{"id":3188,"date":"2012-08-12T01:52:51","date_gmt":"2012-08-12T00:52:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=3188"},"modified":"2012-08-12T08:41:43","modified_gmt":"2012-08-12T07:41:43","slug":"quotes-and-thoughts-deliberative-democracy-and-political-ignorance-ilya-somin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2012\/08\/quotes-and-thoughts-deliberative-democracy-and-political-ignorance-ilya-somin\/","title":{"rendered":"Quotes and thoughts: Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance (Ilya Somin)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Very interesting two papers by Somin! I will definitely check out his other stuff<\/a> when i have time. I just took the time off reading papers before i start reading book #2 on patents (Against Intellectual Monopoly<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance<\/a><\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ABSTRACT: Advocates of \u2018\u2018deliberative democracy\u2019\u2019 want citizens to actively<\/span><\/p>\n

participate in serious dialogue over political issues, not merely go to the polls every<\/span><\/p>\n

few years. Unfortunately, these ideals don\u2019t take into account widespread political<\/span><\/p>\n

ignorance and irrationality. Most voters neither attain the level of knowledge<\/span><\/p>\n

needed to make deliberative democracy work, nor do they rationally evaluate the<\/span><\/p>\n

political information they do possess. The vast size and complexity of modern<\/span><\/p>\n

government make it unlikely that most citizens can ever reach the levels of<\/span><\/p>\n

knowledge and rationality required by deliberative democracy, even if they were<\/span><\/p>\n

better informed than they are at present.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

How very depressing in relation to liquid democracy\/feedback<\/a>!<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

Deliberative democracy is one of the most influential ideas in modern<\/span><\/p>\n

political thought. Advocates want citizens to actively participate in the<\/span><\/p>\n

democratic process by seriously deliberating over important issues, not<\/span><\/p>\n

merely voting for or against candidates put forward by political parties.<\/span><\/p>\n

They hope that voters will not only develop a solid factual understanding<\/span><\/p>\n

of political issues, but will also debate the moral principles at stake in a<\/span><\/p>\n

rational and sophisticated fashion. Deliberative democrats expect more of<\/span><\/p>\n

voters than merely acting to \u2018\u2018throw the bums out\u2019\u2019 if things seem to be<\/span><\/p>\n

going badly.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These high aspirations are admirable and appealing. Unfortunately,<\/span><\/p>\n

they run afoul of the reality of widespread voter ignorance and<\/span><\/p>\n

irrationality. Moreover, even if voters were significantly better informed<\/span><\/p>\n

and more rational than most are today, the vast size and complexity of<\/span><\/p>\n

modern government would prevent them from acquiring enough<\/span><\/p>\n

knowledge and sophistication to deliberate over more than a small<\/span><\/p>\n

fraction of the full range of issues currently decided by government. Such<\/span><\/p>\n

difficulties become even more acute in light of the fact that many<\/span><\/p>\n

deliberative democrats want the political process to control even more of<\/span><\/p>\n

society than is already the case. Previous scholarship has only tentatively<\/span><\/p>\n

considered the implications of widespread voter ignorance and irration-<\/span><\/p>\n

ality for deliberative democracy.1<\/span><\/p>\n

This article is intended to close the gap<\/span><\/p>\n

in the literature more fully. My analysis focuses on theories of<\/span><\/p>\n

deliberative democracy that require deliberation by ordinary citizens. I<\/span><\/p>\n

do not consider the distinct question of deliberation by legislators or<\/span><\/p>\n

expert administrators.<\/span><\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

Parts IV#VI consider three proposals to increase political knowledge<\/span><\/p>\n

that have been advanced by deliberative democrats. These include using<\/span><\/p>\n

education to raise the level of political knowledge, increasing knowledge<\/span><\/p>\n

by having voters engage in structured deliberation, and transferring<\/span><\/p>\n

authority to lower levels of government where individual voters might<\/span><\/p>\n

have stronger incentives to acquire information. Finally, I will briefly<\/span><\/p>\n

suggest that deliberative ideals might be more effectively advanced by<\/span><\/p>\n

limiting the role of government in society.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Deliberative democracy is a normative ideal, not an attempt to explain<\/span><\/p>\n

present-day reality. However, an attractive normative ideal must be<\/span><\/p>\n

feasible. The problem of political ignorance casts serious doubt on the<\/span><\/p>\n

feasibility of deliberative democracy. Moreover, some proposals put<\/span><\/p>\n

forward by deliberative democrats, if implemented, may well cause more<\/span><\/p>\n

harm than good.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The second proposal was my idea as well. It better work, otherwise liquid feedback might be very bad indeed.<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

Decades of public opinion research show that most voters are very far<\/span><\/p>\n

from meeting the knowledge prerequisites of deliberative democracy. To<\/span><\/p>\n

