{"id":3490,"date":"2012-12-22T23:22:39","date_gmt":"2012-12-22T22:22:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=3490"},"modified":"2012-12-22T23:23:36","modified_gmt":"2012-12-22T22:23:36","slug":"review-fashionable-nonsense-postmodern-intellectuals-abuse-of-science-alan-sokal-jean-bricmont","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2012\/12\/review-fashionable-nonsense-postmodern-intellectuals-abuse-of-science-alan-sokal-jean-bricmont\/","title":{"rendered":"Review: Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals\u2019 Abuse of Science (Alan Sokal, Jean Bricmont)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Fashionable Nonsense, Postmodern Intellectuals\u2019 Abuse of Science – Alan Sokal, Jean Bricmont<\/a> ebook download pdf free<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The book contains the best single chapter on filosofy of science that iv com across. very much recommended, especially for those that dont like filosofers’ accounts of things. alot of the rest of the book is devoted to long quotes full of nonsens, and som explanations of why it is nonsens (if possible), or just som explanatory remarks about the fields invoked (say, relativity).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

as such, this book is a must read for ppl who ar interested in the study of seudoscience, and those interested in meaningless language use. basically, it is a collection of case studies of that.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

———-<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[footnote] Bertrand Russell (1948, p. 196) tells the following amusing story: \u201cI once received a <\/span><\/p>\n

letter from an eminent logician, Mrs Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a <\/span><\/p>\n

solipsist, and was surprised that there were not others”. We learned this reference <\/span><\/p>\n

from Devitt (1997, p. 64).<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

LOL!<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The answer, of course, is that we have no proof; it is simply <\/span><\/p>\n

a perfectly reasonable hypothesis. The most natural way to ex\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

plain the persistence of our sensations (in particular, the un\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

pleasant ones) is to suppose that they are caused by agents <\/span><\/p>\n

outside our consciousness. We can almost always change at will <\/span><\/p>\n

the sensations that are pure products of our imagination, but we <\/span><\/p>\n

cannot stop a war, stave off a lion, or start a broken-down car <\/span><\/p>\n

by pure thought alone. Nevertheless\u2014 and it is important to em\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

phasize this\u2014this argument does not refute solipsism. If anyone <\/span><\/p>\n

insists that he is a \u201charpsichord playing solo\u201d (Diderot), there is <\/span><\/p>\n

no way to convince him of his error. However, we have never<\/span><\/p>\n

met a sincere solipsist and we doubt that any exist.52 This illus\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

trates an important principle that we shall use several times in <\/span><\/p>\n

this chapter: the mere fact that an idea is irrefutable does not <\/span><\/p>\n

imply that there is any reason to believe it is true.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

i wonder how that epistemological point (that arguments from ignorance ar no good) works with intuitionism in math\/logic?<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The universality of Humean skepticism is also its weakness. <\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, it is irrefutable. But since no one is systematically <\/span><\/p>\n

skeptical (when he or she is sincere) with respect to ordinary <\/span><\/p>\n

knowledge, one ought to ask why skepticism is rejected in that <\/span><\/p>\n

domain and why it would nevertheless be valid when applied <\/span><\/p>\n

elsewhere, for instance, to scientific knowledge. Now, the rea\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

son why we reject systematic skepticism in everyday life is <\/span><\/p>\n

more or less obvious and is similar to the reason we reject solip\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sism. The best way to account for the coherence of our experi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ence is to suppose that the outside world corresponds, at least <\/span><\/p>\n

approximately, to the image of it provided by our senses.54<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

54 4This hypothesis receives a deeper explanation with the subsequent development of <\/span><\/p>\n

science, in particular of the biological theory of evolution. Clearly, the possession of <\/span><\/p>\n

sensory organs that reflect more or less faithfully the outside world (or, at least, <\/span><\/p>\n

some important aspects of it) confers an evolutionary advantage. Let us stress that <\/span><\/p>\n

this argument does not refute radical skepticism, but it does increase the coherence <\/span><\/p>\n

of the anti-skeptical worldview.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

the authors ar surprisingly sofisticated filosofically, and i agree very much with their reasoning.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For my part, I have no doubt that, although progressive changes <\/span><\/p>\n

are to be expected in physics, the present doctrines are likely to be <\/span><\/p>\n

nearer to the truth than any rival doctrines now before the world. <\/span><\/p>\n

