Emil O. W. Kirkegaard blog
The much mentioned the modal fallacy is not a fallacy (that is, is a valid inference rule) if one accepts an exotic view about modalities and necessities that is logically implied by a particular understanding of infallible knowledge and a knower. Infallible knowledge Some people seem to think that some known things are false and…
Continue ReadingKennethamy in response to something about certainty: I did not say there was such a thing as objective certainty. I said objective certainty was what Descartes was aiming at, not subjective or psychological certainty. He did not care about that. People feel certain about all sorts of things, about which they later turn out to…
Continue ReadingIt is common to speak of true beliefs. As an example think of the JTB analyses of knowledge. JTB, that is, justified true belief. One could see “true belief” as a shorthand for “a belief in a true proposition”. This seems to be the case. It is common to call the theory for the JTB…
Continue ReadingI have had some additional thoughts about this after discussing it with fast here. First fast asks: “You said, “a sentence is true [if and only if] it expresses exactly one proposition and that proposition is true. I don’t understand the reasoning behind the “exactly one” condition as you have worded it. An implication of…
Continue Reading[Update 11/22/09] I note that Ben actually talked about this principle in a post on his blog, “if it’s reasonable to believe a bunch of premises, it’s also reasonable to (on the basis of the logical connection) believe the conclusions that can be validly inferred from those premises”, [/update] I have recently been discussing Gettier’s…
Continue ReadingBen Burgis over at (Blog&~Blog) has commented on my essay about the monist sentence theory of truth bearers. I have some comments on his comments. Aha! Let the comment wars begin. Ben makes three somewhat related points. I have comments only for the two first. The first point Here’s what he had to say: (1)…
Continue ReadingIt seems to me that monist sentence theories are too implausible, but might it not nonetheless be the case that some sentences are true/false? In this essay I will discuss sentences as secondary truth bearers. Pragmatic value I can see that it has some pragmatic value to say that sentences are also sometimes true/false in…
Continue ReadingThe truth bearers are the kind of entities that have the property true. It is thought that it is the same kind of entities that have the property false too. They are sometimes referred to as the bearers of truth/falsity. I shall just refer to them as “truth bearers”. Theories of truth bearers There are…
Continue ReadingI think there are numerous problems with the sentence theory of truth bearers. Here I will touch on one problem, that is, the problem of ambiguity. I start by assuming the sentence theory of truth bearers. The problem Consider the sentence: S. It is logically possible that I exist and that I do not exist….
Continue ReadingA rewrite of an earlier article “two kinds of certainty”. – A quick explanation of two types of certainty that people tend to confuse. Psychological certainty The first is the one we typically mean in normal language. It’s called psychological certainty. It’s a feeling of certainty; A confidence in something. This is the one we’re…
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