{"id":3629,"date":"2013-02-01T00:30:21","date_gmt":"2013-01-31T23:30:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=3629"},"modified":"2013-02-01T00:30:21","modified_gmt":"2013-01-31T23:30:21","slug":"review-beyond-the-hoax-science-and-culture-alan-sokal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2013\/02\/review-beyond-the-hoax-science-and-culture-alan-sokal\/","title":{"rendered":"Review: Beyond the Hoax: Science and Culture (Alan Sokal)"},"content":{"rendered":"

beyond the hoax – alan sokal<\/a><\/p>\n

Much of the material is the same as in Sokal and Bricmont’s earlier book. But there is some new material as well. I especially found the stuff on hindu nationalism and pseudoscience interesting, and the stuff on pseudoscience in nursing. Never heard of that before, but it wasnt totally unexpected. All health related fields hav large amounts of pseudoscience. It is unfortunate that the most important fields are those most full of pseudoscience!<\/p>\n

—-<\/p>\n

Part III goes on to treat weightier social and political topics using the <\/span><\/p>\n

same lens. Chapter 8 analyzes the paradoxical relation between pseudo\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

science and postmodernism, and investigates how extreme skepticism can <\/span><\/p>\n

abet extreme credulity, using a series of detailed case studies: pseudosci\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

entific therapies in nursing and \u201calternative medicine\u201d; Hindu nationalist <\/span><\/p>\n

pseudoscience in India21; and radical environmentalism. This investigation <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

is motivated by my suspicion that credulity in minor matters prepares the <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

mind for credulity in matters of greater import \u2014 and, conversely, that the <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

kind of critical thinking useful for distinguishing science from pseudoscience <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

might also be of some use in distinguishing truths in affairs of state from <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

lies.<\/strong> Chapter 9 takes on the largest and most powerful pseudoscience of all: <\/span><\/p>\n

organized religion. This chapter focusses on the central philosophical and <\/span><\/p>\n

political issues raised by religion in the contemporary world: it deplores the<\/span><\/p>\n

damage that is done by our culture\u2019s deference toward \u201cfaith\u201d, and it asks <\/span><\/p>\n

how nonbelievers and believers can find political common ground based <\/span><\/p>\n

on shared moral ideas. Finally, Chapter 10 draws some of these concerns <\/span><\/p>\n

together, and discusses the relationship between epistemology and ethics as <\/span><\/p>\n

they interact in the public sphere.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

surely this is true.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

#115 The idea that theories should refer only to observable quantities is called operationalism.-, far <\/span><\/p>\n

from being postmodernist, it was popular among physicists and philosophers of physics in the first <\/span><\/p>\n

half of the twentieth century. But it has severe flaws: see Chapter 7 below (pp. 240-245) as well as <\/span><\/p>\n

Weinberg (1992, pp. 174-184).<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

i thought this was a part of logiclal positivism, and it seems that it was. i knew about operational definitions.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

http:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/operationalism\/<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

When all is said and done, the fundamental flaw in Merchant and Hard\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing\u2019s metaphor-hermeneutics is not exegetical but logical. Let us grant for the <\/span><\/p>\n

sake of argument that some of the founders of modem science consciously <\/span><\/p>\n

used sexist metaphors to promote their epistemological and methodological <\/span><\/p>\n

views (this much is probably true, even if Merchant and Harding have exag\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

gerated the case). But what would that entail for the philosophy (as opposed <\/span><\/p>\n

to the history) of science? Apparently the critics wish to claim that sexism <\/span><\/p>\n

could have passed from metaphor into the substantive content of scientific <\/span><\/p>\n

methods and\/or theories. But if modem science does in fact contain sexist <\/span><\/p>\n

assumptions, then surely the feminist theorists ought to be able to locate and <\/span><\/p>\n

criticize those biased assumptions, independently of any argument from his\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tory. Indeed, to do otherwise is to commit the \u201cgenetic fallacy\u201d: evaluating an <\/span><\/p>\n

idea on the basis of its origin rather than its content.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Putting aside the florid accusations of rape and torture, the argument of <\/span><\/p>\n

Merchant and Harding boils down to the assertion that the scientific rev\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

olution of the seventeenth century displaced a female-centered (spiritual, <\/span><\/p>\n

hermetic, organic, geocentric) universe in favor of a male-centered (ratio\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

nalist, scientific, mechanical, heliocentric) one.21 How should we evaluate <\/span><\/p>\n

this argument?<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

To begin with, one might wonder whether the gender associations claimed <\/span><\/p>\n

for these two cosmologies are really as univocal as the feminist critics <\/span><\/p>\n

claim.22 (After all, the main defender of the geocentric worldview \u2014 the<\/span><\/p>\n

