{"id":3938,"date":"2013-08-29T06:28:10","date_gmt":"2013-08-29T05:28:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=3938"},"modified":"2014-10-09T18:52:28","modified_gmt":"2014-10-09T17:52:28","slug":"review-the-myth-of-the-rational-voter-why-democracies-choose-bad-policies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2013\/08\/review-the-myth-of-the-rational-voter-why-democracies-choose-bad-policies\/","title":{"rendered":"Review: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies"},"content":{"rendered":"

[Bryan_Caplan]_The_Myth_of_the_Rational_Voter_Why(Bookos.org)<\/a><\/p>\n

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This is very interesting book. Most interesting I’ve read in a while.<\/p>\n

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If neither way of verifying the existence of preferences over beliefs <\/span><\/p>\n

appeals to you, a final one remains. Reverse the direction of reason\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing. Smoke usually means fire. The more bizarre a mistake is, the <\/span><\/p>\n

harder it is to attribute to lack of information. Suppose your friend <\/span><\/p>\n

thinks he is Napoleon. It is conceivable that he got an improbable <\/span><\/p>\n

coincidence of misleading signals sufficient to convince any of us. <\/span><\/p>\n

But it is awfully suspicious that he embraces the pleasant view that <\/span><\/p>\n

he is a world-historic figure, rather than, say, Napoleon\u2019s dishwasher. <\/span><\/p>\n

Similarly, suppose an adult sees trade as a zero-sum game. Since he <\/span><\/p>\n

experiences the opposite every day, it is hard to blame his mistake on <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201clack of information.\u201d More plausibly, like blaming your team\u2019s defeat <\/span><\/p>\n

on cheaters, seeing trade as disguised exploitation soothes those who <\/span><\/p>\n

dislike the market\u2019s outcome.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Common problem with reincarnation reports. Also: https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Emperor_Norton<\/a><\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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In extreme cases, mistaken beliefs are fatal. A baby-proofed house <\/span><\/p>\n

illustrates many errors that adults cannot afford to make. It is danger\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ous to think that poisonous substances are candy It is dangerous to <\/span><\/p>\n

reject the theory of gravity at the top of the stairs. It is dangerous to <\/span><\/p>\n

hold that sticking forks in electrical sockets is harmless fun.<\/span><\/p>\n

But false beliefs do not have to be deadly to be costly If the price <\/span><\/p>\n

of oranges is 50 cents each, but you mistakenly believe it is a dollar, <\/span><\/p>\n

you buy too few oranges. If bottled water is, contrary to your impres\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sion, neither healthier nor better-tasting than tap water, you may <\/span><\/p>\n

throw hundreds of dollars down the drain. If your chance of getting <\/span><\/p>\n

an academic job is lower than you guess, you could waste your twent\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ies in a dead-end Ph.D. program.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There was a recent danish study on the quality of bottled water vs. tap water, and they were found to be the same. Bottled water is seriously waste of money. http:\/\/www.bt.dk\/test\/stor-test-kildevand-er-det-rene-snyd<\/a><\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Mosca and Jihad. In the Jain example, stubborn belief leads to dis\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

comfort. Gaetano Mosca presents a case where stubborn belief leads <\/span><\/p>\n

to death.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Mohammed, for instance, promises paradise to all who fall in a <\/span><\/p>\n

holy war. Now if every believer were to guide his conduct by that <\/span><\/p>\n

assurance in the Koran, every time a Mohammedan army found <\/span><\/p>\n

itself faced by unbelievers it ought either to conquer or to fall to <\/span><\/p>\n

the last man. It cannot be denied that a certain number of individu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

als do live up to the letter of the Prophet\u2019s word, but as between <\/span><\/p>\n

defeat and death followed by eternal bliss, the majority of Moham\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

medans normally elect defeat.45<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Yes, religious people are irrational, even about their own irrational beliefs: http:\/\/chaospet.com\/2008\/10\/08\/110-jesus-loves-abortion\/<\/a><\/p>\n