Science is at no moment quite right, but it is seldom quite wrong, <\/span><\/p>\n

and has, as a rule, a better chance of being right than the theories <\/span><\/p>\n

of the unscientific. It is, therefore, rational to accept it <\/span><\/p>\n

hypothetically.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development<\/span><\/p>\n

(1995 [1959], p. 13)<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

yes, the analogy is that: science is LIKE a limit function that goes towards 1 [approximates closer to truth] over time. at any given x, it is not quite at y=1 yet, but it gets closer. it might not be completely monotonic either (and i dont know if that completely breaks the limit function, probably doesnt).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

http:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/scientific-progress\/#Tru<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

for a quick grafical illustration, try the function f(x)=1-(-1\/x) on the interval [1;\u221e]. The truth line is f(x)=1 on the interval [0;\u221e]. in reality, the graf wud be mor unsteady and not completely monotonic corresponding to the varius theories as they com and go in science. it is not only a matter of evidence (which is not an infallible indicator of truth either), but it is primarily a function of that.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Once the general problems of solipsism and radical skepti\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cism have been set aside, we can get down to work. Let us sup\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

pose that we are able to obtain some more-or-less reliable <\/span><\/p>\n

knowledge of the world, at least in everyday life. We can then <\/span><\/p>\n

ask: To what extent are our senses reliable or not? To answer <\/span><\/p>\n

this question, we can compare sense impressions among them\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

selves and vary certain parameters of our everyday experience. <\/span><\/p>\n

We can map out in this way, step by step, a practiced rationality. <\/span><\/p>\n

When this is done systematically and with sufficient precision, <\/span><\/p>\n

science can begin.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For us, the scientific method is not radically different from <\/span><\/p>\n

the rational attitude in everyday life or in other domains of hu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

man knowledge. Historians, detectives, and plumbers\u2014indeed, <\/span><\/p>\n

all human beings\u2014use the same basic methods of induction, <\/span><\/p>\n

deduction, and assessment of evidence as do physicists or bio\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

chemists. Modem science tries to carry out these operations in <\/span><\/p>\n

a more careful and systematic way, by using controls and sta\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tistical tests, insisting on replication, and so forth. Moreover, <\/span><\/p>\n

scientific measurements are often much more precise than <\/span><\/p>\n

everyday observations; they allow us to discover hitherto un\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

known phenomena; and they often conflict with \u201ccommon <\/span><\/p>\n

sense\u201d. But the conflict is at the level of conclusions, not the <\/span><\/p>\n

basic approach.55 56<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

55For example: Water appears to us as a continuous fluid, but chemical and physical <\/span><\/p>\n

experiments teach us that it is made of atoms.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

56Throughout this chapter, we stress the methodological continuity between scientific <\/span><\/p>\n

knowledge and everyday knowledge. This is, in our view, the proper way to respond <\/span><\/p>\n

to various skeptical challenges and to dispel the confusions generated by radical <\/span><\/p>\n

interpretations of correct philosophical ideas such as the underdetermination of <\/span><\/p>\n

theories by data. But it would be naive to push this connection too far. Science\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

particularly fundamental physics\u2014 introduces concepts that are hard to grasp <\/span><\/p>\n

intuitively or to connect directly to common-sense notions. (For example: forces <\/span><\/p>\n

acting instantaneously throughout the universe in Newtonian mechanics, <\/span><\/p>\n

electromagnetic fields “vibrating\u201d in vacuum in Maxwell\u2019s theory, curved space-time <\/span><\/p>\n

in Einstein\u2019s general relativity.) And it is in discussions about the meaning o f these <\/span><\/p>\n

theoretical concepts that various brands of realists and anti-realists (e.g., <\/span><\/p>\n

intrumentalists, pragmatists) tend to part company. Relativists sometimes tend to fall <\/span><\/p>\n

back on instrumentalist positions when challenged, but there is a profound difference <\/span><\/p>\n

between the two attitudes. Instrumentalists may want to claim either that we have no <\/span><\/p>\n

way of knowing whether \u201cunobservable\u201d theoretical entities really exist, or that their <\/span><\/p>\n

meaning is defined solely through measurable quantities; but this does not imply that <\/span><\/p>\n

they regard such entities as \u201csubjective\u201d in the sense that their meaning would be<\/span><\/p>\n

significantly influenced by extra-scientific factors (such as the personality of the <\/span><\/p>\n

individual scientist or the social characteristics o f the group to which she belongs). <\/span><\/p>\n