Somin \u2022 Political Ignorance & Deliberative Democracy 257the contrary, they are often ignorant even of very basic political information.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In 2009, the Obama administration and congressional Democrats put<\/span><\/p>\n

forward ambitious plans to restructure the U.S. health-care system and<\/span><\/p>\n

impose a \u2018\u2018cap and trade\u2019\u2019 system to restrict carbon emissions and combat<\/span><\/p>\n

global warming. Both plans were widely discussed in the media and<\/span><\/p>\n

elsewhere. Yet a September 2009 survey found that only 37 percent of<\/span><\/p>\n

Americans claimed to \u2018\u2018understand\u2019\u2019 the health care plan, a figure that<\/span><\/p>\n

likely overestimates the true level of understanding.7 A May 2009 poll<\/span><\/p>\n

showed that only 24 percent of Americans realized that the important<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018\u2018cap and trade\u2019\u2019 proposal recently passed by the House of Representa-<\/span><\/p>\n

tives as an effort to combat global warming addressed \u2018\u2018environmental<\/span><\/p>\n

issues.\u2019\u2019 Some 46 percent believed that it was either a \u2018\u2018health-care<\/span><\/p>\n

reform\u2019\u2019 or a \u2018\u2018regulatory reform for Wall Street.\u2019\u20198<\/span><\/p>\n

Until the Obama health-care reform passed in March 2010, the largest<\/span><\/p>\n

new federal domestic program enacted in the previous 40 years had been<\/span><\/p>\n

the Bush Administration\u2019s prescription-drug entitlement, enacted in<\/span><\/p>\n

2003. Yet a December 2003 poll showed that almost 70 percent of<\/span><\/p>\n

Americans did not even know that Congress had passed the law (Somin<\/span><\/p>\n

2004c, 5#6).<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Public ignorance is not limited to information about specific policies.<\/span><\/p>\n

It also extends to knowledge of political parties, ideologies, and the basic<\/span><\/p>\n

structure and institutions of government (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996;<\/span><\/p>\n

Somin 1998 and 2004c). For example, a majority of voters are ignorant<\/span><\/p>\n

of such fundamentals of the U.S. political system as who has the power<\/span><\/p>\n

to declare war, the respective functions of the three branches of<\/span><\/p>\n

government, and who controls monetary policy (Delli Carpini and<\/span><\/p>\n

Keeter 1996, 70#71). A 2006 Zogby poll found that only 42 percent of<\/span><\/p>\n

Americans could even name the three branches of the federal<\/span><\/p>\n

government (Somin 2010, ch. 2). Another 2006 survey revealed that<\/span><\/p>\n

only 28 percent could name two or more of the five rights guaranteed by<\/span><\/p>\n

the First Amendment to the Constitution (ibid.). A 2002 Columbia<\/span><\/p>\n

University study found that 35 percent believed that Karl Marx\u2019s dictum<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018\u2018From each according to his ability to each according to his need\u2019\u2019 is<\/span><\/p>\n

enshrined the Constitution; 34 percent said they did not know if it was,<\/span><\/p>\n

and only 31 percent correctly answered that it was not (Dorf 2002).<\/span><\/p>\n

Similarly, years of survey data show that most of the public has little<\/span><\/p>\n

understanding of the basic differences between liberalism and con-<\/span><\/p>\n

servatism (RePass 2008; Somin 2010, ch. 2). They are often also<\/span><\/p>\n

confused about the differences between the policy positions of the two<\/span><\/p>\n

major parties (e.g., Somin 2004a).<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Widespread political ignorance has persisted over time, despite<\/span><\/p>\n

massive increases in education and the availability of information through<\/span><\/p>\n

new technologies such as the internet.9 It seems unlikely to diminish<\/span><\/p>\n

substantially in the foreseeable future.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Holy shit. Wud be very interesting to see cross-national data on some of these things. One cud use something like the separation of power<\/a> as a question. Even tho the countries differ in how they do that, most of them do it in some way, and it is thus possible to ask and see whether people know how their country does it.<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

There is nothing inherently objectionable about people who acquire<\/span><\/p>\n

political information for reasons other than becoming a better voter. It is<\/span><\/p>\n

perfectly understandable if people wish to follow politics for any number<\/span><\/p>\n

of reasons. Problems arise, however, when these motives conflict with<\/span><\/p>\n

the goal of rational evaluation of information for the purpose of making<\/span><\/p>\n

informed political decisions. To take one such case, people who acquire<\/span><\/p>\n

information for the purpose of cheering on their political \u2018\u2018team\u2019\u2019 or<\/span><\/p>\n

confirming their existing views are likely to overvalue information that<\/span><\/p>\n

confirms those views and undervalue or ignore anything that cuts against<\/span><\/p>\n

them. Extensive evidence suggests that this is in fact the way most<\/span><\/p>\n

committed partisans evaluate political information.14 Experiments show<\/span><\/p>\n

that political partisans not only reject new information casting doubt on<\/span><\/p>\n

their beliefs, but sometimes actually respond by believing in them even<\/span><\/p>\n

more fervently (Bullock 2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2009). Thus, a recent<\/span><\/p>\n

study found that conservatives presented with evidence showing that<\/span><\/p>\n