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they should also try to get themselves killed as soon as possible. After all, heaven is infinitely good, so it’s obviously infinitely better than being on earth. An infinite improvement!<\/p>\n

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If you listen to your fellow citizens, you get the impression that they <\/span><\/p>\n

disagree. How many times have you heard, \u201cEvery vote matters\u201d? But <\/span><\/p>\n

people are less credulous than they sound. The infamous poll tax\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

which restricted the vote to those willing to pay for it\u2014provides a <\/span><\/p>\n

clean illustration. If individuals acted on the belief that one vote <\/span><\/p>\n

makes a big difference, they would be willing to pay a lot to partici\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

pate. Few are. Historically, poll taxes significantly reduced turnout.65 <\/span><\/p>\n

There is little reason to think that matters are different today. Imagine <\/span><\/p>\n

setting a poll tax to reduce presidential turnout from 50% to 5%. How <\/span><\/p>\n

high would it have to be? A couple hundred dollars? What makes the <\/span><\/p>\n

poll tax alarming is that most of us subconsciously know that most <\/span><\/p>\n

of us subconsciously know that one vote does not count.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Citizens often talk as if they personally have power over electoral <\/span><\/p>\n

outcomes. They deliberate about their options as if they were order\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing dinner. But their actions tell a different tale: They expect to be <\/span><\/p>\n

served the same meal no matter what they \u201corder.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

What does this imply about the material price a voter pays for polit\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ical irrationality? Let D be the difference between a voter\u2019s willingness <\/span><\/p>\n

to pay for policy A instead of policy B. Then the expected cost of <\/span><\/p>\n

voting the wrong way is not D, but the probability of decisiveness p <\/span><\/p>\n

times D. If p = 0, pD = 0 as well. Intuitively, if one vote cannot change <\/span><\/p>\n

policy outcomes, the price of irrationality is zero.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

But rational irrationality does not require Orwellian underpinnings. <\/span><\/p>\n

The psychological interpretation can be seriously toned down with\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

out changing the model. Above all, the steps should be conceived as <\/span><\/p>\n

tacit. To get in your car and drive away entails a long series of steps\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

take out your keys, unlock and open the door, sit down, put the key <\/span><\/p>\n

in the ignition, and so on. The thought processes behind these steps <\/span><\/p>\n

Eire rarely explicit. Yet we know the steps on some level, because when <\/span><\/p>\n

we observe a would-be driver who fails to take one\u2014by, say, trying to <\/span><\/p>\n

open a locked door without using his key\u2014it is easy to state which <\/span><\/p>\n

step he skipped.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Once we recognize that cognitive \u201csteps\u201d are usually tacit, we can <\/span><\/p>\n

enhance the introspective credibility of the steps themselves. The <\/span><\/p>\n

process of irrationality can be recast:<\/span><\/p>\n

Step 1: Be rational on topics where you have no emotional attach\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ment to a particular answer.<\/span><\/p>\n

Step 2: On topics where you have an emotional attachment to a <\/span><\/p>\n

particular answer, keep a \u201clookout\u201d for questions where false be\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

liefs imply a substantial material cost for you.<\/span><\/p>\n

Step 3: If you pay no substantial material costs of error, go with the <\/span><\/p>\n

flow; believe whatever makes you feel best.<\/span><\/p>\n

Step 4: If there are substantial material costs of error, raise your level <\/span><\/p>\n

of intellectual self-discipline in order to become more objective. <\/span><\/p>\n