Indeed, instrumentalists may regard our scientific theories as, quite simply, the most <\/span><\/p>\n

satisfactory way that the human mind, with its inherent biological limitations, is <\/span><\/p>\n

capable of understanding the world.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

right they ar<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Having reached this point in the discussion, the radical skep\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tic or relativist will ask what distinguishes science from other <\/span><\/p>\n

types of discourse about reality\u2014religions or myths, for exam\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ple, or pseudo-sciences such as astrology\u2014and, above all, what <\/span><\/p>\n

criteria are used to make such a distinction. Our answer is nu- <\/span><\/p>\n

anced. First of all, there are some general (but basically nega\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tive) epistemological principles, which go back at least to the <\/span><\/p>\n

seventeenth century: to be skeptical of a priori arguments, rev\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

elation, sacred texts, and arguments from authority. Moreover, <\/span><\/p>\n

the experience accumulated during three centuries of scientific <\/span><\/p>\n

practice has given us a series of more-or-less general method\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ological principles\u2014for example, to replicate experiments, to <\/span><\/p>\n

use controls, to test medicines in double-blind protocols\u2014that <\/span><\/p>\n

can be justified by rational arguments. However, we do not <\/span><\/p>\n

claim that these principles can be codified in a definitive way, <\/span><\/p>\n

nor that the list is exhaustive. In other words, there does not <\/span><\/p>\n

exist (at least at present) a complete codification of scientific ra\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tionality, and we seriously doubt that one could ever exist. After <\/span><\/p>\n

all, the future is inherently unpredictable; rationality is always <\/span><\/p>\n

an adaptation to a new situation. Nevertheless\u2014and this is the <\/span><\/p>\n

main difference between us and the radical skeptics\u2014we think <\/span><\/p>\n

that well-developed scientific theories are in general supported <\/span><\/p>\n

by good arguments, but the rationality of those arguments must <\/span><\/p>\n

be analyzed case-by-case.60<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

60 It is also by proceeding on a case-by-case basis that one can appreciate the <\/span><\/p>\n

immensity of the gulf separating the sciences from the pseudo-sciences.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sokal and Bricmont might soon becom my new favorit filosofers of science.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Obviously, every induction is an inference from the observed to <\/span><\/p>\n

the unobserved, and no such inference can be justified using <\/span><\/p>\n

solely deductive logic. But, as we have seen, if this argument <\/span><\/p>\n

were to be taken seriously\u2014if rationality were to consist only <\/span><\/p>\n

of deductive logic\u2014 it would imply also that there is no good <\/span><\/p>\n

reason to believe that the Sun will rise tomorrow, and yet no one <\/span><\/p>\n

really expects the Sun not to rise.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

id like to add, like i hav don many times befor, that ther is no reason to think that induction shud be proveable with deduction. why require that? but now coms the interesting part. if one takes induction as the basis instead of deduction, one can inductivly prove deduction. <prove> in the ordinary, non-mathetical\/logical sens. the method is enumerativ induction, which i hav discussed befor.<\/p>\n

http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=3219<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

But one may go further. It is natural to introduce a hierarchy <\/span><\/p>\n

in the degree of credence accorded to different theories, de\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

pending on the quantity and quality of the evidence supporting <\/span><\/p>\n

them.95 Every scientist\u2014indeed, every human being\u2014proceeds <\/span><\/p>\n

in this way and grants a higher subjective probability to the <\/span><\/p>\n

best-established theories (for instance, the evolution of species <\/span><\/p>\n

or the existence of atoms) and a lower subjective probability to <\/span><\/p>\n

more speculative theories (such as detailed theories of quantum <\/span><\/p>\n

gravity). The same reasoning applies when comparing theories <\/span><\/p>\n

in natural science with those in history or sociology. For exam\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ple, the evidence of the Earth\u2019s rotation is vastly stronger than <\/span><\/p>\n

anything Kuhn could put forward in support of his historical <\/span><\/p>\n

theories. This does not mean, of course, that physicists are more <\/span><\/p>\n

clever than historians or that they use better methods, but sim\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ply that they deal with less complex problems, involving a <\/span><\/p>\n

