{"id":3948,"date":"2013-09-08T15:50:24","date_gmt":"2013-09-08T14:50:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=3948"},"modified":"2014-10-09T18:52:00","modified_gmt":"2014-10-09T17:52:00","slug":"review-merchants-of-doubt-naomi-oreskes-erik-m-conway","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2013\/09\/review-merchants-of-doubt-naomi-oreskes-erik-m-conway\/","title":{"rendered":"Review: Merchants of Doubt (Naomi Oreskes, Erik M. Conway)"},"content":{"rendered":"

I hadnt planned on reading this book, just saw a random comment about it on a discussion board. I figured i might as well read it since i found a free pdf: http:\/\/bookos.org\/book\/1249598\/3e9299<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

The book turned out to be moderately interesting. It is mostly about the history of denying pollution problems, usually by marked-friendly people. It underlines the problem of lobbying and the need for transparency.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Call it the \u201cTobacco Strategy.\u201d Its target was science, and so it relied <\/span><\/p>\n

heavily on scientists\u2014with guidance from industry lawyers and public re\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

lations experts\u2014willing to hold the rifle and pull the trigger. Among the <\/span><\/p>\n

multitude of documents we found in writing this book were Bad Science: A <\/span><\/p>\n

Resource Book\u2014a how-to handbook for fact fighters, providing example af\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ter example of successful strategies for undermining science, and a list of <\/span><\/p>\n

experts with scientific credentials available to comment on any issue about <\/span><\/p>\n

which a think tank or corporation needed a negative sound bite.14<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Sounds too good to be true, so i checked, and its true:<\/p>\n

\n

http:\/\/legacy.library.ucsf.edu\/tid\/snc52c00<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

These findings shouldn’t have been a surprise. German scientists had <\/span><\/p>\n

shown in the 1930s that cigarette smoking caused lung cancer, and the Nazi <\/span><\/p>\n

government had run major antismoking campaigns; Adolf Hitler forbade <\/span><\/p>\n

smoking in his presence. However, the German scientific work was tainted by <\/span><\/p>\n

its Nazi associations, and to some extent ignored, i f not actually suppressed, <\/span><\/p>\n

after the war; it had taken some time to be rediscovered and independently <\/span><\/p>\n

confirmed.21 Now, however, American researchers\u2014not Nazis\u2014were calling <\/span><\/p>\n

the matter “urgent,\u201d and the news media were reporting it.22 “Cancer by the <\/span><\/p>\n

carton\u201d was not a slogan the tobacco industry would embrace.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Typical case of guilt by association. Im still waiting for eugenics to be free from that association, just like anti-smoking is today, and vegetarianism, etc.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

C. C. Little was a renowned geneticist, a member of the U.S. National <\/span><\/p>\n

Academy of Sciences and former president of the University of Michigan.34 <\/span><\/p>\n

But he was also well outside the mainstream of scientific thinking. In the <\/span><\/p>\n

1930s, Little had been a strong supporter of eugenics\u2014the idea that soci\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ety should actively improve its gene pool by encouraging breeding by the <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cfit\u201d and discouraging or preventing breeding by the \u201cunfit.\u201d His views <\/span><\/p>\n

were not particularly unusual in the 1920s\u2014they were shared by many <\/span><\/p>\n

scientists and politicians including President Theodore Roosevelt\u2014but <\/span><\/p>\n

nearly everyone abandoned eugenics in the \u201940s when the Nazis made <\/span><\/p>\n

manifest where that sort of thinking could lead. Little, however, remained <\/span><\/p>\n

convinced that essentially all human traits were genetically based, includ\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing vulnerability to cancer. For him, the cause of cancer was genetic weak\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ness, not smoking.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Well, there is no ‘the’ cause of cancer, unless one thinks of things like the breakdown of apoptosis<\/a>, i.e. programmed cell death (cells kill themselves when they detect genetic anomalies in themselves, a process which necessarily has to be disabled for cancer to spread, otherwise it just kills itself).<\/p>\n

\n

The treatment of eugenics above is also unfair. See e.g.: https:\/\/www.goodreads.com\/book\/show\/2258889.Future_Human_Evolution?ac=1<\/a><\/p>\n

http:\/\/whatwemaybe.org\/<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

And surely genetics has a lot to do with cancer. I havent looked into the issue before, but i did a quick check for a twin study on the heritability of lung cancer. I found this:<\/p>\n