Step 5: Balance the emotional trauma of heightened objectivity\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

the progressive shattering of your comforting illusions\u2014against <\/span><\/p>\n

the material costs of error.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There is no need to posit that people start with a clear perception of <\/span><\/p>\n

the truth, then throw it away. The only requirement is that rationality <\/span><\/p>\n

remain on \u201cstandby,\u201d ready to engage when error is dangerous.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Relevant to the ethics of belief:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

http:\/\/ajburger.homestead.com\/ethics.html<\/a><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.utilitarianism.net\/singer\/by\/200303–.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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So Classical Public Choice\u2019s stories about rational ignorance prove <\/span><\/p>\n

too much. But not much too much. By any absolute measure, average <\/span><\/p>\n

levels of politicsil knowledge Eire low.8 Less than 40% of American <\/span><\/p>\n

adults know both of their senators\u2019 names.9 Slightly fewer know both <\/span><\/p>\n

senators\u2019 parties\u2014a particularly significant finding given its oft-cited <\/span><\/p>\n

informationEil role.10 Much of the public has forgotten\u2014or never <\/span><\/p>\n

learned\u2014the elementary and unchanging facts taught in every civics <\/span><\/p>\n

class. About half knows that each state has two senators, and only a <\/span><\/p>\n

quarter knows the length of their terms in office.11 FEimiliEirity with <\/span><\/p>\n

politicians\u2019 voting records and policy positions is predictably close <\/span><\/p>\n

to nil even on high-profile issues, but amazingly good on fun topics <\/span><\/p>\n

irrelevant to policy. As Delli Carpini and Keeter remark:<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

During the 1992 presidential campaign 89 percent of the public <\/span><\/p>\n

knew that Vice President Quayle was feuding with the television <\/span><\/p>\n

character Murphy Brown, but only 19 percent could characterize <\/span><\/p>\n

Bill Clinton\u2019s record on the environment. . . 86 percent of the pub\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

lic knew that the Bushes\u2019 dog was named Millie, yet only 15 percent <\/span><\/p>\n

knew that both presidential candidates supported the death pen\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

alty. Judge Wapner (host of the television series \u201cPeople\u2019s Court\u201d) <\/span><\/p>\n

was identified by more people than were Chief Justices Burger or <\/span><\/p>\n

Rehnquist.1<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

sigh!<\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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Apparently irrational cultural beliefs are quite remarkable: <\/span><\/p>\n

They do not appear irrational by slightly departing from <\/span><\/p>\n

common sense, or timidly going beyond what the <\/span><\/p>\n

evidence allows. They appear, rather, like down-right <\/span><\/p>\n

provocations against common sense rationality.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014Richard Shwedei1<\/span><\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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Economists\u2019 love of qualification is notorious, but most doubt that <\/span><\/p>\n

the protechnology position needs to be qualified. Technology often <\/span><\/p>\n

creates new jobs; without the computer, there would be no jobs in <\/span><\/p>\n

computer programming or software development. But the funda\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

mental defense of labor-saving technology is that employing more <\/span><\/p>\n

workers than you need wastes valuable labor. If you pay a worker to <\/span><\/p>\n

twiddle his thumbs, you could have paid him to do something socially <\/span><\/p>\n

useful instead.<\/span><\/p>\n

Economists add that market forces readily convert this potential <\/span><\/p>\n

social benefit into an actual one. After technology throws people out <\/span><\/p>\n

of work, they have an incentive to find a new use for their talents. Cox <\/span><\/p>\n

and Aim aptly describe this process as \u201cchurn\u201d: \u201cThrough relentless <\/span><\/p>\n

turmoil, the economy re-creates itself, shifting labor resources to <\/span><\/p>\n

where they\u2019re needed, replacing old jobs with new ones.\u201d75 They illus\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

trate this process with history\u2019s most striking example: The drastic <\/span><\/p>\n

decline in agricultural employment:<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In 1800, it took nearly 95 of every 100 Americans to feed the country. <\/span><\/p>\n

