{"id":4439,"date":"2014-10-21T22:57:06","date_gmt":"2014-10-21T21:57:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/?p=4439"},"modified":"2014-10-21T22:57:06","modified_gmt":"2014-10-21T21:57:06","slug":"meisenbergs-new-book-chapter-on-intelligence-economics-and-other-stuff","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/2014\/10\/meisenbergs-new-book-chapter-on-intelligence-economics-and-other-stuff\/","title":{"rendered":"Meisenberg’s new book chapter on intelligence, economics and other stuff"},"content":{"rendered":"

G.M. IQ & Economic growth<\/a><\/p>\n

I noted down some comments while reading it.<\/p>\n

—<\/p>\n

In Table 1, Dominican birth cohort is reversed.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201c0.70 and 0.80 in world-wide country samples. Figure 1 gives an impression of<\/p>\n

this relationship.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Figure 1 shows regional IQs, not GDP relationships.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe still depend on these descriptive methods of quantitative genetics because<\/p>\n

only a small proportion of individual variation in general intelligence and<\/p>\n

school achievement can be explained by known genetic polymorphisms (e.g.,<\/p>\n

Piffer, 2013a,b; Rietveld et al, 2013).\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

We don’t. Modern BG studies can confirm A^2 estimates directly from the genes.<\/p>\n

E.g.:<\/p>\n

Davies, G., Tenesa, A., Payton, A., Yang, J., Harris, S. E., Liewald, D., … & Deary, I. J. (2011). Genome-wide association studies establish that human intelligence is highly heritable and polygenic. Molecular psychiatry<\/i>, 16<\/i>(10), 996-1005.<\/p>\n

Marioni, R. E., Davies, G., Hayward, C., Liewald, D., Kerr, S. M., Campbell, A., … & Deary, I. J. (2014). Molecular genetic contributions to socioeconomic status and intelligence. Intelligence<\/i>, 44<\/i>, 26-32.<\/p>\n

Results are fairly low tho, in the 20’s, presumably due to non-additive heritability and rarer genes.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cEven in modern societies, the heritability of<\/p>\n

intelligence tends to be higher for children from higher socioeconomic status<\/p>\n

(SES) families (Turkheimer et al, 2003; cf. Nagoshi and Johnson, 2005; van<\/p>\n

der Sluis et al, 2008). Where this is observed, most likely environmental<\/p>\n

conditions are of similar high quality for most high-SES children but are more<\/p>\n

variable for low-SES children. \u201c<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Or maybe not. There are also big studies that don’t find this interaction effect. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Heritability_of_IQ#Heritability_and_socioeconomic_status<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cSchooling has<\/p>\n

only a marginal effect on growth when intelligence is included, consistent with<\/p>\n

earlier results by Weede & K\u00e4mpf (2002) and Ram (2007).\u201d<\/p>\n

In the regression model of all countries, schooling has a larger beta than IQ does (.158 and .125). But these appear to be unstandardized values, so they are not readily comparable.<\/p>\n

\u201cAlso, earlier studies that took account of<\/p>\n

earnings and cognitive test scores of migrants in the host country or IQs in<\/p>\n

wealthy oil countries have concluded that there is a substantial causal effect of<\/p>\n

IQ on earnings and productivity (Christainsen, 2013; Jones & Schneider,<\/p>\n

2010)\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

National IQs were also found to predict migrant income, as well as most other socioeconomic traits, in Denmark and Norway (and Finland and the Netherland).<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a><\/a> Kirkegaard, E. O. W. (2014). Crime, income, educational attainment and employment among immigrant groups in Norway and Finland<\/a>. Open Differential Psychology.<\/i><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/a><\/a><\/a> Kirkegaard, E. O. W., & Fuerst, J. (2014). Educational attainment, income, use of social benefits, crime rate and the general socioeconomic factor among 71 immigrant groups in Denmark<\/a>. Open Differential Psychology.<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Figures 3 A-C are of too low quality.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

–<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cAllocation of capital resources has been an<\/p>\n

element of classical growth theory (Solow, 1956). Human capital theory<\/p>\n

emphasizes that individuals with higher intelligence tend to have lower<\/p>\n

impulsivity and lower time preference (Shamosh & Gray, 2008). This is<\/p>\n

predicted to lead to higher savings rates and greater resource allocation to<\/p>\n

investment relative to consumption in countries with higher average<\/p>\n

intelligence.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Time preference data for 45 countries are given by:<\/p>\n