\n

Lichtenstein, Paul, et al. “Environmental and heritable factors in the causation of cancer\u2014analyses of<\/p>\n

cohorts of twins from Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.” New England Journal of Medicine<\/em> 343.2 (2000): 78-85.<\/p>\n

\n

SCREENSHOT<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Bolin and his Swedish colleagues had made \u201cmass balance arguments\u201d : <\/span><\/p>\n

they considered how much sulfur could be supplied by the three largest <\/span><\/p>\n

known sources\u2014pollution, volcanoes, and sea spray\u2014and compared this <\/span><\/p>\n

with how much sulfur was falling as acid rain. Since there are no active vol\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

canoes in northern Europe, and sea spray doesn\u2019t travel very far, they de\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

duced that most of the acid rain in northern Europe had to come from air <\/span><\/p>\n

pollution. Still, this was an indirect argument. To really prove the point, <\/span><\/p>\n

you\u2019d want to show that the actual sulfur in actual acid rain came from a <\/span><\/p>\n

known pollution source. Fortunately there was a way to do this\u2014using <\/span><\/p>\n

isotopes.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Scientists love isotopes\u2014atoms of the same element with different <\/span><\/p>\n

atomic weights, like carbon-12 and carbon-14\u2014because they are excep\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tionally useful. I f they are radioactive and decay over time\u2014like carbon- <\/span><\/p>\n

14\u2014they can be used to determine the age of objects, like fossils and <\/span><\/p>\n

archeological relics. I f they are stable, like carbon-13\u2014or sulfur-34\u2014they<\/span><\/p>\n

can be used to figure out where the carbon or sulfur has come from.19 Dif\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ferent sources of sulfur have different amounts of sulfur-34, so you can <\/span><\/p>\n

use the sulfur isotope content as a \u201cfingerprint” or \u201csignature\u201d of a partic\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ular source, either natural or man-made. In 1978, Canadian scientists <\/span><\/p>\n

showed that the isotopic signature of sulfur in acid rain in Sudbury was <\/span><\/p>\n

identical to the sulfur in the nickel minerals being mined there. In later <\/span><\/p>\n

years, some skeptics would argue that the acid in acid rain came from vol\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

canoes (they would say the same about fluorine and ozone depletion, and <\/span><\/p>\n

about C0 2 and global warming), but the isotope analysis showed that couldn’t <\/span><\/p>\n

be true.20 In any case there are no active volcanoes in Ontario.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

pretty cool.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Political Action and the U.S.-Canadian Rift<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In 1979, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe passed the <\/span><\/p>\n

Convention on Long-range Transboundary Pollution. Based on the Decla\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment\u2014the one for <\/span><\/p>\n

which Bert Bolin’s report had been prepared\u2014the convention insisted that <\/span><\/p>\n

all nations have responsibility to \u201censure that activities within their juris\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

diction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states <\/span><\/p>\n

or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.\u201d24 Henceforth, it would <\/span><\/p>\n

be illegal to dump your pollution on someone else, whether you did it with <\/span><\/p>\n

trucks or with smokestacks.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Classic case of negative externalities. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Externality#Negative<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Like most of his colleagues, Singer believed there was a need for more <\/span><\/p>\n

science, but in 1970 he argued that one cannot always wait to act until mat\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ters are proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. Singer cited the famous essay <\/span><\/p>\n

“The Tragedy of the Commons,\u201d in which biologist Garrett Hardin argued <\/span><\/p>\n

that individuals acting in their rational self-interest may undermine the <\/span><\/p>\n

common good, and warned against assuming that technology would save <\/span><\/p>\n

us from ourselves. ” If we ignore the present warning signs and wait for an <\/span><\/p>\n

ecological disaster to strike, it will probably be too late,\u201d Singer noted. He <\/span><\/p>\n

imagined what it must have been like to be Noah, surrounded by “compla\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cent compatriots,\u201d saying,” ‘Don\u2019t worry about the rising waters, Noah; our <\/span><\/p>\n

advanced technology will surely discover a substitute for breathing\/ If it <\/span><\/p>\n

was wisdom that enabled Noah to believe in the ‘never-yet-happened, \u2019 we <\/span><\/p>\n

could use some of that wisdom now,\u201d Singer concluded.63<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