In 1900, it took 40. Today, it takes just 3…. The workers no longer <\/span><\/p>\n

needed on farms have been put to use providing new homes, furni\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ture, clothing, computers, pharmaceuticals, appliances, medical <\/span><\/p>\n

assistance, movies, financial advice, video games, gourmet meals, <\/span><\/p>\n

and an almost dizzying array of other goods and services.. . . What <\/span><\/p>\n

we have in place of long hours in the fields is the wealth of goods <\/span><\/p>\n

and services that come from allowing the churn to work, wherever <\/span><\/p>\n

and whenever it might occur.76<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These arguments sound harsh. That is part of the reason why they are <\/span><\/p>\n

so unpopular: people would rather feel compassionately than think <\/span><\/p>\n

logically. Many economists advocate government assistance to cush\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ion displaced workers\u2019 transition, and retain public support for a dy\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

namic economy. Alan Blinder recommends extended unemployment <\/span><\/p>\n

insurance, retraining, and relocation subsidies.77 Other economists <\/span><\/p>\n

disagree. But almost all economists grant that stopping transitions <\/span><\/p>\n

has a grave cost.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

While this is correct in the general, it does not work in the case where there some jobs that have no possible jobs left, or too few jobs they can perform. Humans are limited by their intelligence, if we can make robots that can do what humans do better or equally well at lower costs, this WILL be a problem.<\/p>\n

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Economists are especially critical of the antiforeign outlook because <\/span><\/p>\n

it does not just happen to be wrong; it frequently conflicts with ele\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

mentary economics. Textbooks teach that total output increases if <\/span><\/p>\n

producers specialize and trade. On an individual level, who could <\/span><\/p>\n

deny it? Imagine how much time it would take to grow your own food, <\/span><\/p>\n

when a few hours\u2019 wages spent at the grocery store feed you for weeks. <\/span><\/p>\n

Analogies between individual and social behavior are at times mis\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

leading, but this is not one of those times. International trade is, as <\/span><\/p>\n

Steven Landsburg explains, a technology:<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There are two technologies for producing automobiles in America. <\/span><\/p>\n

One is to manufacture them in Detroit, and the other is to grow <\/span><\/p>\n

them in Iowa. Everybody knows about the first technology; let me <\/span><\/p>\n

tell you about the second. First you plant seeds, which are the raw <\/span><\/p>\n

materials from which automobiles are constructed. You wait a few <\/span><\/p>\n

months until wheat appears. Then you harvest the wheat, load it <\/span><\/p>\n

onto ships, and sail the ships westward into the Pacific Ocean. After <\/span><\/p>\n

a few months, the ships reappear with Toyotas on them.59<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Great quote! I will remember that one.<\/p>\n

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Skipping ahead to the present, Alan Blinder blames opposition to <\/span><\/p>\n

tradable pollution permits on antimarket bias.39 Why let people \u201cpay <\/span><\/p>\n

to pollute,\u201d when we can force them to cease and desist? The textbook <\/span><\/p>\n

answer is that tradable permits get you more pollution abatement for <\/span><\/p>\n

the same cost. The firms able to cheaply cut their emissions do so, <\/span><\/p>\n

selling their excess pollution quota to less flexible polluters. End re\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sult: More abatement bang for your buck. A price for pollution is <\/span><\/p>\n

therefore not a pure transfer; it creates incentives to improve environ\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

mental quality as cheaply as possible. But noneconomists disagree\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

including relatively sophisticated policy insiders. Blinder discusses a <\/span><\/p>\n

fascinating survey of 63 environmentalists, congressional staffers, <\/span><\/p>\n

and industry lobbyists. Not one could explain economists\u2019 standard <\/span><\/p>\n

rationale for tradable permits.4<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sounds like: http:\/\/citizensclimatelobby.org\/carbon-fee-and-dividend-faq\/<\/a><\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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Good intentions are ubiquitous in politics; what is scarce is accu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

rate beliefs. The pertinent question about selective participation is <\/span><\/p>\n

whether voters are more biased than nonvoters, not whether voters <\/span><\/p>\n

take advantage of nonvoters.59 Empirically, the opposite holds: The <\/span><\/p>\n

median voter is less biased than the median nonvoter. One of the <\/span><\/p>\n

main predictors of turnout, education, substantially increases eco\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

nomic literacy. The other two\u2014age and income\u2014have little effect on <\/span><\/p>\n

economic beliefs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Though it sounds naive to count on the affluent to look out for the <\/span><\/p>\n

interests of the needy, that is roughly what the data advise. All kinds <\/span><\/p>\n

of voters hope to make society better off, but the well educated are <\/span><\/p>\n

more likely to get the job done.60 Selective turnout widens the gap <\/span><\/p>\n

between what the public gets and what it wants. But it narrows the <\/span><\/p>\n

gap between what the public gets and what it needs.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

great quote, \u201cGood intentions are ubiquitous in politics; what is scarce is accurate beliefs.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