smaller number of variables which, moreover, are easier to mea\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sure and to control. It is impossible to avoid introducing such a <\/span><\/p>\n

hierarchy in our beliefs, and this hierarchy implies that there is <\/span><\/p>\n

no conceivable argument based on the Kuhnian view of history<\/span><\/p>\n

that could give succor to those sociologists or philosophers who <\/span><\/p>\n

wish to challenge, in a blanket way, the reliability of scientific <\/span><\/p>\n

results.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sokal and Bricmont even get the epistemological point about the different fields right. color me very positivly surprised.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Bruno Latour and His Rules of Method<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The strong programme in the sociology of science has found <\/span><\/p>\n

an echo in France, particularly around Bruno Latour. His works <\/span><\/p>\n

contain a great number of propositions formulated so ambigu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ously that they can hardly be taken literally. And when one re\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

moves the ambiguity\u2014 as we shall do here in a few <\/span><\/p>\n

examples\u2014 one reaches the conclusion that the assertion is ei\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ther true but banal, or else surprising but manifestly false.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

sound familiar? its the good old two-faced sentences again, those that Swartz and Bradley called Janus-sentences. they yield two different interpretations, one trivial and true, one nontrivial and false. their apparent plausibility is becus of this fact.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

quoting from Possible Worlds<\/em>:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Janus-faced sentences <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

The method of possible-worlds testing is not only an invaluable aid towards resolving ambiguity; it is also an effective weapon against a particular form of-linguistic sophistry. <\/span><\/p>\n

Thinkers often deceive themselves and others into supposing that they have discovered a profound <\/span><\/p>\n

truth about the universe when all they have done is utter what we shall call a “Janus-faced <\/span><\/p>\n

sentence”. Janus, according to Roman mythology, was a god with two faces who was therefore able <\/span><\/p>\n

to ‘face’ in two directions at once. Thus, by a “Janus-faced sentence” we mean a sentence which, like “In the evolutionary struggle for existence just the fittest species survive”, faces in two directions. It is ambiguous insofar as it may be used to express a noncontingent proposition, e.g., that in the struggle for existence just the surviving species survive, and may also be used to express a contingent proposition, e.g., the generalization that just the physically strongest species survive. <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

If a token of such a sentence-type is used to express a noncontingently true proposition then, of <\/span><\/p>\n

course, the truth of that proposition is indisputable; but since, in that case, it is true in all possible <\/span><\/p>\n

worlds, it does not tell us anything distinctive about the actual world. If, on the other hand, a token <\/span><\/p>\n

of such a sentence-type is used to express a contingent proposition, then of course that proposition <\/span><\/p>\n

does tell us something quite distinctive about the actual world; but in that case its truth is far from <\/span><\/p>\n

indisputable. The sophistry lies in supposing that the indisputable credentials of the one proposition <\/span><\/p>\n

can be transferred to the other just by virtue of the fact that one sentence-token might be used to <\/span><\/p>\n

express one of these propositions and a different sentence-token of one and the same sentence-type <\/span><\/p>\n

might be used to express the other of these propositions. For by virtue of the necessary truth of one <\/span><\/p>\n

of these propositions, the truth of the other \u2014 the contingent one \u2014 can be made to seem <\/span><\/p>\n

indisputable, can be made to seem, that is, as if it “stands to reason” that it should be true. <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

We could be accused here of focusing our attention on an <\/span><\/p>\n

ambiguity of formulation and of not trying to understand what <\/span><\/p>\n

Latour really means. In order to counter this objection, let us go <\/span><\/p>\n

back to the section \u201cAppealing (to) Nature\u201d (pp. 94-100) where <\/span><\/p>\n

the Third Rule is introduced and developed. Latour begins by <\/span><\/p>\n

ridiculing the appeal to Nature as a way of resolving scientific <\/span><\/p>\n

controversies, such as the one concerning solar neutrinos[121]:<\/span><\/p>\n

A fierce controversy divides the astrophysicists who calcu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

late the number o f neutrinos coming out o f the sun and Davis, <\/span><\/p>\n

the experimentalist who obtains a much smaller figure. It is <\/span><\/p>\n

easy to distinguish them and put the controversy to rest. Just <\/span><\/p>\n

let us see for ourselves in which camp the sun is really to be <\/span><\/p>\n

found. Somewhere the natural sun with its true number o f <\/span><\/p>\n

neutrinos will close the mouths o f dissenters and force them <\/span><\/p>\n

to accept the facts no matter how well written these papers <\/span><\/p>\n

were. (Latour 1987, p. 95)<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Why does Latour choose to be ironic? The problem is to know <\/span><\/p>\n

