propositions that are the primary truth bearers. A reason not to think so is again parsimony similar to the case of allowed sentences to be true too. Suppose that it is<\/span> a good idea anyway.<\/p>\n

What are the truth-conditions for beliefs?<\/h3>\n

First we may note that there seems to be no problem with ambiguity as there is with sentences<\/a> as truth bearers. Perhaps there are ambiguous beliefs. We will suppose that there are none. We may, then, introduce these simple truth-conditions for beliefs:<\/p>\n

A belief is true iff the proposition believed in is true.<\/p>\n

A belief is false iff the proposition believed in is false.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

It is common to speak of true beliefs. As an example think of the JTB analyses of knowledge. JTB, that is, justified true belief. One could see \u201ctrue belief\u201d as a shorthand for \u201ca belief in a true proposition\u201d. This seems to be the case. It is common to call the theory for the JTB […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[144,1473,1464,1475],"class_list":["post-1907","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","tag-beliefs","tag-pluralistic-proposition-theory","tag-truth-bearers","tag-truth-bearers-metaphysics-philosophy","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1907","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1907"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1907\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1910,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1907\/revisions\/1910"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1907"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1907"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1907"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}