If people dont vote for self-interest, then representation is not necessary. To complaints about lack of representation are not well-founded, at least to some degree.<\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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In financial and betting markets, there are intrinsic reasons why <\/span><\/p>\n

clearer heads wield disproportionate influence.61 People who know <\/span><\/p>\n

more can expect to earn higher profits, giving them a stronger to in\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

centive to participate. Furthermore, past winners have more assets to <\/span><\/p>\n

influence the market price. In contrast, the disproportionate electoral <\/span><\/p>\n

influence of the well educated is a lucky surprise. Indeed, since the <\/span><\/p>\n

value of their time is greater, one would expect them to vote less. To <\/span><\/p>\n

be blunt, the problem with democracy is not that clearer heads have <\/span><\/p>\n

surplus influence. The problem is that, compared to financial and <\/span><\/p>\n

betting markets, the surplus is small.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

More meritocracy is needed, it seems.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

If education causes better economic understanding, there is an ar\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

gument for education subsidies\u2014albeit not necessarily higher sub\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sidies than we have now.62 If the connection is not causal, however, <\/span><\/p>\n

throwing money at education treats a symptom of economic illiteracy, <\/span><\/p>\n

not the disease. You would get more bang for your buck by defunding <\/span><\/p>\n

efforts to \u201cget out the vote.\u201d63 One intriguing piece of evidence against <\/span><\/p>\n

the causal theory is that educational attainment rose substantially in <\/span><\/p>\n

the postwar era, but political knowledge stayed about the same.64<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

this indicates that it is g<\/em> not education that causes greater political knowledge. In other words, g<\/em> is a common cause of both better education and greater political knowledge. This isnt surprising at all. But it might still be that education has some beneficial effect, the study referred to is faulty in some way. Or that perhaps we’re doing education wrong. Perhaps we need incentives for people to increase their political knowledge? After all, if greater political knowledge causes better democratic results, and better democratic results cause more economic growth for the country, then it does pay for itself. It might even be a good investment.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The cite of 64 is: Delli Carpini, Michael, and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About<\/p>\n

Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

It cant be found on either bookos or libgen, so i cant look it up.<\/p>\n

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–<\/p>\n

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Before studying public opinion, many wonder why democracy does <\/span><\/p>\n

not work better. After one becomes familiar with the public\u2019s system\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

atic biases, however, one is struck by the opposite question: Why does <\/span><\/p>\n

democracy work as well as it does? How do the unpopular policies <\/span><\/p>\n

that sustain the prosperity of the West survive? Selective participation <\/span><\/p>\n

is probably one significant part of the answer. It is easy to criticize <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

the beliefs of the median voter, but at least he is less deluded than <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

the median nonvoter.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

lol’d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

If voters are systematically mistaken about what policies work, <\/span><\/p>\n

there is a striking implication: They will not be satisfied by the politi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cians they elect. A politician who ignores the public\u2019s policy prefer\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ences looks like a corrupt tool of special interests. A politician who <\/span><\/p>\n

implements the public\u2019s policy preferences looks incompetent be\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cause of the bad consequences. Empirically, the shoe fits: In the GSS, <\/span><\/p>\n

only 25% agree that \u201cPeople we elect to Congress try to keep the <\/span><\/p>\n

promises they have made during the election,\u201d and only 20% agree <\/span><\/p>\n

that \u201cmost government administrators can be trusted to do what is <\/span><\/p>\n

best for the country.\u201d71 Why does democratic competition yield so few <\/span><\/p>\n

satisfied customers? Because politicians are damned if they do and <\/span><\/p>\n