U.S. forces failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq were<\/span><\/p>\n

actually strengthened in their pre-existing view thatWMDs were present<\/span><\/p>\n

(Nyhan and Reifler 2009, 11#15). Similarly, liberals confronted with<\/span><\/p>\n

evidence that 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry had<\/span><\/p>\n

incorrectly claimed that the Bush Administration had \u2018\u2018banned\u2019\u2019 stem-<\/span><\/p>\n

cell research persisted in their pre-existing view that the charge was<\/span><\/p>\n

accurate (ibid., 23#24). Similarly, most people discuss political issues only<\/span><\/p>\n

with those who agree with them (Mutz 2006, 29#41). This tendency is<\/span><\/p>\n

most pronounced among \u2018\u2018those most knowledgeable about and<\/span><\/p>\n

interested in politics\u2019\u2019 (ibid., 37), which implies that those who seek<\/span><\/p>\n

out political knowledge the most are not motivated primarily by truth-<\/span><\/p>\n

seeking. If they were, it would make sense to sample a wide variety of<\/span><\/p>\n

sources, possibly placing particular emphasis on those with viewpoints<\/span><\/p>\n

opposed to one\u2019s own. The latter are more likely to expose the truth-<\/span><\/p>\n

seeker to facts and analysis that he has not already considered. As John<\/span><\/p>\n

Stuart Mill ([1869] 1975, 35#51) famously emphasized in On Liberty, we<\/span><\/p>\n

are more likely to discover the truth if we consider opposing viewpoints,<\/span><\/p>\n

not merely those that we already agree with.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Wow. Good thing im primarily a filosofer with truth as the goal, and not party politics. Impartial truth-seekers are perhaps the best politicians then? If so, then thats sad since they are the ones least likely to become politicians in todays system.<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

In addition to processing information in ways that provide internal<\/span><\/p>\n

psychological gratification, people also often try to express opinions that<\/span><\/p>\n

conform to social expectations and seek to avoid negative reactions from<\/span><\/p>\n

other members of the community (Kuran 1995; Sunstein 2003). For<\/span><\/p>\n

example, people in a socially conservative community may hesitate to<\/span><\/p>\n

express approval of gay marriage for fear of alienating antigay friends,<\/span><\/p>\n

family members, and neighbors. Those in politically liberal settings such<\/span><\/p>\n

as university campuses often hesitate to criticize liberal policies such as<\/span><\/p>\n

affirmative action (Kuran 1995, 310#25). Even in a relatively tolerant<\/span><\/p>\n

liberal democratic society, dissenters often hesitate to openly endorse<\/span><\/p>\n

unpopular views; they instead find it easier to pretend to agree with the<\/span><\/p>\n

majority. Such \u2018\u2018preference falsification\u2019\u201916 can easily lead people to reject<\/span><\/p>\n

powerful arguments against socially approved positions, or even to<\/span><\/p>\n

refrain from voicing them in the first place.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Preference falsification can infect many kinds of political processes.<\/span><\/p>\n

But it is an especially serious danger in a deliberative democracy, where<\/span><\/p>\n

citizens have to engage in open dialogue on political issues and therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

take positions (or refrain from doing so) in a setting where other<\/span><\/p>\n

members of the community can observe them. Under \u2018\u2018aggregative\u2019\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n

democracy, by contrast, voters usually make decisions and access<\/span><\/p>\n

information in more private settings and therefore may face less pressure<\/span><\/p>\n

to conform.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

To combat this problem, liquid feedback systems shud have anonymization in various ways. Perhaps by allowing users to go under many different names, but only allow them to vote once.<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

IV. CAN EDUCATION SAVE DEMOCRACY?<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Is it possible not to love this guy? :D<\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Very interesting two papers by Somin! I will definitely check out his other stuff when i have time. I just took the time off reading papers before i start reading book #2 on patents (Against Intellectual Monopoly). Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance –   ABSTRACT: Advocates of \u2018\u2018deliberative democracy\u2019\u2019 want citizens to actively participate in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1879,1925,1861],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3188","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-education-politik","category-government-form","category-politics-philosophy","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3188","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3188"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3188\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3192,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3188\/revisions\/3192"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3188"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3188"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3188"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}