how many neutrinos are emitted by the Sun, and this question <\/span><\/p>\n

is indeed difficult. We can hope that it will be resolved some day, <\/span><\/p>\n

not because \u201cthe natural sun will close the mouths of dis\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

senters\u201d, but because sufficiently powerful empirical data will <\/span><\/p>\n

become available. Indeed, in order to fill in the gaps in the cur\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

rently available data and to discriminate between the currently <\/span><\/p>\n

existing theories, several groups of physicists have recently <\/span><\/p>\n

built detectors of different types, and they are now performing<\/span><\/p>\n

the (difficult) measurements.122 It is thus reasonable to expect <\/span><\/p>\n

that the controversy will be settled sometime in the next few <\/span><\/p>\n

years, thanks to an accumulation of evidence that, taken to\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

gether, will indicate clearly the correct solution. However, other <\/span><\/p>\n

scenarios are in principle possible: the controversy could die <\/span><\/p>\n

out because people stop being interested in the issue, or be\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cause the problem turns out to be too difficult to solve; and, at <\/span><\/p>\n

this level, sociological factors undoubtedly play a role (if only <\/span><\/p>\n

because of the budgetary constraints on research). Obviously, <\/span><\/p>\n

scientists think, or at least hope, that if the controversy is re\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

solved it will be because of observations and not because of <\/span><\/p>\n

the literary qualities of the scientific papers. Otherwise, they <\/span><\/p>\n

will simply have ceased to do science.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

the footnode 121 is:<\/p>\n

The nuclear reactions that power the Sun are expected to emit copious quantities <\/span><\/p>\n

of the subatomic particle called the neutrino. By combining current theories of solar <\/span><\/p>\n

structure, nuclear physics, and elementary-particle physics, it is possible to obtain <\/span><\/p>\n

quantitative predictions for the flux and energy distribution of the solar neutrinos. <\/span><\/p>\n

Since the late 1960s, experimental physicists, beginning with the pioneering work of <\/span><\/p>\n

Raymond Davis, have been attempting to detect the solar neutrinos and measure their <\/span><\/p>\n

flux. The solar neutrinos have in fact been detected; but their flux appears to be less <\/span><\/p>\n

than one-third o f the theoretical prediction. Astrophysicists and elementary-particle <\/span><\/p>\n

physicists are actively trying to determine whether the discrepancy arises from <\/span><\/p>\n

experimental error or theoretical error, and if the latter, whether the failure is in the <\/span><\/p>\n

solar models or in the elementary-particle models. For an introductory overview, see <\/span><\/p>\n

Bahcall (1990).<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

this problem sounded familiar to me.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Solar_neutrino_problem<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The <\/span>solar neutrino problem<\/strong><\/span> was a major discrepancy between measurements of the numbers of neutrinos<\/a> flowing through the Earth<\/a> and theoretical models of the solar<\/a> interior, lasting from the mid-1960s to about 2002. The discrepancy has since been resolved by new understanding of neutrino<\/a> physics, requiring a modification of the Standard Model<\/a> of particle physics<\/a> \u2013 specifically, neutrino oscillation<\/a>. Essentially, as neutrinos have mass, they can change from the type that had been expected to be produced in the Sun’s interior into two types that would not be caught by the detectors in use at the time.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

science seems to be working. Sokal and Bricmont predicted that it wud be resolved \u201din the next few years\u201d. this was written in 1997, about 5 years befor the data Wikipedia givs for the resolution. i advice one to read the Wiki article, as it is quite good.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In this quote and the previous one, Latour is playing con\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

stantly on the confusion between facts and our knowledge of <\/span><\/p>\n

them.123 The correct answer to any scientific question, solved or<\/span><\/p>\n

not, depends on the state of Nature (for example, on the num\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ber of neutrinos that the Sun really emits). Now, it happens that, <\/span><\/p>\n

for the unsolved problems, nobody knows the right answer, <\/span><\/p>\n

while for the solved ones, we do know it (at least if the accepted <\/span><\/p>\n

