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Monthly Archives: November 2009

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Infallible knowledge, the modal fallacy and modal collapse

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:28. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:2 Comments

The much mentioned the modal fallacy is not a fallacy (that is, is a valid inference rule) if one accepts an exotic view about modalities and necessities that is logically…

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Dialogue – Kennethamy and Emil

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:28. November 2009
  • Post category:Epistemology/Humor/Multilogues
  • Post comments:0 Comments

Kennethamy in response to something about certainty: I did not say there was such a thing as objective certainty. I said objective certainty was what Descartes was aiming at, not…

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Beliefs as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:21. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:0 Comments

It is common to speak of true beliefs. As an example think of the JTB analyses of knowledge. JTB, that is, justified true belief. One could see “true belief” as…

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Sentences as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory #2

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:21. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:2 Comments

I have had some additional thoughts about this after discussing it with fast here. First fast asks: “You said, "a sentence is true [if and only if] it expresses exactly…

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A justification principle about logical implication

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:21. November 2009
  • Post category:Epistemology
  • Post comments:0 Comments

[Update 11/22/09] I note that Ben actually talked about this principle in a post on his blog, “if it’s reasonable to believe a bunch of premises, it’s also reasonable to…

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The sentence theory of truth bearers – the problem of ambiguity #2

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:19. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:4 Comments

Ben Burgis over at (Blog&~Blog) has commented on my essay about the monist sentence theory of truth bearers. I have some comments on his comments. Aha! Let the comment wars…

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Sentences as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:18. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:0 Comments

It seems to me that monist sentence theories are too implausible, but might it not nonetheless be the case that some sentences are true/false? In this essay I will discuss…

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Truth bearers

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:18. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:0 Comments

The truth bearers are the kind of entities that have the property true. It is thought that it is the same kind of entities that have the property false too.…

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The sentence theory of truth bearers – the problem of ambiguity

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:18. November 2009
  • Post category:Uncategorized
  • Post comments:0 Comments

I think there are numerous problems with the sentence theory of truth bearers. Here I will touch on one problem, that is, the problem of ambiguity. I start by assuming…

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Psychological and epistemic certainty

  • Post author:Emil O. W. Kirkegaard
  • Post published:17. November 2009
  • Post category:Epistemology
  • Post comments:0 Comments

A rewrite of an earlier article "two kinds of certainty". - A quick explanation of two types of certainty that people tend to confuse. Psychological certainty The first is the…

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