But prevention is usually cheaper than clearing up afterwards. So it is better to prevent if one can.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Singer also presumed that the costs were mostly accrued in the present, <\/span><\/p>\n

but the benefits in the future, and therefore the latter had to be discounted <\/span><\/p>\n

in order to make them commensurate with the former. (That is to say, a <\/span><\/p>\n

dollar in the future is not worth as much to you as a dollar now, so you <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cdiscount” its value in your planning and decision making. How much <\/span><\/p>\n

you discount it depends in part on inflation, but also in part on how much <\/span><\/p>\n

you value the future.) Discounting would later become a huge issue in as\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

sessing the costs and benefits of stopping global warming, as long-term <\/span><\/p>\n

risks can be quickly written off with a sufficiently high discount rate.111<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Im pretty sure there is a name for this kind of bias, but i cant recall its name or find it on Wikipedia’s list. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_cognitive_biases<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

In later years, emissions trading would be used to reduce acid pollution\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

and today many people are looking to such a system to control the green\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

house gases that cause global warming. Yet economists (and ordinary <\/span><\/p>\n

people) know that markets do not always work.114 Indeed, many economists <\/span><\/p>\n

would say that pollution is a prime example of market failure: its collateral <\/span><\/p>\n

damage is a hidden cost not reflected in the price of a given good or service. <\/span><\/p>\n

Milton Friedman\u2014the modem guru of free market capitalism\u2014had a name <\/span><\/p>\n

for such costs (albeit an innocuous one): he called them \u201cneighborhood <\/span><\/p>\n

effects.\u201d115<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Or \u201dnegative externalities\u201d.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

David Hounshell is one of America\u2019s leading historians of technology. <\/span><\/p>\n

Recently he and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon University have turned <\/span><\/p>\n

their attention to the question of regulation and technological innovation. <\/span><\/p>\n

In an article published in 2005, “Regulation as the Mother of Innovation,\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n

based on the Ph.D. research of Hounshell\u2019s student, Margaret Taylor, they <\/span><\/p>\n

examined the question of what drives innovation in environmental control <\/span><\/p>\n

technology. It is well established that the lack of immediate financial bene\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

fits leads companies to underinvest in R & D, and this general problem is <\/span><\/p>\n

particularly severe when it comes to pollution control. Because pollution <\/span><\/p>\n

prevention is a public good\u2014not well reflected in the market price of <\/span><\/p>\n

goods and services\u2014the incentives for private investment are weak. Com\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

petitive forces just don\u2019t provide enough justification for the long-term in\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

vestment required; there is a lack of driving demand. However, when <\/span><\/p>\n

government establishes a regulation, it creates demand. I f companies know <\/span><\/p>\n

they have to meet a firm regulation with a definite deadline, they respond\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

and innovate. The net result may even be cost savings for the companies, as <\/span><\/p>\n

obsolete technologies are replaced with state-of-the art ones, yet the com\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

panies would not have bothered to make the change had they not been <\/span><\/p>\n

forced to.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

That is unexpected under a rational choice theory of companies. Are companies also irrational?<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Satellites don’t just \u201ccollect” data in the way that nineteenth-century ge\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ologists collected rocks or biologists collected butterflies; they detect sig\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

nals and process them. The electronics and computer software involved <\/span><\/p>\n

are very complex and sometimes things go awry, so procedures are in\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cluded for screening and rejecting \u201cbad\u201d data. This was the case here. The <\/span><\/p>\n

satellite processing software contained computer code designed to flag <\/span><\/p>\n

ozone concentrations below a certain level\u2014180 Dobson units\u2014as unre- <\/span><\/p>\n

alistically low, and therefore probably bad data.44 Concentrations that low <\/span><\/p>\n

had never been detected in the stratosphere and could not be generated by <\/span><\/p>\n

any existing theoretical model, so it seemed like a reasonable choice. <\/span><\/p>\n

When some of the Antarctic ozone retrievals had come in well below 180, <\/span><\/p>\n

they were catalogued as errors. The instrument’s science team had a map<\/span><\/p>\n

that showed the errors concentrated over the Antarctic in October, but they <\/span><\/p>\n

had ignored it, assuming the instrument was faulty. A healthy skepticism <\/span><\/p>\n

about their machinery led them to dismiss crucial data.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