Catholic Church \u2014 was not exactly a female-centered enterprise, its adora\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tion of the Virgin Mary notwithstanding.) But let us put aside this objection <\/span><\/p>\n

and grant these gender associations for the sake of argument; for the princi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

pal flaw in the Merchant-Harding thesis is, once again, not historical but log\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ical. Margarita Levin puts it bluntly: Do Merchant and Harding really \u201cthink <\/span><\/p>\n

we have a choice about which theory is correct? Masculine or feminine, the <\/span><\/p>\n

solar system is the way it is.\u201d23<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The same point applies not only to astronomy but to scientific theories <\/span><\/p>\n

quite generally; and the bottom line is that there is ample evidence, indepen\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

dent of any allegedly sexist imagery, for the epistemic value of modem sci\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ence. Therefore, as Koertge remarks, \u201cif it really could be shown that patri\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

archal thinking not only played a crucial role in the Scientific Revolution but <\/span><\/p>\n

is also necessary for carrying out scientific inquiry as we know it, that would <\/span><\/p>\n

constitute the strongest argument for patriarchy that I can think of!\u201d24<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

true story :D<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Of course, the feminist science-critics are not only archaeologists of <\/span><\/p>\n

300-year-old science; some of their critique is resolutely modem, even post\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

modern. Here, for instance, is what Donna Haraway, professor of the history <\/span><\/p>\n

of consciousness (!) at the University of Califomia-Santa Cruz and one of <\/span><\/p>\n

the most acclaimed feminist theorists of science, says about her research:<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For the complex or boundary objects in which I am interested, the <\/span><\/p>\n

mythic, textual, technical, political, organic, and economic dimensions <\/span><\/p>\n

implode. That is, they collapse into each other in a knot of extraordinary <\/span><\/p>\n

density that constitutes the objects themselves. In my sense, story telling <\/span><\/p>\n

is in no way an \u2018art practice\u2019 \u2014 it is, rather, a fraught practice for narrat\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing complexity in such a field of knots or black holes. In no way is story <\/span><\/p>\n

telling opposed to materiality. But materiality itself is tropic; it makes us <\/span><\/p>\n

swerve, it trips us; it is a knot of the textual, technical, mythic\/oneiric, <\/span><\/p>\n

organic, political, and economic.2<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

As right-wing critic Roger Kimball acidly comments: \u201cRemember that this <\/span><\/p>\n

woman is not some crank but a professor at a prestigious university and <\/span><\/p>\n

one of the leading lights of contemporary \u2018women\u2019s studies.\u2019 \u201d26 The saddest <\/span><\/p>\n

thing, for us pinkos and feminists, is that Kimball is dead on target.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

women’s studies is nearly completely trash. reminds me of the article about black studies in the US: https:\/\/chronicle.com\/blogs\/brainstorm\/the-most-persuasive-case-for-eliminating-black-studies-just-read-the-dissertations\/46346<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This theory is startling, to say the least: Does the author really believe <\/span><\/p>\n

that menstruation makes it more difficult for young women to understand <\/span><\/p>\n

elementary notions of geometry? Evidently we are not far from the Victorian <\/span><\/p>\n

gentlemen who held that women, with their delicate reproductive organs, <\/span><\/p>\n

are unsuited to rational thought and to science. With friends like this, the <\/span><\/p>\n

feminist cause has no need of enemies.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

the worst enemy of women: women.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[after quoting Lacan]<\/span><\/p>\n

Mathematicians and physicists are used to receiving this sort of stuff in <\/span><\/p>\n

typewritten envelopes from unknown correspondents. Lacan\u2019s grammar and <\/span><\/p>\n

spelling are better than in most of these treatises, but his logic isn\u2019t. To put it<\/span><\/p>\n

bluntly, Lacan is a crank \u2014 an unusually erudite one, to be sure, but a crank <\/span><\/p>\n

nonetheless.59<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

interesting. i will ask Sokal to expand on that theme.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

So, if we look critically at realism, we may be tempted to turn toward <\/span><\/p>\n

instrumentalism. But if we look critically at instrumentalism, we feel forced <\/span><\/p>\n

to return to a modest form of realism. What, then, should one do? Before <\/span><\/p>\n

coming to a possible solution, let us first consider radical alternatives.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

surprisingly true.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[after quoting Plantinga]<\/span><\/p>\n