damned if they don\u2019t. The public calls them venal for failing to deliver <\/span><\/p>\n

the impossible.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

As in economics, laymen reject the basics, not merely details. Toxi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cologists are vastly more likely than the public to affirm that \u201cuse of <\/span><\/p>\n

chemicals has improved our health more than it has harmed it,\u201d to <\/span><\/p>\n

deny that natural chemicals are less harmful than man-made chemi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cals, and to reject the view that \u201cit can never be too expensive to <\/span><\/p>\n

reduce the risks associated with chemicals.\u201d81 While critics might like <\/span><\/p>\n

to impugn the toxicologists\u2019 objectivity, it is hard to take such accusa\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tions seriously. The public\u2019s views are often patently silly, and toxicol\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ogists who work in industry, academia, and regulatory bureaus largely <\/span><\/p>\n

see eye to eye.82<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

seems worth looking up these studies.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

81. Kraus, Nancy, Torbj\u00f6rn Malmfors, and Paul Slovic. “Intuitive toxicology: Expert and lay judgments of chemical risks.” Risk analysis<\/em> 12.2 (1992): 215-232.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

82. Lichter and Rothman (1999) similarly document that cancer research\u00ad<\/p>\n

ers\u2019 ideology has little effect on their scientific judgment. Liberal cancer re\u00ad<\/p>\n

searchers who do not work in the private sector still embrace their profes\u00ad<\/p>\n

sion\u2019s contrarian views. \u201cAs a group, the experts\u2014whether conservative or<\/p>\n

liberal, Democratic or Republican\u2014viewed cancer risks along roughly the<\/p>\n

same lines. Thus, their perspectives on this topic do not appear to be \u2018con\u00ad<\/p>\n

taminated\u2019 by either narrow self-interest or broader ideological commit\u00ad<\/p>\n

ments\u201d (1999: 116).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Why then does environmental policy put as much emphasis on <\/span><\/p>\n

dosage as it does? Selective participation is probably part of the story. <\/span><\/p>\n

Mirroring my results, Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic (1992) find that ed\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ucation makes people think like toxicologists.84 The bulk of the expla\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

nation, though, is probably that voters care about economic well-being <\/span><\/p>\n

as well as safety from toxic substances. Moving from low dosage to <\/span><\/p>\n

zero is expensive. It might absorb all of GDP. This puts a democratic <\/span><\/p>\n

leader in a tight spot. If he embraces the public\u2019s doseless worldview <\/span><\/p>\n

and legislates accordingly, it would spark economic disaster. Over <\/span><\/p>\n

60% of the public agrees that \u201cIt can never be too expensive to reduce <\/span><\/p>\n

the risks associated with chemicals,\u201d85 but the leader who complied <\/span><\/p>\n

would be a hated scapegoat once the economy fell to pieces. On the <\/span><\/p>\n

other hand, a leader who dismisses every low-dose scare as \u201cunscien\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tific\u201d and \u201cparanoid\u201d would soon be a reviled symbol of pedantic in\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sensitivity. Given their incentives, politicians cannot disregard the <\/span><\/p>\n

public\u2019s misconceptions, but they often drag their feet.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

nowhere is this as clear as with pesticides and radiation. The public’s extreme fear of those do not at all mirror the scientific evidence of their harmfulness at low dosages.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Leaders\u2019 incentive to rationally assess the effects of policy might be <\/span><\/p>\n

perverse, not just weak. Machiavelli counsels the prince \u201cto do evil if <\/span><\/p>\n

constrained\u201d but at the same time \u201ctake great care that nothing goes <\/span><\/p>\n

out of his mouth which is not full of\u201d \u201cmercy, faith, integrity, humanity <\/span><\/p>\n

and religion.\u201d One can freely play the hypocrite because \u201ceverybody <\/span><\/p>\n

sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will <\/span><\/p>\n

not dare oppose themselves to the many.\u201d10 Yet, contra Machiavelli, <\/span><\/p>\n

psychologists have documented humans\u2019 real if modest ability to de\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tect dishonesty from body language, tone of voice, and more.11 George <\/span><\/p>\n

