{"id":1986,"date":"2009-12-31T01:00:09","date_gmt":"2009-12-31T00:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=1986"},"modified":"2009-12-31T01:00:09","modified_gmt":"2009-12-31T00:00:09","slug":"the-myth-of-morality-and-carelessness","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2009\/12\/the-myth-of-morality-and-carelessness\/","title":{"rendered":"The Myth of Morality and carelessness"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!-- \t\t@page { margin: 2cm } \t\tP { margin-bottom: 0.21cm } \t\tA:link { so-language: zxx } -->I&#8217;m currently reading <em>The Myth of Morality<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> by Richard Joyce. In the summery section of chapter three he presents a central argument thus:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">1. If <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> morally ought to \u00d8, then <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> ought to \u00d8 regardless of what his desires and interests are.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">2. If <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> morally ought to \u00d8, then <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> has a reason for \u00d8ing.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">3. Therefore, if <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> morally ought to \u00d8, then <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> can have a reason for \u00d8ing regardless of what his desires and interests are.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">4. But there is no sense to be made of such reasons.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">5. Therefore, <\/span><em>x<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\"> is never under a moral obligation. (p. 77)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">This argument is not valid under a straightforward interpretation. However Joyce earlier clarified the structure of the argument. He stated that the form is:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">1. If P, then Q<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">2. If P, then R<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\">\u22a2 <span style=\"font-style: normal;\">3. If P, then (Q and R)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\"><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">4. Not (Q and R)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 1.25cm;\">\u22a2 <span style=\"font-style: normal;\">5. Not P. (p. 42)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">However this does not correspond well to the words above. First, notice the wording in (3). It is \u201ccan have\u201d, which expresses a possibility, not an actuality like (2) does; \u201chas a reason\u201d. (3) should be either reworded (probably the best solution) or the formalization changed to \u25caR (\u201cit is possible that R\u201d). <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">Second, (4) does not correspond very well to the formalization at all.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">Third, (5) contains the word \u201cnever\u201d which is a temporal concept not found in any of the other premises. Indeed they don&#8217;t feature temporal words at all. Accordingly, the wording of (5) should be changed or the formalization changed (to something like <\/span><em>G<\/em><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">Q, using <a href=\"http:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/logic-modal\/#TemLog\">these<\/a> formalization keys). If we ignore the word \u201cnever\u201d in (5), then the argument is valid even though (3) is a about a possibility instead of an actuality. This is of course because (\u2200P), from P, \u25caP follows. (P\u2192\u25caP is a theorem of S5)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-style: normal;\">So, given the above, I think that Joyce is a bit careless. More careless than professional philosophers should be. Especially a professor!<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>I&#8217;m currently reading The Myth of Morality by Richard Joyce. In the summery section of chapter three he presents a central argument thus: 1. If x morally ought to \u00d8, then x ought to \u00d8 regardless of what his desires and interests are. 2. If x morally ought to \u00d8, then x has a reason [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[1518,1519,1517],"class_list":["post-1986","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ethics-philosophy","tag-careless","tag-richard-joyce","tag-the-myth-of-morality","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1986","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1986"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1986\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1987,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1986\/revisions\/1987"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1986"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1986"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1986"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}