When Stolarski double-checked, he found that the depleted region <\/span><\/p>\n

covered all of Antarctica\u2014and the “ozone hole\u201d was bom. It wasrft an instru\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ment error. It was a real phenomenon. It had been detected by the satellites. <\/span><\/p>\n

And it defied expectation.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

That is why one does not program such things into the primary data collectors. In general, discarding data is bad bad bad, and any such process shud be explicit.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Officially the mission of the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution is to pro\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

mote democracy; in 1993 the Institution decided to promote democracy <\/span><\/p>\n

by defending secondhand smoke. \u201cEPA and the Science of Environ\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

mental Tobacco Smoke\u201d was written by Fred Singer and Kent Jeffreys.75 The <\/span><\/p>\n

Tocqueville Institution had anointed Jeffreys with the title of \u201cadjunct scholar,\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n

but he was in fact a lawyer affiliated with the Cato Institute, the Competi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tive Enterprise Institute, and the Republican Party. He was well-known for <\/span><\/p>\n

his attacks on Superfund\u2014the federal fund designed to pay for the cleanup <\/span><\/p>\n

of toxic waste sites\u2014and for his advocacy of \u201cfree-market environmental\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ism.\u201d One of his slogans was \u201cbehind every tree should stand a private . . . <\/span><\/p>\n

owner.\u201d To prevent overfishing, Jeffreys wanted to privatize the oceans.76<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The defense of secondhand smoke was part of a larger report criticizing <\/span><\/p>\n

the EPA over radon, pesticides, and the Superfund, but the center of it\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

and the focus of the accompanying press releases\u2014was what Singer and <\/span><\/p>\n

Jeffreys called \u201cCase Study No. 1: Environmental Tobacco Smoke.\u201d It be\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

gan by accusing the federal government of seeking a ban on smoking\u2014 <\/span><\/p>\n

although there was no pending legislation to do so\u2014and asserting that the <\/span><\/p>\n

vehicle of the alleged ban would be the EPA. But the EPA had not asked <\/span><\/p>\n

for a ban, so how did Singer and Jeffreys build their case? By asserting that <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cscientific standards were seriously violated in order to produce a report to <\/span><\/p>\n

ban smoking in public settings.\u201d77 What was the alleged violation? The <\/span><\/p>\n

EPA panel had assumed a linear dose-response curve. They had assumed <\/span><\/p>\n

the risk was directly proportional to the exposure.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Singer and Jeffreys argued that the EPA should have assumed a \u201cthresh\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

old effect”\u2014that doses below a certain level would have no effect. Citing the <\/span><\/p>\n

old adage \u201cthe dose makes the poison,\u201d they insisted that there might be a <\/span><\/p>\n

threshold value below which no harm occurred. Since the EPA had failed to <\/span><\/p>\n

provide proof that this wasn\u2019t so, the linear-dose response assumption was <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cflawed.\u201d78<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A threshold model is indeed possible, and one cannot just assume a linear non-threshold model. Not for smoke and not for radiation either. One needs data points that establishes the LNT model before one can use it for predicting things.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

The real culprit in smoking, Seitz argued, was smoke, and this was “no <\/span><\/p>\n

more wanted by smokers than coffee grounds by cappuccino addicts or a <\/span><\/p>\n

hangover by drinkers of red wine.\u201d So Seitz suggested that the U.S. gov\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ernment should figure out how to remove the smoke from cigarettes. <\/span><\/p>\n

“Only one-tenth of one percent of a cigarette is nicotine, and it should not <\/span><\/p>\n

take a rocket scientist to devise a means to volatilizing that small drop of <\/span><\/p>\n

active ingredient without generating a thousand times its weight in burn\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing leaves.\u201d122 Seitz was proposing that the government should spend tax\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

payer money figuring out how to safely deliver nicotine\u2014an addictive and <\/span><\/p>\n

toxic substance\u2014to the American people.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