Costanza memorably counseled Jerry Seinfeld, \u201cJust remember, it\u2019s <\/span><\/p>\n

not a lie if you believe it.\u201d12 The honestly mistaken politician appears <\/span><\/p>\n

more genuine because he is more genuine. This gives leaders who <\/span><\/p>\n

sincerely share their constituents\u2019 policy views a competitive advan\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tage over Machiavellian rivals.13<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

I’ve sometimes heard the claim that privately, politicians really do acknowledge that ex. war on drugs does not work and is counter-productive, but that they go along with the voter opinion anyway. Perhaps this isn’t true. Perhaps the politicians really are<\/em> as deluded as the voters? Or even more! Polls in Denmark show that politicians are firmly against legalization, while the public\/voters are slightly positive.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

To get ahead in politics, leaders need a blend of naive populism <\/span><\/p>\n

and realistic cynicism. No wonder the modal politician has a law de\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

gree. Dye and Zeigler report that \u201c70 percent of the presidents, vice <\/span><\/p>\n

presidents, and cabinet officers of the United States and more than <\/span><\/p>\n

50 percent of the U.S. senators and House members\u201d have been law\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

yers.14 The economic role of government has greatly expanded since <\/span><\/p>\n

the New Deal, but the percentage of congressmen with economic <\/span><\/p>\n

training remains negligible.15 Economic issues Eire important to vot\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ers, but they do not want politicians with economic expertise\u2014espe\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cially not ones who lecture them and point out their confusions.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

no wonder they think new laws can solve everything…<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

It helps to sell the right kind of favors. Like a journalist with an ax <\/span><\/p>\n

to grind, a shrewd politician moves along the margins of voter indif\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ference. The public is protectionist, but rarely has strong opinions <\/span><\/p>\n

about which industries need help. This is a great opportunity for a <\/span><\/p>\n

politician and a struggling industry to make a deal. Steel manufactur\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ers could pay a politician to take (a) a popular stand against foreigners <\/span><\/p>\n

combined with (b) a not unpopular stand for American steel. In <\/span><\/p>\n

maxim form: Do what the public wants when it cares; take bids from <\/span><\/p>\n

interested parties when its doesn\u2019t. Bear in mind, though, that the <\/span><\/p>\n

important thing is not how burdensome a concession is, but how bur\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

densome voters perceive it to be.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Always lean to the green, as it is said in Congress. http:\/\/www.huffingtonpost.com\/lawrence-lessig\/neoprogressives_b_704715.html<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Consider the insurance market failure known as \u201cadverse selec\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tion.\u201d If people who want insurance know their own riskiness, but <\/span><\/p>\n

insurers only know average riskiness, the market tends to shrink. Low- <\/span><\/p>\n

risk people drop out, which raises consumers\u2019 average riskiness, <\/span><\/p>\n

which raises prices, which leads more low-risk customers to drop <\/span><\/p>\n

out.52 In the worst-case scenario, the market \u201cunravels.\u201d Prices get so <\/span><\/p>\n

high that no one buys insurance, and consumers get so risky that <\/span><\/p>\n

firms cannot afford to sell for less.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Interesting. This shud happen to some degree becuz of the new consumer genomics. It may also be illegal for the insurance companies to utilize known information to change rates. For instance, feminists’ ideas about equality of the sexes had the result that it become illegal in the EU to change rates conditional on sex. This means that prices rose for women and fell for men even tho men cause most of the accidents.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/justice\/newsroom\/gender-equality\/news\/121220_en.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The main upshot of my analysis of democracy is that it is a good <\/span><\/p>\n

idea to rely more on private choice and the free market. But what\u2014if <\/span><\/p>\n

anything\u2014can be done to improve outcomes, taking the supremacy <\/span><\/p>\n

of democracy over the market as fixed?. The answer depends on how <\/span><\/p>\n