Let us stress that we disagree with 90% of Plantinga\u2019s philosophy; but if he is so eloquently on <\/span><\/p>\n

target on this particular point, why not give him credit for it?<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

i was surprised they quoted him, but then, they make that comment. perfect play!<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Let me stress in advance that I will not be concerned here with explaining <\/span><\/p>\n

in detail why astrology, homeopathy and the rest are in fact pseudoscience; <\/span><\/p>\n

that would take me too far afield. Nor will I address, except in passing, the <\/span><\/p>\n

important but difficult problems of understanding the psychological attrac\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tions of pseudoscience and the social factors affecting its spread.28 Rather, <\/span><\/p>\n

my principal aim is to investigate the logical and sociological nexus between <\/span><\/p>\n

pseudoscience and postmodernism.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

footnote 28:<\/span><\/p>\n

For a shrewd meditation on the former question, see Levitt (1999, especially pp. 12-22 <\/span><\/p>\n

and chapter 4). The latter question is indirectly addressed by Burnham (1987), in the context <\/span><\/p>\n

of a fascinating history of the popularization of science in the United States in the nineteenth <\/span><\/p>\n

and twentieth centuries.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For my own part, I have been struck by the fact that nearly all the pseudoscientific systems <\/span><\/p>\n

to be examined in this essay are based philosophically on vitalism: that is, the idea that living <\/span><\/p>\n

beings, and especially human beings, are endowed with some special quality ( \u201clife energy\u201d, <\/span><\/p>\n

elan vital, prana, q i ) that transcends the ordinary laws of physics. Mainstream science has <\/span><\/p>\n

rejected vitalism since at least the 1930s, for a plethora of good reasons that have only become <\/span><\/p>\n

stronger with time (see e.g. Mayr 1982). But these good reasons are understood by only a tiny <\/span><\/p>\n

fraction of the populace, even in the industrialized countries where science is supposedly held <\/span><\/p>\n

in high esteem. Moreover \u2014 and perhaps much more importantly \u2014 the anti-vitalism charac\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

teristic of modem science is deeply unsettling emotionally to most (perhaps all) people, even <\/span><\/p>\n

to those who are not conventionally religious. See again Levitt (1999). Of course, none of these <\/span><\/p>\n

speculations pretend to any scientific rigor; careful empirical investigation by psychologists <\/span><\/p>\n

and sociologists is required.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

vitalism -.-<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sokal mentions the https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Emily_Rosa<\/a> experiment.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

the proponents must really feel bad… even a child can disprove their beliefs. how study are they??? hopefully, it was only a fringe idea, right, right?<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

When I first heard about Emily\u2019s experiment, I admired her ingenuity but <\/span><\/p>\n

wondered whether anyone really took Therapeutic Touch seriously. How <\/span><\/p>\n

wrong I was! Therapeutic Touch is taught in more than 80 college and uni\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

versity schools of nursing in at least 70 countries, is practiced in at least <\/span><\/p>\n

80 hospitals across North America, and is promoted by leading American <\/span><\/p>\n

nursing associations.32 Its inventor claims to have trained more than 47,000 <\/span><\/p>\n

practitioners over a 26-year period, who have gone on to train many more.33 <\/span><\/p>\n

At least 245 books or dissertations have been published that include \u201cThera\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

peutic Touch\u201d in the title, subject headings or table of contents.34 All in all, <\/span><\/p>\n

Therapeutic Touch appears to have become one of the most widely practiced <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cholistic\u201d nursing techniques.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

sigh!<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

cited from pseudoscience source:<\/p>\n

[0]ur intuitive faculty is nothing other than a source of sound premises about the <\/span><\/p>\n

nature of reality…. [T]here exists within us a source of direct information about <\/span><\/p>\n

reality that can teach us all we need to know.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

top #1 reason not to teach Plato’s nonsense.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

But of course, those who believe in Genesis or transubstantiation do not <\/span><\/p>\n

consider these ideas to be crazy; quite the contrary, they think that they have <\/span><\/p>\n

good reasons to hold their beliefs. Indeed, Harris argues convincingly that <\/span><\/p>\n

whenever any person P believes any proposition X \u2014 at least in the ordi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

nary sense of the English word \u201cbelieve\u201d \u2014 this requires, first of all, that P <\/span><\/p>\n

must believe X to be true, i.e. to be a factually accurate representation of <\/span><\/p>\n

the world; and secondly, that P must think he has good reasons to believe <\/span><\/p>\n

X, in the sense that he envisions his belief as caused, at least in part, by <\/span><\/p>\n

the fact that X is true. As Harris puts it (p. 63), \u201cthere must be some causal <\/span><\/p>\n

connection, or an appearance thereof, between the fact in question and my <\/span><\/p>\n

acceptance of it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

this kind of causal reliabilism will not work. cf. http:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/platonism-mathematics\/#EpiAcc<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

beyond the hoax – alan sokal Much of the material is the same as in Sokal and Bricmont’s earlier book. But there is some new material as well. I especially found the stuff on hindu nationalism and pseudoscience interesting, and the stuff on pseudoscience in nursing. Never heard of that before, but it wasnt totally […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27,1457,19,1673,1935,1921],"tags":[1932],"class_list":["post-3629","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-epistemology","category-metaphysics","category-religion-filosofi","category-science-philosophy","category-science-politik","category-sociology","tag-physics","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3629","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3629"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3629\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3648,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3629\/revisions\/3648"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3629"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3629"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3629"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}