This sort of exigent approach might make sense for methadone since it <\/span><\/p>\n

helps people get off heroin, whose dangers to individuals and society are <\/span><\/p>\n

both grave and immediate. But what public good would be served by the <\/span><\/p>\n

government deliberately enabling people to continue to smoke?<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The authors apparently do not understand harm reduction. The goal is not to stop people from smoking. The goal is to reduce harmful effects. If one can invest less dangerous alternatives, this is a great idea. Some people will never give up their nicotine dependence, and the only way to reduce harm for them without overly draconic regulation (banning smoking, and with a huge surveillance society to back it up), is to have less harmful alternatives.<\/p>\n

\n

See also: https:\/\/christianengstrom.wordpress.com\/2013\/03\/07\/snus-helps-reduce-smoking-related-deaths-in-sweden\/<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

http:\/\/www.clivebates.com\/?p=434<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

The Global Climate Coalition meanwhile had circulated a report enti\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

tled \u201cThe IPCC: Institutionalized Scientific Cleansing\u201d to reporters, mem\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

bers of Congress, and some scientists. By chance, anthropologist Myanna <\/span><\/p>\n

Lahsen interviewed Nierenberg about his \u201cskepticism\u201d about global warm\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ing two weeks before the Working Group I Report was published, and <\/span><\/p>\n

found that he had a copy of the coalition report. He had evidently accepted <\/span><\/p>\n

its veracity, even though there was no way to compare its claims against <\/span><\/p>\n

the real chapter 8 (since the latter had not yet been released). He quoted its <\/span><\/p>\n

claims to Lahsen, telling her that the revisions had \u201cjust altered the whole <\/span><\/p>\n

meaning of the document. Without permission of the authors.\u201d Moreover, <\/span><\/p>\n

he claimed, \u201cAnything that would imply the current status of knowledge is <\/span><\/p>\n

so poor that you can’t do anything is struck out.\u201d 144 That was hardly true; <\/span><\/p>\n

Santer7 s panel had included six pages of discussion of uncertainty in the fi\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

nal text. But Bill Nierenberg knew all about altering scientific reports for <\/span><\/p>\n

political reasons, so perhaps he followed the adage that the best defense is<\/span><\/p>\n

offense. Or perhaps he was guilty of \u201cmirror imaging,\u201d as Team B had <\/span><\/p>\n

accused the CIA of in 1976: assuming that his opponents thought and op\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

erated the way he did.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The term for this is projection bias. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Projection_bias<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

Ignore the Freudian crap.<\/p>\n

\n

–<\/p>\n

\n

Fred Singer gave his game away when he denied the reality of the ozone <\/span><\/p>\n

hole, suggesting that people involved in the issue “probably [have]. . . <\/span><\/p>\n

hidden agendas of their own\u2014not just to ‘save the environment” but to <\/span><\/p>\n

change our economic system . . . Some of these ‘coercive Utopians\u2019 are so\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

cialists, some are technology-hating Luddites; most have a great desire to <\/span><\/p>\n

regulate\u2014on as large a scale as possible.\u201d33 He revealed a similar anxiety <\/span><\/p>\n

in his defense of secondhand smoke: ” I f we do not carefully delineate the <\/span><\/p>\n

government*s role in regulating [danger]. . . there is essentially no limit to <\/span><\/p>\n

how much government can ultimately control our lives.\u201d34 Today tobacco, <\/span><\/p>\n

tomorrow the Bill of Rights. Milton Friedman said much the same in Cap\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

italism and Freedom: that economic freedom is as important as civic free\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

dom, because i f you lose one, it is only a matter of time before you lose the <\/span><\/p>\n

other.35 And so one must defend free markets with the same vigor and vig\u00ad<\/span><\/p>\n

ilance as free speech, free religion, and free assembly.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

He wasnt completely wrong about this. There is a crazy amount of overregulation in some areas, altho probably not in the areas he was complaining about here.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I hadnt planned on reading this book, just saw a random comment about it on a discussion board. I figured i might as well read it since i found a free pdf: http:\/\/bookos.org\/book\/1249598\/3e9299 The book turned out to be moderately interesting. It is mostly about the history of denying pollution problems, usually by marked-friendly people. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1946],"tags":[2021,1920,1947,1067],"class_list":["post-3948","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-political-science","tag-climate-science","tag-energy-science","tag-history","tag-review","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3948","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3948"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3948\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3949,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3948\/revisions\/3949"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3948"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3948"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3948"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}