solution is correct, which can always be challenged). But there <\/span><\/p>\n

is no reason to adopt a \u201crelativist\u201d attitude in one case and a \u201cre\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

alist\u201d one in the other. The difference between these attitudes is <\/span><\/p>\n

a philosophical matter, and is independent of whether the prob\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

lem is solved or not. For the relativist, there is simply no unique <\/span><\/p>\n

correct answer, independent of all social and cultural circum\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

stances; this holds for the closed questions as well as for the <\/span><\/p>\n

open ones. On the other hand, the scientists who seek the cor\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

rect solution are not relativist, almost by definition. Of course <\/span><\/p>\n

they do \u201cuse Nature as the external referee\u201d: that is, they seek to <\/span><\/p>\n

know what is really happening in Nature, and they design ex\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

periments for that purpose.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

the footnote 123 is:<\/p>\n

An even more extreme example o f this confusion appears in a recent article by <\/span><\/p>\n

Latour in La Recherche, a French monthly magazine devoted to the popularization of <\/span><\/p>\n

science (Latour 1998). Here Latour discusses what he interprets as the discovery in <\/span><\/p>\n

1976, by French scientists working on the mummy of the pharaoh Ramses II, that his <\/span><\/p>\n

death (circa 1213 B.C.) was due to tuberculosis. Latour asks: \u201cHow could he pass<\/span><\/p>\n

away due to a bacillus discovered by Robert Koch in 1882?\u201d Latour notes, correctly, <\/span><\/p>\n

that it would be an anachronism to assert that Rainses II was killed by machine-gun <\/span><\/p>\n

fire or died from the stress provoked by a stock-market crash. But then, Latour <\/span><\/p>\n

wonders, why isn\u2019t death from tuberculosis likewise an anachronism? He goes so far <\/span><\/p>\n

as to assert that \u201cBefore Koch, the bacillus has no real existence.\u201d He dismisses the <\/span><\/p>\n

common-sense notion that Koch discovered a pre-existing bacillus as \u201chaving only the <\/span><\/p>\n

appearance o f common sense\u201d. Of course, in the rest o f the article, Latour gives no <\/span><\/p>\n

argument to justify these radical claims and provides no genuine alternative to the <\/span><\/p>\n

common-sense answer. He simply stresses the obvious fact that, in order to discover <\/span><\/p>\n

the cause of Ramses\u2019 death, a sophisticated analysis in Parisian laboratories was <\/span><\/p>\n

needed. But unless Latour is putting forward the truly radical claim that nothing we <\/span><\/p>\n

discover ever existed prior to its \u201cdiscovery\u201d\u2014 in particular, that no murderer is a <\/span><\/p>\n

murderer, in the sense that he committed a crime before the police \u201cdiscovered” him <\/span><\/p>\n

to be a murderer\u2014 he needs to explain what is special about bacilli, and this he has <\/span><\/p>\n

utterly failed to do. The result is that Latour is saying nothing clear, and the article <\/span><\/p>\n

oscillates between extreme banalities and blatant falsehoods.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

?!<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

a quote from one of the crazy ppl:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The privileging o f solid over fluid mechanics, and indeed the <\/span><\/p>\n

inability o f science to deal with turbulent flow at all, she at\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tributes to the association o f fluidity with femininity. Whereas <\/span><\/p>\n

men have sex organs that protrude and become rigid, women <\/span><\/p>\n

have openings that leak menstrual blood and vaginal fluids. <\/span><\/p>\n

Although men, too, flow on occasion\u2014 when semen is emit\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ted, for example\u2014 this aspect o f their sexuality is not empha\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sized. It is the rigidity o f the male organ that counts, not its <\/span><\/p>\n

complicity in fluid flow. These idealizations are reinscribed in <\/span><\/p>\n

mathematics, which conceives o f fluids as laminated planes <\/span><\/p>\n

and other modified solid forms. In the same way that women <\/span><\/p>\n

are erased within masculinist theories and language, existing <\/span><\/p>\n

only as not-men, so fluids have been erased from science, ex\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

isting only as not-solids. From this perspective it is no wonder <\/span><\/p>\n

that science has not been able to arrive at a successful model <\/span><\/p>\n

for turbulence. The problem o f turbulent f low cannot be <\/span><\/p>\n

solved because the conceptions o f fluids (and o f women) <\/span><\/p>\n

have been formulated so as necessarily to leave unarticulated <\/span><\/p>\n

remainders. (Hayles 1992, p. 17)<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

u cant make this shit up<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Over the past three decades, remarkable progress has been <\/span><\/p>\n

made in the mathematical theory of chaos, but the idea that <\/span><\/p>\n

some physical systems may exhibit a sensitivity to initial con\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ditions is not new. Here is what James Clerk Maxwell said in <\/span><\/p>\n