flexibly you define \u201cdemocracy.\u201d Would we still have a \u201cdemocracy\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n

if you needed to pass a test of economic literacy to vote? If you needed <\/span><\/p>\n

a college degree? Both of these measures raise the economic under\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

standing of the median voter, leading to more sensible policies. Fran\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

chise restrictions were historically used for discriminatory ends, but <\/span><\/p>\n

that hardly implies that they should never be used again for any rea\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

son. A test of voter competence is no more objectionable than a driv\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing test. Both bad driving and bad voting are dangerous not merely <\/span><\/p>\n

to the individual who practices them, but to innocent bystanders. As <\/span><\/p>\n

Frederic Bastiat argues, \u201cThe right to suffrage rests on the presump\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tion of capacity\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

And why is incapacity a cause of exclusion? Because it is not the <\/span><\/p>\n

voter alone who must bear the consequences of his vote; because <\/span><\/p>\n

each vote involves and affects the whole community; because the <\/span><\/p>\n

community clearly has the right to require some guarantee as to <\/span><\/p>\n

the acts on which its welfare and existence depend.56<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A more palatable way to raise the economic literacy of the median <\/span><\/p>\n

voter is by giving extra votes to individuals or groups with greater <\/span><\/p>\n

economic literacy. Remarkably, until the passage of the Representa\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tion of the People Act of 1949, Britain retained plural voting for gradu\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ates of elite universities and business owners. As Speck explains, <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cGraduates had been able to vote for candidates in twelve universities <\/span><\/p>\n

in addition to those in their own constituencies, and businessmen <\/span><\/p>\n

with premises in a constituency other than their own domicile could<\/span><\/p>\n

vote in both.\u201d57 Since more educated voters think more like econo\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

mists, there is much to be said for such weighting schemes. I leave it <\/span><\/p>\n

to the reader to decide whether 1948 Britain counts as a democracy.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

wow, never knew this!<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Since well-educated people are better voters, another tempting way <\/span><\/p>\n

to improve democracy is to give voters more education. Maybe it <\/span><\/p>\n

would work. But it would be expensive, Eind as mentioned in the pre\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

vious chapter, education may be a proxy for intelligence or curiosity. <\/span><\/p>\n

A cheaper strategy, and one where a causal effect is more credible, is <\/span><\/p>\n

changing the curriculum. Steven Pinker Eirgues that schools should <\/span><\/p>\n

try to \u201cprovide students with the cognitive skills that are most im\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

portant for grasping the modern world and that are most unlike the <\/span><\/p>\n

cognitive tools they Eire born with,\u201d by emphasizing \u201ceconomics, evo\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

lutionary biology, and probability and statistics.\u201d60 Pinker essentially <\/span><\/p>\n

wants to give schools a new mission: rooting out the biased beliefs <\/span><\/p>\n

that students arrive with, especially beliefs that impinge on govern\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ment policy.61 What should be cut to make room for the new material?<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There are only twenty-four hours in a day, and a decision to teach <\/span><\/p>\n

one subject is also a decision not to teach another one. The ques\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tion is not whether trigonometry is important, but whether it is <\/span><\/p>\n

more important than statistics; not whether an educated person <\/span><\/p>\n

should know the classics, but whether it is more important for an <\/span><\/p>\n

educated person to know the classics than elementary economics.62<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Indeed<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[Bryan_Caplan]_The_Myth_of_the_Rational_Voter_Why(Bookos.org)   This is very interesting book. Most interesting I’ve read in a while.   –   If neither way of verifying the existence of preferences over beliefs appeals to you, a final one remains. Reverse the direction of reason\u00ad ing. Smoke usually means fire. The more bizarre a mistake is, the harder it is […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1898,1946,1653,1921],"tags":[2012,1067],"class_list":["post-3938","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-economics","category-political-science","category-psychology","category-sociology","tag-political-ignorance","tag-review","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3938","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3938"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3938\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4384,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3938\/revisions\/4384"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3938"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3938"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3938"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}