Swartz on fuzzy concepts
"Trying to define “classical music” in a short phrase (or a few sentences) is a forlorn task. The very attempt is the product of an outmoded and insupportable theory of…
Are contradictions meaningful?
Introduction In this essay I answer the question in the title with a very confident “Yes”, I give multiple arguments for this answer. For the purposes of this essay a…
Bachelors and essential properties
When explaining the distinction between essential and accidental properties bachelors are often used. The idea of essential properties is this: The distinction between essential versus accidental properties has been characterized…
Something about Moore’s ‘paradox’
Wiki. Source. Kennethamy: Well, here is an example: in English we use the terms, "believe" and "know" very differently, from which we can infer that there is a difference between…
The contagiosity of meaninglessness – formalised for propositional logic
In an earlier essay I mentioned that that meaninglessness is contagious with respect to sentences. One can pretty easily formulate the principle in normal english - if a sentence is…
Sentence theories of truth, meaningless sentences and untrue sentences
By sentence theory I just mean a theory of truth carriers that implies that some sentences are true or some are false. Not necessarily a monist sentence theory (=theory that…
Translating “x believe(s) in y” into “x believes that z”
For some reason some people get these wrong. Phrase Translated phrase “I believe in God” “I believe that God exists” “I do not believe in God” “I do not believe…
Quine’s On What There Is
Is it worth reading if you are interested in meaningfulness, contradictions, names and ontological arguments. W.v.O. Quine - On what there is
The phrase “so-called …” and the correct use of language without knowing the conditions for correct use
Consider the phrase in the title in this paragraph: “each has a thumb, followed in order by four fingers: the index (or forefinger), the middle, the third, and the so-called…
Norman Swartz on the omniword “thing”
From Beyond Experience, p. 157: "The term “ things ” here is meant in a very broad, inclusive sense. On this interpretation, “ things ” will include, of course, the…