Wang, M., Rieger, M. O., & Hens, T. (2011). How time preferences differ: evidence from 45 countries.<\/p>\n

They are in the megadataset<\/a> from version 1.7f<\/p>\n

Correlations among some variables of interest:<\/p>\n

r\r\n<\/a>             SlowTimePref Income.in.DK Income.in.NO   IQ lgGDP<\/span><\/span>\r\nSlowTimePref         1.00         0.45         0.48 0.57  0.64\r\nIncome.in.DK         0.45         1.00         0.89 0.55  0.59\r\nIncome.in.NO         0.48         0.89         1.00 0.65  0.66\r\nIQ                   0.57         0.55         0.65 1.00  0.72\r\nlgGDP                0.64         0.59         0.66 0.72  1.00\r\n\r\nn\r\n             SlowTimePref Income.in.DK Income.in.NO  IQ lgGDP<\/span><\/span>\r\nSlowTimePref          273           32           12  45    40\r\nIncome.in.DK           32          273           20  68    58\r\nIncome.in.NO           12           20          273  23    20\r\nIQ                     45           68           23 273   169\r\nlgGDP                  40           58           20 169   273<\/pre>\n
So time prefs predict income in DK and NO only slightly worse than national IQs or lgGDP.<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
–<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
\u201cAnother possible mediator of intelligence effects that is difficult to<\/p>\n
measure at the country level is the willingness and ability to cooperate. A<\/p>\n
review by Jones (2008) shows that cooperativeness, measured in the Prisoner\u201fs<\/p>\n
dilemma game, is positively related to intelligence. This correlate of<\/p>\n
intelligence may explain some of the relationship of intelligence with<\/p>\n
governance. Other likely mediators of the intelligence effect include less red<\/p>\n
tape and restrictions on economic activities (\u201ceconomic freedom\u201d), higher<\/p>\n
savings and\/or investment, and technology adoption in developing countries.\u201d<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
There are data for IQ and trust too. Presumably trust is closely related to willingness to cooperate.<\/p>\n
Carl, N. (2014). Does intelligence explain the association between generalized trust and economic development? Intelligence<\/i>, 47<\/i>, 83\u201392. doi:10.1016\/j.intell.2014.08.008<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
–<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
\u201cThere is no psychometric evidence for rising intelligence before that time<\/p>\n
because IQ tests were introduced only during the first decade of the 20th<\/p>\n
century, but literacy rates were rising steadily after the end of the Middle Age<\/p>\n
in all European countries for which we have evidence (Mitch, 1992; Stone,<\/p>\n
1969), and the number of books printed per capita kept rising (Baten & van<\/p>\n
Zanden, 2008).\u201d<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
There’s also age heaping scores which are a crude measure of numeracy. AH scores for 1800 to 1970 are in the megadataset. They have been going up for centuries too just like literacy scores. See:<\/p>\n
A\u2019Hearn, B., Baten, J., & Crayen, D. (2009). Quantifying quantitative literacy: Age heaping and the history of human capital. The Journal of Economic History<\/i>, 69<\/i>(03), 783\u2013808.<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
–<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
\u201cWhy did this spiral of economic and cognitive growth take off in Europe<\/p>\n
rather than somewhere else, and why did it not happen earlier, for example in<\/p>\n
classical Athens or the Roman Empire? One part of the answer is that this<\/p>\n
process can start only when technologies are already in place to translate rising<\/p>\n
economic output into rising intelligence. The minimal requirements are a<\/p>\n
writing system that is simple enough to be learned by everyone without undue<\/p>\n
effort, and a means to produce and disseminate written materials: paper, and<\/p>\n
the printing press. The first requirement had been present in Europe and the<\/p>\n
Middle East (but not China) since antiquity, and the second was in place in<\/p>\n
Europe from the 15thcentury. The Arabs had learned both paper-making and<\/p>\n
printing from the Chinese in the 13thcentury (Carter, 1955), but showed little<\/p>\n
interest in books. Their civilization was entering into terminal decline at about<\/p>\n
that time (Huff, 1993). \u201c<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
Are there no FLynn effects in China? They still have a difficult writing system.<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
\u201cMost important is that Flynn effect gains have been decelerating in recent<\/p>\n
years. Recent losses (anti-Flynn effects) were noted in Britain, Denmark,<\/p>\n
Norway and Finland. Results for the Scandinavian countries are based on<\/p>\n
comprehensive IQ testing of military conscripts aged 18-19. Evidence for<\/p>\n