1877, after stating the principle of determinism ( \u201cthe same <\/span><\/p>\n

causes will always produce the same effects\u201d):<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

but thats not what determinism is. their quote seems to be from Hume’s Treatise.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Causality#After_the_Middle_Ages<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

it is mentioned in his discussion of causality, which is related to but not the same as, determinism.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Wikipedia givs a fine definition of <determinism><\/a>: \u201dDeterminism is a philosophy stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could happen.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

also SEP<\/a>: \u201d<\/span>Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[T]he first difference between science and philosophy is their <\/span><\/p>\n

respective attitudes toward chaos. Chaos is defined not so <\/span><\/p>\n

much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every <\/span><\/p>\n

form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a noth\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and <\/span><\/p>\n

drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to dis\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

appear immediately, without consistency or reference, with\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

out consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed o f birth and dis\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

appearance. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, pp. 117-118, italics <\/span><\/p>\n

in the original)<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

???<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For what it\u2019s worth, electrons, unlike photons, have a non-zero <\/span><\/p>\n

mass and thus cannot move at the speed of light, precisely <\/span><\/p>\n

because of the theory of relativity of which Virilio seems so <\/span><\/p>\n

fond.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

i think the authors did not mean what they wrote here. surely, relativity theory is not the reason why electrons cannot move at the speed of light. relativity theory is an explanation of how nature works, in this case, how objects with mass and velocity\/speed works.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

We met in Paris a student who, after having brilliantly fin\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ished his undergraduate studies in physics, began reading phi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

losophy and in particular Deleuze. He was trying to tackle <\/span><\/p>\n

Difference and Repetition. Having read the mathematical ex\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cerpts examined here (pp. 161-164), he admitted he couldn\u2019t <\/span><\/p>\n

see what Deleuze was driving at. Nevertheless, Deleuze\u2019s repu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tation for profundity was so strong that he hesitated to draw the <\/span><\/p>\n

natural conclusion: that if someone like himself, who had stud\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ied calculus for several years, was unable to understand these <\/span><\/p>\n

texts, allegedly about calculus, it was probably because they <\/span><\/p>\n

didn\u2019t make much sense. It seems to us that this example should <\/span><\/p>\n

have encouraged the student to analyze more critically the rest <\/span><\/p>\n

of Deleuze\u2019s writings.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

i think the epistemological conditions of this kind of inference ar very interesting. under which conditions shud one conclude that a text is meaningless?<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

7. Ambiguity as subterfuge. We have seen in this book nu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

merous ambiguous texts that can be interpreted in two differ\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ent ways: as an assertion that is true but relatively banal, or as <\/span><\/p>\n

one that is radical but manifestly false. And we cannot help <\/span><\/p>\n

thinking that, in many cases, these ambiguities are deliberate. <\/span><\/p>\n

Indeed, they offer a great advantage in intellectual battles: the <\/span><\/p>\n

radical interpretation can serve to attract relatively inexperi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

enced listeners or readers; and if the absurdity of this version is <\/span><\/p>\n

exposed, the author can always defend himself by claiming to <\/span><\/p>\n

have been misunderstood, and retreat to the innocuous inter\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

pretation.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

mor on Janus-sentences.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Fashionable Nonsense, Postmodern Intellectuals\u2019 Abuse of Science – Alan Sokal, Jean Bricmont ebook download pdf free   The book contains the best single chapter on filosofy of science that iv com across. very much recommended, especially for those that dont like filosofers’ accounts of things. alot of the rest of the book is devoted to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1937,1879,1660,13,1935,1921],"tags":[1592,1932],"class_list":["post-3490","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-education-science","category-education-politik","category-linguisticslanguage","category-meta","category-science-politik","category-sociology","tag-meaning-language-philosophy","tag-physics","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3490","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3490"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3490\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3492,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3490\/revisions\/3492"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3490"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3490"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3490"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}