losses among British teenagers is derived from the Raven test (Flynn, 2009)<\/p>\n
and Piagetian tests (Shayer & Ginsburg, 2009). These observations suggest<\/p>\n
that for cohorts born after about 1980, the Flynn effect is ending or has ended<\/p>\n
in many and perhaps most of the economically most advanced countries.<\/p>\n
Messages from the United States are mixed, with some studies reporting<\/p>\n
continuing gains (Flynn, 2012) and others no change (Beaujean & Osterlind,<\/p>\n
2008).\u201d<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
These are confounded with immigration of low-g migrants however. Maybe the FLynn effect is still there, just being masked by dysgenics + low-g immigration.<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
–<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
\u201cThe unsustainability of this situation is obvious. Estimating that one third<\/p>\n
of the present IQ differences between countries can be attributed to genetics,<\/p>\n
and adding this to the consequences of dysgenic fertility within countries,<\/p>\n
leaves us with a genetic decline of between 1 and 2 IQ points per generation<\/p>\n
for the entire world population. This decline is still more than offset by Flynn<\/p>\n
effects in less developed countries, and the average IQ of the world\u201fs<\/p>\n
population is still rising. This phase of history will end when today\u201fs<\/p>\n
developing countries reach the end of the Flynn effect. \u201cPeak IQ\u201d can<\/p>\n
reasonably be expected in cohorts born around the mid-21stcentury. The<\/p>\n
assumptions of the peak IQ prediction are that (1) Flynn effects are limited by<\/p>\n
genetic endowments, (2) some countries are approaching their genetic limits<\/p>\n
already, and others will fiollow, and (3) today\u201fs patterns of differential fertility<\/p>\n
favoring the less intelligent will persist into the foreseeable future. \u201c<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
It is possible that embryo selection for higher g will kick in and change this.<\/p>\n
Shulman, C., & Bostrom, N. (2014). Embryo Selection for Cognitive Enhancement: Curiosity or Game-changer? Global Policy<\/i>, 5<\/i>(1), 85\u201392. doi:10.1111\/1758-5899.12123<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
–<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
\u201cFertility differentials between countries lead to replacement migration: the<\/p>\n
movement of people from high-fertility countries to low-fertility countries,<\/p>\n
with gradual replacement of the native populations in the low-fertility<\/p>\n
countries (Coleman, 2002). The economic consequences depend on the<\/p>\n
quality of the migrants and their descendants. Educational, cognitive and<\/p>\n
economic outcomes of migrants are influenced heavily by prevailing<\/p>\n
educational, cognitive and economic levels in the country of origin (Caraba\u00f1a,<\/p>\n
2011; Kirkegaard, 2013; Levels & Dronkers, 2008), and by the selectivity of<\/p>\n
migration. Brain drain from poor to prosperous countries is extensive already,<\/p>\n
for example among scientists (Franzoni, Scellato & Stephan, 2012; Hunter,<\/p>\n
Oswald & Charlton, 2009). \u201c<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n
There are quite a few more papers on the spatial transferability hypothesis. I have 5 papers on this alone in ODP: http:\/\/openpsych.net\/ODP\/tag\/country-of-origin\/<\/a><\/p>\n
But there’s also yet unpublished data for crime in Netherlands<\/a> and more crime data for Norway<\/a>. Papers based off these data are on their way.<\/p>\n
 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
G.M. IQ & Economic growth I noted down some comments while reading it. — In Table 1, Dominican birth cohort is reversed.   \u201c0.70 and 0.80 in world-wide country samples. Figure 1 gives an impression of this relationship.\u201d   Figure 1 shows regional IQs, not GDP relationships. \u201cWe still depend on these descriptive methods of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1839,1898,1937,1690,2591,1921],"tags":[1912,2031,1947],"class_list":["post-4439","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-psychometics","category-economics","category-education-science","category-genetics","category-intelligence-iq-cognitive-ability","category-sociology","tag-eugenics-genetics","tag-growth","tag-history","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4439","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4439"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4439\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4441,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4439\/revisions\/4441"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4439"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4439"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/emilkirkegaard.dk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}